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Harold [Wilson] said he had invented the concept of output per 
man-shift and even the concept of productivity which had been a 
theoretical concept before but he had got it extended over all 
industry. A terrible thing to have on his conscience. 
(Tony Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries 1973-76, London: 1989, 
p. 506) 
instead of fussing about glaring and conspicuous evils, squalor and 
injustice and distressed areas ... [democratic socialists] have to fuss 
about the balance of payments, and incentives, and higher 
productivity. 
(C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, London: 1956, p. 99) 
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Chapter 1 
British industry, state intervention 
and Labour politics, 1900-39 
The theme of relative industrial and economic decline dominates the 
historiography of twentieth-century Britain. Whilst there is little 
agreement on the precise character, scope, timing, let alone causes, of 
this decline, its central importance in shaping British society seems 
indisputable. 1 
Explanations for this process have ranged over almost every feature 
of the economy and wider society, these interpretations seemingly being 
themselves subject to cycles of support and disavowal. Indeed, 
historical explanations have also frequently been linked to contem-
porary ideological and political concerns. In the 1960s and 1970s, for 
example, much emphasis was put on low investment rates as a key 
problem, in tum often related to the alleged focus of British ruling 
groups on external economic goals (such as foreign investment and a 
strong currency) at the expense of the interests of industry.2 
In the 1980s two kinds of hypothesis tended to dominate. On the one 
hand 'cultural' explanations, especially those associated with the names 
of Martin Wiener and Corelli Barnett, created a 'Thatcherite' history of 
economic decline, linked to the alleged atrophying of entrepreneurial 
spirit and an excessive political concern with social welfare at the 
expense of industry.3 Accompanying this a less politically fashionable 
but more firmly historically grounded literature emerged, which saw 
economic failure as a consequence of political blockage, the absence of 
a state giving priority to industrial modernisation. This view was best 
summarised by Marquand, who concluded that 'Unlike its counterparts 
on the mainland of Europe and in Japan, Britain's political class had 
never managed - even in its interventionist periods - to create an 
entrepreneurial or developmental state' ,4 though similar views, albeit 
with varying ideological glosses, appeared in a range of work. 5 Some of 
the themes raised here could be found in earlier investigations, which 
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argued that throughout the twentieth century policy had been 
excessively either externally oriented or attuned to domestic macro-
economic goals. However, the originality and insightfulness of the new 
writing stemmed from its emphasis on the political conditions for a shift 
to a potentially more successful industrial policy. Much literature on 
British decline soon collapses into 'grand themes' of cultural 
malfunction, imperial grandeur and supersession or the dominance of 
finance capital, with politics read-off as simply a reflection of these 
over-arching designs or misadventures.6 In contrast, Marquand, Hall, 
Newton and Porter, and others underlined the specifics of party 
strategies, ideologies and organisation in explaining the absence of the 
political will and capacity to create a 'developmental state'. Such an 
emphasis on the importance of political parties and their policies is 
pursued in this book. 
It is useful to begin by sketching in the kind of history of British 
economic decline before 1939 that this approach would suggest. First, it 
is clear that economic decline begins to emerge as a serious political 
issue around the tum of the century, mainly linked to worries about 
Britain's waning relative strength as a Great Power. The threat to this 
position came from a number of sources including perceived failures in 
competitiveness, largely registered through the trade figures. 7 
This initial period of concern saw the emergence of a cross-party 
alliance of those wanting to address 'efficiency' issues, the Co-
Efficients. But this group was essentially a small coterie of metropolitan 
intellectuals whose claim to fame was precisely their novelty and 
exceptionality, rather than their position as the spearhead of a mass 
movement. In addition, whilst the Co-Efficients were certainly mindful 
of industrial efficiency, their focus was in fact very different from that 
which marked later 'industrial policy', except in regard to the issue of 
technical education. Their central concerns were, on the one hand, 
governmental efficiency and, on the other, the efficiency of the worker, 
thought of largely as a question of physical health.8 
Above all, the issue of efficiency lost political resonance because it 
cut across the linked major economic debates of the pre-1914 period-
tariff reform and public finance. On tariff reform, the Co-Efficients were 
divided, though many regarded it as a diversion from the 'real' issues. 
Equally, on the question of whether higher government expenditure 
should come from tariff revenues or from higher direct taxes, the 
Co-Efficients' position did not fit in with the Conservative/Liberal party 
divide. Consequently, they failed to become major contributors to the 
economic arguments of the period.9 
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Of course, and as always, this failure may be traced back to 'deeper' 
forces at work in the British political economy. Undoubtedly one of the 
difficulties of making industrial efficiency a prime political goal was the 
strikingly rentier character of the economy, with large parts of the 
country drawing income as tribute from foreign investment. Perhaps 10 
per cent of National Income came from this source immediately before 
1914. In addition, Britain depended in its foreign trade to a large extent 
on earnings from shipping and financial services, which had no direct 
links with industrial competitiveness.10 
These factors in turn may be linked (though not in an over-
determinist fashion) to weakness in the organisation of the main 
industrial producer groups. Crucially, industrial employers had failed to 
establish a 'peak association' to fight for their aims and interests, most 
of their organisations being oriented to either industrial relations or 
technical, trade issues. This lack of a unified voice in turn partly 
reflected the divisions amongst employers on the big political issues of 
tariffs and public finance. 11 
But an adequate account of the absence of a developmental state prior 
to 1914 must refer to more than these structural factors. Politics, it must 
be insisted, has an independent character and must be discussed in its 
own terms. On this basis it is clear that neither of the two main parties, 
the Liberals or the Conservatives, was plausible as a vehicle for policies 
of industrial modernisation in this period. 
On the one hand, the Liberals, partly under the influences of New 
Liberalism and partly through straight electoral calculation, were 
shedding major elements of their Gladstonian heritage and committing 
themselves to a much more active state in the field of welfare. But this 
activism was on a clearly limited front. In particular, a commitment to 
private ownership and competition in industry remained largely 
unchallenged, with much of the radicalism of the New Liberalism 
coming from its attacks on the abuses of private ownership and the 
monopolistic supersession of competition, rather than any questioning 
of the desirability of these two kinds of institution. Hence the Liberal 
agenda encompassed higher taxation and greater state expenditure but 
resisted the idea of seeing the state as pivotal in the strategic and 
economic rivalry of the period. In economic terms it remained 
committed to the priority of consumer interests - free trade, cheap food 
and competition - over those of domestic producers. 12 
On the Conservative side, concern about threats to Britain's Great 
Power status led to a sharper break with Victorian orthodoxy. Tariff 
reform was at least in part about defending domestic producer interests 
4 Industrial efficiency and state intervention 
against foreign competition. But the Conservatives, more than the 
Liberals, were committed to the sanctity of private property and free 
enterprise. Whilst Conservative concerns with industrial efficiency as 
an aspect of the general problem of Empire efficiency could encompass 
better education and more state expenditure on research and 
development, what was increasingly the party of business was hardly 
likely to emerge as an initiator of intervention in the private industrial 
sector. 13 
By 1914 the traditional laissez1aire state had, therefore, undoubtedly 
been altered from its Victorian heyday. Public spending was sig-
nificantly higher than 40 years earlier and tax levels reflected this. The 
state's role in the labour market was much expanded in the 1906-14 
period. But the broad parameters of Britain's political economy had 
been sustained. The gold standard, free trade and the (relatively) low 
and balanced budget remained in place, constraining in their different 
ways the emergence of a state aiming to break with 'market forces' in 
the name of industrial efficiency. 
The First World War, like the Boer conflict, put the efficiency of 
British industry once more on the agenda. Dependence on imported 
(especially German) war materials exposed some of the weaknesses of 
Britain's industrial structure, whilst analyses of post-war prospects 
highlighted the problems of a number of key industries. 14 In many areas 
the exposure of British industry to the glare of state scrutiny during the 
First World War matched that which was to come with the war of 
1939-45. But the key difference was the very limited continuity 
between wartime and post-war policy on the earlier occasion. 
Broadly speaking, the state machine rolled into industrial inter-
vention in the First World War, but was then rolled back afterwards. 
Some permanent changes survived the ebb and flow. The 'safeguarding' 
of certain key industries against import competition continued and 
indeed expanded post-war. Employers' peak associations, drawn into 
existence by the wartime state, became a permanent feature of the 
political landscape.15 But these were untypical developments, 
exceptions to the rule. Post-1918 politics (especially after 1920) saw a 
concerted attempt to return to the norms of the pre-1914 political 
economy. 
At the core of this policy stance was a continued adherence to 
economic internationalism - to varieties of a (very mildly qualified) free 
trade and the gold standard. This in tum was related to an economic 
analysis which saw post-war economic problems as largely the result of 
wartime disruption to established financial and trade patterns. The 
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priorities were therefore to restore exchange rates, defeat inflation and 
secure the conditions for a revival of trade. 16 These broad positions, it 
should be noted, were shared by most Labour politicians as much as by 
the Liberals and Conservatives - a point returned to in a later section.17 
Economic policy in the 1920s was dominated by this desire to restore 
'normalcy', a factor which underlay the return to gold in 1925. It also 
fitted in with an emphasis on relieving unemployment, as an acceptable 
means of dealing with the problem until the 'real' solution of expanded 
world trade arrived. Only slowly did disillusion with this approach 
emerge. Of course, Keynes and his Liberal allies attacked the priority 
given to the external value of the pound and the impact of this on the 
staple export industries. But this was in many ways a marginal as well 
as an ineffective attack on policy. Whilst Keynes might note the 'end of 
laissez-faire', his major concern in the 1920s was with monetary 
management not industrial modernisation. 18 
Nevertheless, alongside the dominant orientation, change was 
beginning to occur. Thus, whilst remaining resistant to the calls for 
proto-Keynesian public works policies, the overwhelmingly 
Conservative Governments of the decade did begin to accept that the old 
staples would not regain their former scale and employment levels, and 
that some degree of change in industrial structure and organisation was 
desirable. The change of approach was signalled by the Industrial 
Transference Act of 1928, which encouraged workers to move from the 
old staple regions to work elsewhere in the country. In practical terms 
this achieved little, but symbolically it suggested an acceptance that 
financial stability, however much it might be secured, would be 
insufficient to revive significantly the fortunes of coal, steel, 
shipbuilding and cotton. 19 Even more significant for the development of 
policy on industry was the widespread if inchoate and often inconsistent 
enthusiasm for 'rationalisation' in industry. Like so many economic 
fashions in Britain, this was imported from Germany, and usually 
denoted in some general sense the need to reorganise industry into larger 
units to secure greater efficiency via economies of scale.20 
Enthusiasm for such a change went across the political spectrum 
albeit with different ideological glosses. For many in the late 1920s 
it seemed obvious that British industry must reorganise or be re-
organised in order to revive, and this was supported by much of the 
material presented to, and reproduced in official form by, the Balfour 
Committee.21 
But widespread support for the principle of rationalisation was 
insufficient to generate much policy to that end, especially before the 
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slump of 1929-32. The enforced amalgamation of the railways in 1921 
might be seen in this context, though it basically made permanent the 
wartime arrangements. More innovatory was the creation of the Central 
Electricity Board (CEB) in 1926, which very much reflected the idea 
that industrial efficiency required cheap large-scale generation of 
electricity.22 The most active body in the area of rationalising the staples 
was the Bank of England, drawn in by the problems of its own customers 
and by the threat posed to the banking system of bad debts arising in the 
older industries. The Bank had also acted to pre-empt more radical 
action by an incoming Labour Government in 1929.23 
As in the pre-war period, the Conservative Governments of the 1920s 
were hardly laissez-faire in attitude, and were not averse to expanding 
the frontiers of state intervention in certain directions (e.g. industrial 
transference). But rationalisation suggested a direct role in the private 
sector and its prerogatives which most Conservatives still found 
anathema. Hence, for example, intervention in the coal industry in the 
1920s, a prime industry for rationalisation, allowed for state compulsion 
in amalgamations, but only if the initiative came from a majority of 
owners in an area. The impact was quite limited.24 A more radical 
measure of state intervention was embodied in the cartel and 
compulsory amalgamation provisions of the Coal Mines Reorganisation 
Act of 1930, the product of a parliamentary alliance between Labour and 
the Liberals, but again its results were limited.25 
The collapse of the gold standard and the ending of free trade in 1931 
mark a kind of watershed in the development of British economic 
policy. The liberal, cosmopolitan arrangements of the pre-1914 era had 
rested on three pillars - the gold standard, free trade and low and 
balanced budgets.26 Two of these were now defunct. At the same time 
the cause of their demise - the world slump - gravely exacerbated the 
problems of the staple industries, problems which had largely initiated 
the tentative movements to state intervention in the 1920s. There was 
now both an economic and a political 'space' for a more dirigistic role 
from government. 
But this role took a largely defensive form. The tariff imposition 
obviously shielded British industries from competition and so reduced 
the need to reorganise. The Government proved unable to replace such 
an incentive by any other, so that in iron and steel, for example, official 
enthusiasm for rationalisation as a quid pro quo for protection in the 
end achieved very little.27 Overall, the picture of the Conservative 
Governments and industry in the 1930s is one of support for 
cartelisation and market sharing within a protectionist framework. This 
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is not to argue either that protectionism is always harmful to industrial 
efficiency or that cartelisation combined with forced amalgamations 
might not have yielded some benefits. But in the circumstances of the 
1930s it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the administration's 
role was largely unhelpful to any notion of a state-sponsored industrial 
modernisation. 28 
First, these were Conservative Governments which drew substantial 
support from owners in the private sector, who were not only 
ideologically an unlikely source of proposals for major state inter-
vention but, perhaps more important, ill-organised to produce any 
consistent policy positions. The impression that employers presented, 
even within individual industries, was usually one of fragmentation and 
disagreement rather than unity. This seems to have led to a persistent 
'lowest common denominator' attitude of defensiveness and minimal 
change, with which the politicians went along in the absence of a viable 
alternative.29 
This 'safety first' stance was reinforced by the Tories' conception of 
overall economic policy. Alan Booth has persuasively argued that the 
Conservatives had a fairly coherent approach to economic policy in the 
1930s, which involved managing the economy in a new way. The 
party's package revolved around taking advantage of the departure from 
gold by using a programme of cheap money and maintaining a low 
exchange rate for the pound. These measures were (eventually) 
envisaged as means of reviving the economy by raising the price level, 
and hence profits, but this required, in the Government's eyes, tight 
fiscal control to prevent any loss of confidence which would threaten the 
compatibility of the two central policies.30 This strategy not only ruled 
out Keynesian-style fiscal 'extravagance' but also militated against any 
innovative policy on the economy. The defensiveness and negativism of 
industrial policy was, therefore, on a par with the general stance as 
regards economic policy. 
As a consequence of these factors, by the outbreak of the Second 
World War Britain had little more of a 'developmental state' than in 
1900. The Government had intervened in new ways after the First World 
War exposed some of the shortcomings of British industry. Certain 
'key' industries had been given protection, and this was extended to all 
of manufacturing and some of agriculture in the 1930s. But whilst 
protection may have been a necessary condition to allow space for the 
reorganisation of certain of Britain's industries, or the growth of new 
ones, it was not a sufficient condition. The simple fact was that the 
Government remained reluctant to intervene directly and systematically 
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in industry. There were examples of such intervention - railways, 
electricity and coal have been noted above. There were also such cases 
as the official encouragement given to the creation of ICI, particularly 
stimulated by the strategic significance of some of its products. But in 
no sense could this be said to amount to an industrial strategy, and it only 
added up in the end to a set of ad hoe interventions which failed to 
address the real magnitude of British manufacturing weakness. 
Furthermore, though some general 'supply-side' initiatives were made, 
such as the wartime creation of the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR), their impact was insubstantial. Typically, 
the DSIR focused its efforts on prodding the private sector to expand 
research, rather than acting as a major player itself. It does not seem to 
have succeeded in shifting the low levels of R. & D. prevalent 
throughout British industry.31 
In sum, whilst by the 1930s there had been a decisive break with the 
political economy of Victorian liberalism in the sphere of international 
economic policy (the gold standard and free trade), confidence in the 
capacity of private industry to deliver efficient production and 
employment had been replaced not with an aggressive programme of 
modernisation but with a defensive, even defeatist, alignment, which 
arguably managed to combine the worst features of private enterprise 
and state intervention. 
What of Labour's role in this story? Up until 1939 the party never 
achieved a parliamentary majority. It became the main challenger to the 
Conservatives after the First World War, but was only able to form two 
short-lived governments in 1924 and 1929-31. Hence Labour's direct 
impact on state policy was limited. But the party's views on industry and 
industrial policy were undergoing significant changes, and these form 
an important background to its later role in the 'years of influence', 
1939-45, and years of power from 1945 to 1951. These developments 
also deserve some detailed consideration as there is currently a striking 
dearth of material on this important topic. 
From its foundation in 1900 (as the Labour Representative 
Committee) until 1918 the Labour Party was a body whose 
programmatic and policy-making side continued to be extremely 
underdeveloped. The basis for the foundation of a distinct Labour Party 
was a desire to form a body to represent the interests of the working 
class, where that representation was seen largely in sociological terms 
(i.e. giving a voice to a class) rather than as involving a distinct set of 
policy objectives. Initially this situation even precluded political goals 
beyond working-class representation. In 1908 common ownership of 
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industry became a general objective, but was simultaneously rejected as 
a programme. The dominant view was that the party consisted of a 
fragile alliance of trade unionists and socialists, a unity which would not 
survive detailed statements of intention. The most that should be done 
was to establish principles, and let the Parliamentary Party tum them 
into practical activity. Policies that did emerge were largely ad hoe 
responses to events of the day.32 
Alongside this programmatic vacuum there was the development of 
a definite approach to industry, largely from Fabian sources. Whilst the 
Independent Labour Party dominated the 'ethos' of Labour at this stage, 
it was the Fabians who seemed to give the most serious consideration to 
policy issues, on industry as in so many other areas. 33 
In the first significant Fabian publication, the Fabian Essays of 1889, 
two chapters were devoted to industry, the most substantial by William 
Clarke, the other by Annie Besant. Both had a similar line. Above all 
they shared a highly evolutionary analysis of industry, describing an 
ineluctable movement from handicraft to machine production, and an 
ever increasing massing of capital and grouping of workers. This 
process was now reaching a new stage in which the 'ring' and the 'trust' 
more and more replaced previously free competition. Such develop-
ments were seen as both inevitable and efficient: 'Those combinations 
can be shown to be the most economical and efficient methods of 
organising production and exchange. They check waste, encourage 
machinery, dismiss useless labour, facilitate transport, steady prices and 
raise profits.' The socialist aim should therefore be not to break up the 
combinations but to 'absorb and administer' them: 
Instead ... of attempting to undo the work which the capitalists are 
unconsciously doing for the people, the real reformer will rather 
prepare the people, educated and organised as a true industrial 
democracy, to take up the threads when they fall from the weak hands 
of the possessing class. 34 
Annie Besant carried the argument a logical step further by noting that 
the development of industry had separated the industrial population into 
a proletarian majority and a tiny owning class, and that this laid the basis 
for a straightforward expropriation of the trusts' owners. In addition she 
spelt out a further highly significant practical consequence of the new 
configuration of industry: 
There is no practical difficulty in the way of management of the 
ordinary productive industries, large or small. The Trusts and 
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Co-operatives have, between them, solved or put us in the way of 
solving, all problems connected with these.35 
These two essays defined a position which was both widespread and 
long-lived. Other Fabians wrote on similar lines, and the approach 
seems to have become close to an official Labour position. 36 But the 
perspective employed clearly drew on much wider Left traditions. 
Besant's essay, especially, employs an almost Leninist tone, whilst on 
the other hand closely paralleling the views of the most important 'New 
Liberal' economic theorist, J.A. Hobson.37 In other words, this position 
on industry illustrates the pervasiveness of evolutionary modes of 
thought across the ideological spectrum at this time, with Fabians and 
Labour sharing a common intellectual heritage. 
Such views remained the bedrock of Labour's thinking on industry 
up to the First World War. Whilst such an approach, as already noted, 
was not translated into a programme during these years, it was 
compatible with the largely ad hoe policies which did emerge at this 
time. In particular, Labour's accretion of commitments to nationalise 
particular areas, such as the railways, was fully in line with the 
judgement that this would represent a further step along the path which 
industry was already following, rather than a fundamental break in its 
development. Thus, the case for railway nationalisation (parallel to that 
for land) was founded upon the belief that the employers in this industry 
were currently exacting a monopolistic surplus which distorted the 
distribution of income, rather than any allegations about their supposed 
inefficiency. 38 
In other words, nationalisation did relate to efficiency but not in the 
sense of the efficiency of industrial organisation. The private ownership 
ofland, railways and mining royalties was seen as imposing inefficiency 
on other sectors by exacting monopoly rents from them. Secondly, the 
maldistribution of income which resulted from such monopolies, it was 
argued, lowered the incomes of workers, and so made them inefficient. 
This latter sense of efficiency, relating to the physical health of the 
worker, was a predominant one in discussions of this period, again 
uniting Labour and the New Liberals. But such a focus highlights the 
absence of attention to the details of corporate performance, an absence 
explained by the continuing popularity of the evolutionary view that 
private ownership, whilst it might be a problem in some respects, did not 
involve any problems as regards efficiency. This is also evident in the 
programme of the 'Co-Efficients' whose concern with efficiency involved 
no criticism whatever of current forms of industrial organisation. 39 
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Faith in the productive efficiency of current capitalist forms of 
industrial organisation remained pervasive until the First World War. 
Then, like many across the political spectrum, Labour thinkers were 
shaken by wartime revelations of British incapacity and lack of 
organisation. In later writing, the Webbs pointed to the Board of Trade 
Reports as demonstrating 'the gross inefficiency in processes, 
mechanical plant and organisation within each of the staple trades' .40 
Whilst many were unwilling to give up entirely the idea of the advan-
tages of economies of scale made possible by industrial concentration, 
the overall view of the capabilities of industry soon became vastly more 
qualified than pre-war. 
Thus, in the Constitution for a Socialist Commonwealth of Great 
Britain of 1920, the Webbs argued that 'it was one of the unexpected 
discoveries of government during the Great War that the system of 
capitalist profit-making, as a method of producing commodities and 
services, habitually fell so enormously short of the maximum efficiency 
of which it was capable'. Accordingly, they came to the conclusion that 
there was need for a 'Standing Committee on Productivity' as part of a 
new scheme of government, to aid all industries to conduct themselves 
more efficiently.41 
This was not just Fabian eccentricity. A loss of faith in the conduct of 
industry was part of the whole recasting of the Labour Party's political 
and ideological orientation at the end of the First World War. As is well 
known, in 1918 the Labour Party adopted a new constitution, which 
embodied Clause Four, committing it to a programme of common 
ownership as the central long-term goal. In some ways the significance 
of this latter goal can be exaggerated. On the one hand, it was not seen 
as a major issue in the Labour Party at the time, attention being paid 
much more to other parts of the constitution. On the other hand, it can 
be seen as simply a logical development of the pre-war stance, coupled 
to an invigorated desire to give Labour a distinct political position.42 
Perhaps more important than the new constitution and Clause Four 
was the adoption by Labour of a new programmatic statement, written 
by Sidney Webb, called Labour and the New Social Order. This 
included some sections very much following pre-war assumptions, 
including an argument for nationalisation because private ownership 
involved a 'perpetual private mortgage on the annual product of the 
nation'. But beyond this, and marking a new departure, was a case for 
public ownership based on the inefficiency of the private sector. Webb 
put this as follows: 
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the Labour Party refuses absolutely to believe that the British people 
will permanently tolerate any reconstruction or perpetuation of the 
disorganisation, waste and inefficiency involved in the abandonment 
of British industry to a jostling crowd of separate private employers . 
. . . What the nation needs is undoubtedly a great bound onward in its 
aggregate productivity. But this cannot be secured merely by 
pressing the manual workers to more strenuous toil, or even by 
encouraging the Captains of Industry to a less wasteful organisation 
of their several enterprises on a profit-making basis. What the Labour 
Party looks to is a genuinely scientific reorganisation of the nation's 
industry no longer deflected by individual profiteering, on the basis 
of Common Ownership of the Means of Production.43 
This emphasis on the pursuit of efficiency as a basis for nationalisation 
was carried over into particular cases. For example, the advocacy of 
railway and electricity nationalisation was related to the importance of 
efficiency in these industries for the economy as a whole, and the 
obstacle presented by private ownership to the realisation of the 
economies of scale available in each of the two cases.44 
In sum, the war had significantly shifted Labour's approach to the 
economy. It had increased belief in the efficacy of government planning, 
as Oldfield emphasises. Conversely, it had reduced the evolutionist faith 
in general, and especially in relation to industry. Nationalisation was 
nothing new, but the grounds for its advocacy had significantly shifted, 
and was coupled to a new 'productionist' emphasis in Labour thinking. 
At the June 1918 Labour Party conference, Ramsay Macdonald put 
forward what seems to have been the first ever resolution calling for 
increased production as a priority. This was amended, not to deny the 
objective but to stress that it was acceptable only in the context of public 
ownership.45 
How did this position develop between 1920 and 1939? Most 
discussion of Labour's economic policies during these years has been 
dominated by questions about the party's resistance to adopting whole-
hearted Keynesianism as a response to the mass unemployment of the 
period.46 During the post-1945 boom, which was assumed to have been 
caused by the adoption of such Keynesianism, it was perhaps natural to 
assume that this might well have been the path to solving the inter-war 
slump. More recent work has distanced itself a little from such 
perspectives, though still tending to focus on macroeconomic rather 
than industrial policy .47 
Unemployment did dominate Labour's economic agenda in the 
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interwar period, but overall the record of policy ideas from the party on 
this issue is not an impressive one. Skidelsky' s suggestion that there was 
an 'obvious' solution, which only Labour's combination of Utopian 
rhetoric and practical conservatism obscured, requires substantial 
qualification.48 But his point that the Labour Party, especially in the 
1920s, was not geared up to formulate a plausible reformist strategy for 
economic management is surely right. Labour's continued adherence to 
pre-1914 radical internationalism, involving support for free trade, the 
gold standard and financial conservatism, was not a framework likely to 
produce the necessary re-orientation of British economic policy. 
Equally the leadership of the Labour Party desired neither to overthrow 
capitalism nor to lose its claims to political responsibility by adopting 
unorthodox economic doctrine.49 
The orthodoxy of the Labour Party was challenged by elements 
within it. Most importantly, the Independent Labour Party in the 1920s 
continued to produce impressive initiatives on unemployment. The most 
detailed of these was the 1925 Revolution by Reason, which embodied 
neo-Keynesian proposals for an expansion of demand via a nationalised 
banking system coupled to a floating exchange rate. The following year 
another group of ILP members published The Living Wage, which drew 
much on J.A. Robson's underconsumptionist theories to argue for a 
minimum wage and large-scale redistribution of income via steeply 
progressive taxation. Such views were widely debated on the Left, and 
restated in a weaker form by Oswald Mosley in his famous memo-
randum of 1930. But their impact on official Labour policy, whether the 
party was in or out of government, remained minimal.50 
During Labour's first period in office in 1924 the watchwords were 
financial orthodoxy and general economic caution. Labour still looked 
to the revival of the international economy as the only sure way of 
guaranteeing trade regeneration and a fall in unemployment.51 But the 
concern with unemployment was also reflected in Labour's approach to 
industry. Whilst carefully eschewing any strong commitment to 
nationalisation in its 1923 Election manifesto, in government Labour 
did revive the idea of much greater expenditure on and standardisation 
of electricity generation, with many arguing that this could be secured 
only by nationalisation. Nothing directly came of this during the period 
of office, though it gave impetus to the pressures which eventually led 
to the creation of the Central Electricity Board in 1926. Here was a 
classic case where private enterprise seemed simply incapable of 
achieving the potential economies of scale, and where a technical and 
non-political case for nationalisation could have wide appeal.52 
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Labour's approach to industry also developed in the context of the 
debates about rationalisation during the late 1920s. One way of viewing 
these debates is as signalling a loss of faith in the revival of trade as the 
only real remedy for unemployment, and a desire to see greater 
industrial efficiency as a way of expanding Britain's markets. 
Before the election of the second Labour Government in 1929 
enthusiasm for rationalisation was more apparent in the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) than in the Labour Party. For example, in Labour's 
1928 statement of policy, Labour and the Nation, rationalisation was 
urged as a solution to 'the waste and inefficiency of private ownership 
in industries which, whether called private or not, are essentially public 
in character'. But beyond this rhetoric there was little in the way of 
practical policy proposals, and the extent of the government's role in 
efficiency remained, to say the least, obscured by the statement that 
'employers ... will be well advised to begin by setting their own house 
in order, to modernise their organisation, improve their technique, 
eliminate waste, and apply more intelligently the resources which 
science has revealed' .53 
Labour's reply to Lloyd George's We Can Conquer Unemployment 
in 1929 argued that unemployment necessitated 'drastic reorganisation' 
of the staple export sectors, but it also recognised that unemployment 
was being caused by rationalisation of other industries. The potential 
difficulty in advocating a policy which was at once both apparently a 
cause of, and a panacea for, unemployment was not, however, 
addressed. Rather, there was just a broad statement emphasising the 
need for the state to be involved in the necessary industrial reorgani-
sation, 'not by uniform measures applied to them all, but by a variety of 
steps,designed to eliminate waste and wasteful competition, to improve 
and co-ordinate methods of marketing, purchase of materials, and 
production, and to adapt business structure to the changed economic 
conditions of the post-war world' .54 
The TUC involvement in the debate over rationalisation came about 
essentially because of its involvement in the Mond-Turner talks, which 
flowed from a general desire on both sides of industry to move on from 
the conflict of 1926 and seek a more consensual pattern of industrial 
relations (Mond was the head of ICI, Turner a Trade Union leader and 
the TUC president in 1927). A major incentive to talk here was the issue 
of rationalisation. The employers involved mainly represented 
'progressive' firms which wanted to rationalise but were worried about 
union opposition. On the union side there was a significant fear that 
rationalisation would go ahead without them and at their cost.55 Initially 
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the talks achieved some success, with the participants outlining an 
agreement which included a 'deal' on rationalisation, where the unions 
would offer to assist the process if they were given a role in designing 
it. But this agreement ultimately came to nothing, essentially because of 
opposition from many employers to giving unions an enhanced role 
either in wage negotiation or, even more, in discussing firms' policies.56 
Nevertheless, it is significant that the unions, as distinct from the Labour 
Party at this stage, were willing to countenance substantial industrial 
reorganisation as a way of trying to restore the fortunes of British 
industry. 
The 1929-31 Labour Government is chiefly remembered for its 
failure to deal with the unemployment problem, and for its ignominious 
collapse in the face of the counter-claims of financial 'prudence' and the 
living standards of the unemployed.57 Reasonably enough, perhaps, 
these events have obscured other aspects of the economic policy 
pursued by the Government. In particular it is important to recognise 
that the Government did attempt to raise efficiency in both the public 
and private sectors. In the former case, the major monument that was 
created was the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) which, like 
the CEB, reflected the view that private competition was inefficient and 
that significant economies of scale could be achieved by an amal-
gamation under public ownership.58 The LPTB owed much to Herbert 
Morrison, whose work on it reflected what were to become the dominant 
themes in Labour's nationalisation programmes of the 1930s and 1940s. 
The Morrisonian corporation, as it came to be called, would be largely 
autonomous of government, run by experts, and bereft of workers in any 
direct managerial role. This was a model which was grounded on a 
technocratic belief in the efficacy of large-scale administration and an 
ethos of public service. In economic terms it represented the belief that 
efficiency sprang largely from a combination of economies of scale and 
technical expertise, though Morrison himself also held that public 
ownership would unleash an enthusiasm for production from the 
workers.59 
A similar set of ideas underlay the Labour Government's support for 
the rationalisation of coal. Here the 'rationalisation' of forced amal-
gamations with consequent increases in unemployment clashed with 
the 'rationalisation' of allowing the industry to create a cartel and 
hoping this would protect output and jobs. 60 As noted above, the 
outcome was an amalgamation of both approaches, but one which 
essentially emphasised the protection of the industry against 
competitive pressures. 
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Rationalisation figured quite largely in the rhetoric of the 1929-31 
Government, but the obvious difficulty with such an approach, given the 
unemployment prevailing, was that it had to be an essentially long-run 
measure. In the short-run rationalisation could only exacerbate 
unemployment, and such a prospect was hardly attractive as the 
unemployed grew month by month in 1930 and I 93 I. But apart from 
this compelling short-run political problem, Labour did little to involve 
itself actively in policies of rationalisation except in the coal industry. 
By and large it abdicated its role to the Bank of England whose priorities 
remained essentially financial rather than those connected with 
industrial modernisation.61 
Labour was out of power from August 1931 until the Second World 
War. Its impact on economic and other policy areas in the 1930s was 
minimal, perhaps less than might have been the case even given the lack 
of a parliamentary majority.62 This long absence from power led to a 
major shift in thinking amongst many Labour supporters, and to some 
degree this was reflected in the Party's programmatic development. 
One area of change involved the Morrisonian corporation. After 
fierce debates in the early years of the decade this became unchallenged 
as Labour's approach to public ownership.63 The model outlined here 
was linked to a clear identification of priorities as regards the sectors to 
be nationalised, creating a 'shopping list' which was close to the 
industries actually taken over in I 945-51.64 In the current context what 
is striking about the discussion of nationalisation in this period is the 
emphasis on efficiency. In the key document, For Socialism and Peace, 
the case for public ownership is grounded on the fact that it was to 
enable industrial reorganisation to take place. 'Reorganisation from the 
point of view of productive efficiency' was in tum to aim at six 
objectives: 
(a) The introduction of efficient methods of production; 
(b) The organised purchase of raw materials; 
(c) The establishment of effective selling agencies; 
(d) The elimination of all unnecessary charges; 
(e) Reasonable wages and conditions for the producers; 
(f) Reasonable prices for the consumers. 65 
Booth and Pack66 are critical of this focus on efficiency, as inappropriate 
to the immediate unemployment problem, but nevertheless it does 
demonstrate the extent to which nationalisation was seen as a pragmatic, 
quasi-technical response to the failings of the private sector, rather than 
as an 'ideological' objective linked to control over industry. Finally, For 
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Socialism and Peace can be seen to have accepted that the need for 
reorganisation went beyond those industries that were likely to come 
quickly into the public sector, and there was some talk of the need to 
'enforce' such a policy. But no details of what this might involve were 
given.67 Here, perhaps, we can see the development of an attitude that 
the private sector need not be seriously addressed as in need of reform 
because nationalisation would eventually be appropriate for almost all 
industries -though this remained implicit in Labour's discussions rather 
than explicit. 
Amongst Labour's economic intelligentsia, three strands of opinion 
became evident in the 1930s. Many of the party's thinkers became 
converted to versions of Keynesianism, which gave a priority to demand 
management in economic policy, but they also argued for significant 
measures of nationalisation in the name of efficiency where there 
existed natural monopoly. The most important of such thinkers was 
James Meade.68 A second group, including G.D.H. Cole, were not 
hostile to Keynesianism but were keen to distinguish it from socialism, 
and to assert the political importance of social ownership. They tended 
also to make planning a central feature of their socialism, though the 
content of this planning was ill-defined.69 Finally there were those, 
especially Evan Durbin, who were much keener on the orthodox tools of 
economic analysis than Cole and his supporters, but who were sceptical 
of Keynesianism. Above all, they saw the key socialist objective as 
equality and believed that economic policies should be subordinated to 
such inescapably political objectives. 70 
All of these approaches were influential when Labour came to 
address seriously economic policy issues from inside government 
during the 1940s. They represented a major step forward in the 
sophistication of Labour's economic thinking. But this had its limits. 
Broadly speaking, economics as a discipline focuses its attention on the 
efficiency of resource allocation, not the efficiency of production. 
Labour's economists of the 1930s tended to accept this traditional 
demarcation: hence, for example, the discussion on the need to 
nationalise natural monopolies, which hinged on the argument that in 
such industries the realisation of economies of scale led to monopolistic 
units and the misallocation of resources; hence, too, the discussion on 
the applicability of marginal cost pricing rules to public sector 
industries. 71 
The point about these debates is not that they were irrelevant, but that 
they largely 'crowded-out' thinking about the determinants of 
productive efficiency. Indeed, they rested on the orthodox economists' 
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usual assumption, that productive efficiency will be assured as long as 
firms have to compete. In terms of Labour's priorities, the economists 
tended to have the effect of switching attention away from the 
examination of how efficiency is attained, except in so far as this was 
linked to the existence of competition or monopoly. 
To a degree the new economic thinking of the 1930s was in fact 
compatible with the 'old' emphasis on public ownership. Most of the 
industries that were listed as to be nationalised in For Socialism and 
Peace could be characterised as natural monopolies or as sectors having 
other characteristics which limited competition. Hence quite orthodox 
economic arguments might be advanced for their nationalisation, 
though this necessarily contradicted the idea that beyond this list the 
scope of nationalisation was more or less unlimited. 72 
Some escaped this framework. In particular Durbin, despite a great 
attachment to economic orthodoxy, appears to have set the agenda of 
efficiency in much wider terms. He saw that agenda embracing issues of 
motivation, training, personnel selection, production organisation, 
forms of accountancy, and investment levels.73 In this way he may be 
seen as at least recognising many of the issues which were to come to 
the fore in the 1940s. 
This survey, in conclusion, allows two major observations about the 
broad position prior to 1939. It is apparent, firstly, that industrial 
modernisation and efficiency had never been the primary goal of any 
British government before this date. Equally, it is quite clear that Labour 
had been by no means indifferent to such issues, contrary to those 
accounts which characterise the party as having been only ever 
interested in distributive questions.74 Labour did not have, of course, 
well developed plans, only some fairly general ideas; but the important 
point is that it had generated at least an aspiration to intervene at a micro 
level in the economy. 
The aim of this book is to explain what happened after 1939, and in 
particular how the whole efficiency issue was handled when Labour was 
in power between 1945 and 1951. There is already a body of literature 
on this subject and it will be as well to conclude this introduction by 
reviewing what others have argued, in order to indicate how the 
following text differs from the existing interpretations. 
Historians, it should be noted at once, have not judged the Attlee 
Governments' policies on industrial modernisation very highly. Labour, 
the consensus would have it, came to office essentially determined to 
pursue welfare reform, an object that shaped macroeconomic policies 
and fuelled the nationalisation programme. Trading and financial 
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difficulties subsequently necessitated a closer relationship with the 
private sector, but there was little attempt by the Government to force 
reform here or to pursue modernisation because of the overwhelming 
need to obtain exports at all costs. Industrial policy as a whole thus 
remained, as even the otherwise sympathetic Morgan has to admit, 
'half-hearted, indirect, and in many ways unsuccessful' .75 What makes 
this particularly irritating for many is that, as they claim, it all could and 
indeed should have been so very different. The 'audit of war' had 
revealed, to anyone willing to see, the true extent of Britain's industrial 
weakness. Labour, at least early on, had distinct advantages, inheriting 
a coherent set of wartime controls, and basking in an unprecedented 
degree of political superiority both inside and outside Parliament. 
Intervention, perhaps on the French model, to induce the kinds of 
technical and managerial innovation that were needed to arrest Britain's 
long-term economic decline, seemed a real option. As it was, the 
possibilities were not even explored, largely, the argument runs, because 
of Labour's hazy thinking on industrial subjects and general lack of 
political will. In Marquand's words, which find echo in the works of 
historians as diverse as Miliband, Middlemas and Barnett, 'the chance 
for a radical reconstruction of the supply side of the economy was 
lost' .76 
This looks, at first sight, to be a highly impressive case, but on closer 
examination much of it turns out to be assertion rather than real argu-
ment. Many historians have been interested in the Attlee Governments, 
but most have concentrated on welfare reforms or foreign policy, for 
example, at the expense of any real consideration of industrial issues. 
Those who do examine economic policy and performance generally 
adopt a macro perspective. 77 As a result, whole areas of government 
activity have tended to remain unexamined, largely imagined rather 
than established. A measure of the bias that exists here is the confusion 
to be found in many accounts about even the more obvious of Labour's 
initiatives on industry. The creation of the British Institute of 
Management was an important achievement of these years by any 
standards, yet it is largely ignored in almost all of the literature. 78 Lack 
of precision also clouds evaluations of Cripps's Working Parties, with 
one prominent authority confusing these with the very different 
Development Councils. 79 
In fact, a detailed and rigorous review of the evidence shows that 
many historians have simply got it wrong. The Attlee Governments 
were very interested in industrial modernisation and did develop 
appropriate policies to pursue this goal. There is room for legitimate 
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argument about what this package achieved, and it seems very likely 
that gains were not as great as was expected. However, blame for any 
relative failure cannot simply be placed with Labour. In fact, as this 
book will show, the blunting of industrial modernisation policies 
occurred largely at the hands of British industrialists themselves. 
It remains only to indicate how the argument that follows will unfold. 
The starting point is the production crisis of 1941-2, when Labour, 
having entered the Coalition, found itself involved in the battle to raise 
output for the war effort (Chapter 2). This episode, and the industrial 
deficiencies that it revealed, led to the whole issue of industrial 
efficiency being opened up in an unprecedented way. A particular focus 
was on the quality of British management, but towards the war's end 
almost every facet of industry was discussed in depth, with each of the 
interested parties formulating policies for the peace (Chapter 3). 
Once the Labour Government was in power the opportunity and the 
strong incentive to devise a strategy were present, and 1945-7 saw the 
development of a wide range of initiatives and policies (Chapter 4). In 
the later years of the Government three broad areas emerged as 
especially important in the battle to ameliorate efficiency. Good 'human 
relations' at the workplace were seen as vital because of the belief that 
the coming of full employment meant a new era in the labour market, 
and because the shortage of investment meant that 'the human factor' 
appeared to be one of the most obvious short-run routes to increased 
productivity (Chapter 5). Management efficiency, raised as a problem in 
the early 1940s, was also regarded as crucial in this period (Chapter 6). 
Finally, the corning of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity 
promoted the whole issue of the relevance and applicability of American 
models of industrial organisation to Britain (Chapter 7). 
Industrial efficiency is an enormous and complex issue. It is almost 
impossible to give an exhaustive list of the factors which may affect it. 
This book does not pretend to cover every aspect of the issue as it 
presented itself in the 1940s. Rather, the focus is on the most important 
areas of ideas and policies as they impacted upon manufacturing 
industry, importance being measured by the weight of activity but also 
by the influence of Labour's approaches on the evolution of the 
economy. To a significant extent Labour made itself into a 'party of 
industrial modernisation' over this period, and this represented a major 
shift. The conclusion (Chapter 8) therefore attempts to assess both the 
political and economic significance of what had happened. 
Chapter 2 
The production crisis, productivity, 
and the rise of the management 
question, 1941-4 
In 1941-2, Britain was rocked not just by military reverses abroad but 
also by a production crisis at home, as deliveries of armaments and 
munitions consistently failed to reach what were considered reasonable 
targets. The Government sought to cope with this latter situation in the 
first instance through a range of organisational and legislative measures, 
geared to maximising resources in the required sectors. At the same 
time, there was a growing official concern with the question of 
productivity. It was recognised that, once the economy was fully 
mobilised for war production, further growth in outputs would be 
possible only by the rationalisation and streamlining of manufacturing 
processes. This chapter examines the logic that dictated a productivity 
focus, and then looks at how the Government responded to the challenge 
of stimulating intensive growth in the period to the end of 1943. A final 
section summarises a debate that emerged fully over the following year, 
concerning the future of industrial management. It asks why discussion 
of this variable increasingly came to dominate the whole productivity 
question. 
During the early years of the war, those at work in Britain's factories 
were encouraged to believe that they were playing a crucial role in 
ensuring the nation's survival. As Douglas Jay expressed it on the BBC, 
behind 'the Battles of France, and Britain, and Greece, and Iraq', the 
sudden and short-lived military flare-ups, was 'The Battle for 
Production ... going on all the time, by day and night'. Without victory 
here, the situation would indeed be bleak. 1 
Yet it was also increasingly clear that in this home front engagement 
things were not going well. In January 1941, 62 per cent answered with 
a negative when Gallup asked, 'Do you think all is being done that can 
be done to increase war production in this country?' 2 In July, The 
Economist bluntly concluded that war output was 'chronically 
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insufficient'. A few weeks later, it returned to this theme, arguing that 
'Notwithstanding the remarkable results which have been achieved in 
the face of many difficulties, production ... is not as high as it might be. 
Every test reveals deficiencies which can be remedied. ' 3 
By the beginning of 1942, The Times, too, was becoming anxious, 
with a widely reported leader backing 'competent judges' who assessed 
Britain's output of arms as 40 per cent below the amount possible. It 
could not be denied, the paper declared, that 'the ever broadening stream 
[of war production] ... flows less strongly and widens less quickly than 
it could and should do' .4 
Over the following months, this theme both dominated press 
discussion and acquired a sharp polemical tone, as Mass Observation 
succinctly reported: 
All is not well in our war-production at present. Something is 
seriously wrong somewhere. Different people point the accusing 
finger at different wrong points and potential strong points. The 
amount of pointing, especially in all types of printed matter, adds up 
to a veritable forest of inked fingers.5 
Some targets for blame seemed essentially to be dictated by political 
prejudice. Diehards of the Right were obsessed with the supposed 
defects of the labour force: there was widespread 'deliberate slacking, 
deliberate idleness and shameless agitations for higher wages', at the 
very time when the 'flower of our land' had been 'mown down at two 
shillings a day in Crete and elsewhere through lack of arms' .6 For the 
Left, Capital was the obstructive vested interest. 'All too frequently', 
one investigative journalist contended, 'the needs of total war and the 
interests of influential sections of the community do not coincide. ' 7 
On the other hand, there was also a strong strand of technical 
criticism, which took existing patterns of ownership and control as 
largely given, but suggested that within them much better results could 
be achieved. One problem, for this lobby, was the Government's organi-
sation of procurement. All too often, specifications were changed 
needlessly or orders not matched to the actual capacities of firms. 8 Yet 
improving this situation alone would not, it was asserted, solve the 
problem. Another obstruction to efficiency lay, all too often, within the 
firm, in out-dated attitudes and practices. The Select Committee on 
National Expenditure was particularly vocal in making this point, 
arguing in one much reported enquiry, for example, that: 'Management 
is one of the most important factors affecting output. The evidence 
shows that idling is frequently due to bad management or want of 
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supervision.' The Economist concurred here, believing that the course of 
events in 1941-2 had 'proved' that good management was 'the scarcest 
of all factors of production' .9 
The Government's eventual reaction to this welter of criticism 
centred, in the first instance, on organisational and administrative 
measures, with a new Ministry of Production, created in February 1942, 
being perhaps the key innovation. 10 Nevertheless, members of the 
Cabinet recognised that, as some of their critics were arguing, this type 
of action alone would not be enough. The administration's first 
responsibility, certainly, was to fashion a system which could 
mobilise resources for war production as fully and as efficiently as 
possible. Mistakes had been made over this in the early years of the 
hostilities, which were now being rectified by the various reforms 
enacted. Yet once this process was completed, and Britain's 
manufacturing industry was on a total war footing, it would still be 
necessary to keep on increasing output if the strategic plans of the 
military were to be fulfilled. Extra capacity could hardly be brought 
in from abroad. Nor could further resources be switched from home 
consumption, as civilians were already judged to have made 
enormous sacrifices.11 The only hope, therefore, as Ministers 
gradually recognised, lay in improving productivity: more would 
have to be obtained from each unit employed. Cripps, the new 
Minister of Aircraft Production, and perhaps the keenest Cabinet 
advocate of industrial efficiency, described the logic behind this 
conclusion during a broadcast at Christmas 1942: 
We have now reached the time when the inflow of fresh labour to our 
aircraft industry will gradually dry up and yet we must continue to 
expand our production so as to expedite our victory. How are we to 
do it? Not by longer hours; that only leads to exhaustion and 
inefficiency. . . . No, we must improve our methods and cut out all 
waste of labour - and, let me say, of materials too. 12 
The task must increasingly be, in The Economist's paraphrase of official 
thinking, 'to extract the last ounce from the resources already harnessed 
in the war factories'. 13 Accordingly, Ministers of production depart-
ments began to spend more and more time attempting to ensure that this 
was done. 
Of course, consciousness of the productivity issue in relation to the 
war effort had always been present to some extent since the rearmament 
programme of the late 1930s, and a number of schemes to promote 
efficiency were already in existence. Thus, the Ministry of Labour had 
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long encouraged the appointment of personnel officers in munitions 
factories, and had in fact made grants available so that suitable 
candidates could receive the required training in this field at various 
universities. 14 The same Ministry's welfare schemes - providing doctors 
and canteens at the works - were also designed, ultimately, to make 
labour more efficient. 15 
However, from mid-1942, the drive for productivity was very much 
transformed, in both scale and content. The watchword of efficiency 
now became accepted as of great importance in most production 
departments. At the same time, there was a growing awareness that the 
greatest gains would be made only if the scope of official initiative were 
broadened. Training schemes, such as those already established, were 
clearly important. But there was also a need for more direct intervention, 
to ensure, for example, that individual firms' production processes were 
as well organised as was possible. All of this added up to a significant 
departure in government-industry relations. 
One indication of the changed atmosphere was the progress that was 
made with establishing Joint Production Committees (JPCs).16 The idea 
of expanding local consultative machinery to advise on matters relating 
to production had been extensively discussed during 1941, with 
attitudes ranging from the enthusiastic (Communist shop stewards) to 
the downright hostile (many employers). Bevin was sympathetic, but 
the Government as a whole remained cautious, anxious to maintain 
consensus in the face of boardroom antipathy and trade union leadership 
unease. By the end of the following year, however, the situation had 
been almost entirely transformed. In February 1942 the Ministry of 
Supply approved the setting-up of JPCs in the Royal Ordnance 
Factories. The following month an agreement between the Engineering 
Employers' Federation and the unions provided for the creation of JPCs 
in engineering establishments with over 150 workers. Subsequently, 
similar arrangements were concluded in shipbuilding and iron and steel, 
so that by December 1942 there were over 2,000 JPCs in existence, 
covering plants employing some two million workers. In each case, the 
motivations of the different parties involved were, of course, often 
different: some union activists saw the JPCs as a way of increasing 
industrial democracy, while some employers were more impressed by 
their potential for containing and disarming discontent. Yet what 
excited the Government, and ultimately proved decisive, was the 
contribution that the local committees might make to improving 
productivity. Cripps was the most enthusiastic proponent of JPCs in the 
Cabinet, but his observation that 'in a happy factory where there is good 
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co-operation there is also efficient production' 17 was broadly shared by 
the majority of his Ministerial colleagues. 
However, if the JPCs represented the most visible side of the new 
official concern, equally important innovations were occurring in less 
publicised areas, as various Whitehall departments sought to galvanise 
private industry into more efficient methods. The new Ministry of 
Production, for example, was from the first very much concerned with 
promoting best practice and by the end of 1943 had constructed a 
network of committees, panels and agencies to achieve this end. One 
initiative involved the creation of an expert advisory service in each 
region, which could be consulted by client firms and was qualified to 
offer information on, amongst other things, 'production layout and 
method, casting, designing, planning, rate-fixing, machine loading, 
office organisation, inspection and general administrative and financial 
problems' .18 Another scheme, the Mutual Aid by Technical Experts or 
MATE facility, was aimed at getting efficient firms to share their 
knowledge as widely as possible. Panels of experts were recruited from 
the larger companies and then used, like a fire-brigade, to help smaller 
employers in difficulty. 19 At the same time, the Ministry also reserved 
the right to make its own investigations where it felt that this would be 
helpful. A special Industrial Panel, consisting of employers and trade 
unionists alongside the civil servants, was created for this purpose.20 
Meanwhile, productivity consciousness was also transforming more 
mundane aspects of the Ministry's operations. Typical here were a 
number of innovations on standardisation, such as a case involving 
welding equipment of 1943: 
the Directorate of Industrial Electrical Equipment of the Machine 
Tool Control found that one of the principal obstacles to the rapid 
expansion of welding - a conspicuous saver of labour - in 
shipbuilding and repairing and in tank production was the lack of 
standardisation of welding plant, components, plugs, sockets, etc. In 
co-operation with the Admiralty and the BSI [British Standards 
Institute] the Directorate worked out British Standard 1071:1943, 
which covers the complete range of multi-operator A.C. welding 
equipment from the incoming supply of current to the electrode 
holder. As no user can obtain new welding equipment without a 
purchase certificate from the Control, and as a certificate will 
normally be issued only for the purchase of standard equipment, the 
result will be that modem high-speed high-voltage welding will 
quickly become universal in all work for which it is appropriate. 21 
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Alongside the Ministry of Production, the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production (MAP) was also very active over the productivity issue, 
particularly after Cripps had taken over control of its operations at the 
end of November 1942. Especially noteworthy here were the 
contributions made by the Production Efficiency Board (PEB) and the 
Technical Costs Branch (TCB). 
The PEB was created by Cripps in the month of his appointment and 
consisted essentially of four key figures - Sir C. Bruce-Gardner (the 
Chairman of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors), F.E. Chappell 
(an Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [AEU] official), A.G. 
Shaw (one of the country's leading experts in personnel management 
and motion study) and Sir J. Buchanan (a secretary from within the 
Ministry) - plus back-up staff.22 The Minister's idea was that the PEB 
should deal with production efficiency in both its capital and labour 
aspects. It would serve as 'a small, highly qualified advisory body to 
carry out investigations in the field, as distinct from the usual admini-
strative work of the headquarters and regional staff of the Ministry' 23 
and would report direct to the top. 
In fact, the PEB came quite quickly to be regarded as an outstanding 
success. One substantial achievement was the fillip it gave to personnel 
management, through, for example, specially sponsored courses at 
universities. At the same time, the PEB fulfilled its brief to carry out 
various detailed investigations of its own, which led to improvements in 
areas such as methods of machining and salvage of scrapped work. 
Finally, there was also a strong effort made to popularise motion study. 
Shaw had worked for Metropolitan-Vickers, a pioneer in this area, and 
she and Cripps persuaded that organisation to lend teaching staff and 
premises in order to train nominees from various other aircraft factories. 
The result was a number of courses from 1943 onwards which did much 
to popularise this relatively new form of work study. 
The TCB had originally been part of the Admiralty, being transferred 
to MAP and then greatly expanded at the beginning of the war.24 By 
1943 a considerable number of specialists were involved: 'rate-fixers, 
planning engineers, time and motion study experts ... as well as 100 
cost accountants and clerks' .25 The unit's central function was to 
measure costs accurately in order to fix suitable contract prices, but this 
inevitably led to a concern with efficiency. In fact, rather as with the 
PEB, the TCB soon began to be called in whenever MAP or other 
Ministries sensed that firms were performing below an acceptable 
standard, in order to recommend realistic solutions. One of the principal 
officers involved described how the TCB operated as follows: 
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The firms chosen for investigation are visited by trained rate-fixers who 
study the processes in the factory and spot the particular weaknesses in 
the system. These may be due to factors beyond the control of individual 
workers, such as faulty operational lay-out or uneven supply of 
materials, or they may be due to a poor level of output on the part of the 
workers, sometimes caused by bad rate-fixing. . . . In this way it is 
possible for the investigator to demonstrate not only to the management 
of a factory but to the Production Committee as well, the exact cause of 
the high labour cost of the work in question, and to obtain their 
agreement to the measures necessary to reduce this cost. 26 
How big, therefore, had the Government's machinery for improving 
industrial productivity become by the end of 1943? This is not an easy 
question to answer for a number of reasons. There is, firstly, the question 
of definition, of deciding which civil servants and advisers were acting 
primarily to an efficiency brief. The Ministry of Labour's 800 Labour 
Supply Inspectors were initially concerned solely with 'forwarding 
dilution' but, as the war progressed, some spent more and more time on 
the wider aspects of labour utilisation, which clearly contributed to the 
drive for productivity. Unfortunately it is impossible to evaluate in any 
more detail what this may have contributed to the overall equation.27 At 
the same time, it is clear that the key agencies which were charged with 
pursuing productivity were sometimes actually weaker than they 
formally appeared. One continual problem for all of the institutions 
involved was how to recruit sufficient qualified staff. Industry itself had 
been an important source in the early years of the war but, by 1943, this 
option no longer existed. The end-product was that some parts of the 
Government apparatus often struggled to cope. It was noted of the TCB 
in early 1944, for example, that: 'Its studies tend to be retrospective (i.e. 
made after contracts have actually been placed) and are now heavily in 
arrears. This is due to lack of staff. ' 28 
Nor, finally, can Government estimates of the forces being deployed 
do very much to clarify the issues at stake here. The following reply to 
an enquiry about the scale ofMAP's activities on productivity is typical 
in its vagueness: 
I am afraid that we cannot give you even a guess at the full cost of the 
steps taken ... to improve efficiency offirms ... [.] ... the costs of 
the specialist services represent only a fraction of the total. For what 
the figures are worth, you may like to know that PEB salaries . . . 
amount to £9,000 per annum .... The Technical Costs Branch costs 
in salaries about £240,000 per annum.29 
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Nevertheless, accepting these various qualifications, it is clear that, by 
late 1943, the Government-created apparatus to improve efficiency had 
reached quite impressive proportions. Thus, the JPC network was 
largely flourishing, as the figures in Table 2.1 illustrate. Moreover, the 
situation within Ministries had been substantially transformed. 
Departments reacted to the productivity drive with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, but all accepted the goal of promoting efficiency, and some 
had shown themselves prepared to pursue it with some persistence. 
Nowhere was the new spirit more in evidence than at MAP. Indeed, as 
one civil servant noted, 'the activities of most branches' of this Ministry 
were aimed 'in greater or less degree . . . at improving industrial 
efficiency' .30 Some idea of the scale of what was involved here can be 
gained from the fact that the PEB alone had advised nearly 300 factories 
by the end of its first year of full operation. 31 
Reviewing the progress that was made obviously gave advocates of 
the productivity drive considerable pleasure, but it also provoked 
several questions. By late 1943, it was clear that Britain would be on the 
winning side of the war, whether victory came sooner or later. What 
lessons could be drawn from the productivity policy being pursued, 
especially in terms of the future, post-war relationship between 
Government and industry? 
In attempting to answer this question, civil servants recognised, first 
of all, that the record proved that government intervention could make a 
positive difference. Some experiments, of course, had failed. Thus, the 
Munitions Management and Labour Efficiency Committee, set up in 
late 1942 to 'put into effect measures for increasing the productive 
efficiency of the munitions industry', seemed to have been almost 
Table 2.1 Joint Production Committees at establishments in engineering 
and allied industries, 1942-4 
Date covered Tota/no. Tota/no. of Tota/no. of 
ofJPCs JPCs in firms workers 
with 150+ 
workers 
Dec. 1942 2,644 2,037 1,914,000 
Dec. 1943 4,427 2,843 2,676,000 
June 1944 4,567 2,959 2,666,000 
Source: BT 171/210 'Origin of Joint Production Committees', p. 3, enclosed with 
Note by G. Calder, 13/5/1946. 
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wholly ineffective, a consequence both of its unwieldy constitution and 
of its lack of influence in supply departments.32 However, against this, 
many other initiatives could be justifiably regarded as considerable 
successes. 
Comment on the JPCs, for example, had been on the whole quite 
positive. An AEU enquiry of 1943 noted that the smooth running of the 
consultative machinery was not universal, but ended with a generally 
very favourable conclusion: 'the committees have fully justified their 
existence and have proved themselves a factor of incalculable value in 
the war effort.' 33 Business journal was also enthusiastic about what had 
been achieved. A survey during the winter of 1942-3 led it to conclude 
that the JPCs were a 'success' and had 'come to stay'. In June 1943 a 
more detailed investigation into employer attitudes towards the 
committees was equally positive. Business now found that, though some 
owners of medium-sized firms continued to regard JPCs with suspicion, 
the vast majority of both big and small employers were a good deal more 
favourable. Moreover, it was generally felt that JPCs were valuable in 
the pursuit of productivity: when asked by the journal whether their own 
committee had 'contributed towards increasing efficiency and 
production', no less than 70 per cent of the employers questioned had 
answered in the affirmative. 34 
More direct kinds of intervention also seemed to have yielded 
important results. MAP staff kept close track of those who had attended 
motion study training courses and generally found that they had 
produced significant innovations on return to their respective factories. 
The increases in output per employer that resulted were variable, 
according to the type of job and the efficiency of previous methods, but 
there was usually considerable progress: 
The average increase in output of the jobs studied ... was 140 per 
cent, the lowest figure being 30 per cent and the highest 800 per cent. 
This latter result was rather exceptional, though there were two 
jobs ... which were about this figure. 35 
TCB staff, too, could point to a range of successful investigations, in 
which cost data had been used to break price cartels or as leverage in 
improving the performance of less efficient units.36 
On top of this, it was impossible to ignore some less tangible benefits 
that had flowed from the overall policy. An example was the situation 
with personnel officers. Relatively few companies employed such staff 
in the 1930s, but during the war numbers increased substantially, 
encouraged ( as has been noted) by the joint efforts of various Ministries. 
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By 1943, indeed, it was estimated that there were around 5,700 
personnel officers working in factories with 250 or more employees -
probably a fourfold increase on pre-war days. Yet the change involved 
here was more than just a question of numbers. There had also been 
appreciable improvements in the whole way in which the profession saw 
itself and was seen by others. As one authority put it in 1944: 
In spite of the fact that industry as a whole failed to grasp and apply 
these essential principles [of personnel management] in the early 
days of the war, there has since been a notable development both in 
the quality of personnel management and in the extent to which it is 
practised .... The experience of the last five years has shown that 
industry will emerge from the present war with a greater appreciation 
of the value of personnel work, and a higher level of technical 
application than ever before. 37 
However, if officials could be reasonably pleased with the progress that 
had resulted from some of the productivity initiatives, they had to 
recognise, as well, that there was little room for complacency. Close 
contact with industry had revealed a scale of inefficient practice 
amongst manufacturers that the civil servants found deeply shocking. 
Thus, many firms were found to have little idea about a rudimentary 
question such as how long it took for raw materials to move through 
their plants.38 Even more seriously, few could produce even near 
accurate costings data. The scale of this problem was revealed during an 
investigation of 3,000 Ministry of Supply contractors in 1943-4. This 
concluded, amongst other things, that: 
(a) Comparatively few firms have efficient costing systems; 
(d) Many small firms have no system at all; 
(e) There is an apathy towards costs by British manufacturers; 
(t) American controlled companies have costing systems far in 
advance of most British manufacturers, appear to be more cost-
minded and use the information available to a greater extent. 39 
Clearly, as officials recognised, in analysing these kinds of finding some 
allowance had to be made for mitigating circumstances. Many firms had 
been asked to expand very fast in the early part of the war, using 
whatever resources, methods and locations were most easily to hand, 
and this had hardly encouraged streamlined working. Many contractors, 
too, remained short of key personnel because of the call-up, so that it 
was hardly surprising if, for example, accounting practices were 
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somewhat deficient. However, accepting all of this, the civil servants 
concluded, did not explain away the problem. Day-to-day contact with 
industry and special enquiry alike revealed not just sub-optimalworking 
but many instances where industrial efficiency could only be described 
as actually below what it was 'reasonable to expect' .40 To officials, 
therefore, the conclusion had to be that employers themselves were 
often partly culpable: they were either oblivious to some productivity 
issues or too conservative to adopt any but very simple ameliorative 
measures.41 
In the light of this, civil servants in production departments were 
increasingly persuaded that government initiatives on productivity 
could not end with the war. Britain's economic position would 
obviously be precarious in the early years of peace, with efficient 
manufacturing the condition of survival. Some employers might be able 
to meet this challenge unaided, but it appeared from wartime experience 
that many would simply have to be pressured into adaptation. 
However, accepting this broad conclusion, there was still the 
question of what precisely should be done in practice. Officials 
recognised that their current successes were being obtained in a 
peculiarly favourable environment, where departments enjoyed both 
enhanced legal capabilities and the considerable leverage which went 
with their positions as sole purchasers. Yet this situation, it was 
generally assumed, would be hardly likely to outlive the war; indeed the 
pressure for a relaxation of controls, the moment that peace was 
declared, seemed to be growing with each new Allied victory. What 
needed to be decided, therefore, was how policy should be modified to 
cope with the likely, very different parameters of a peace-time society. 
What could the government do to encourage productivity growth once 
its special powers had disappeared?42 
A variety of civil servants commented on this question, but 
discussion was most animated in the Board of Trade, the department at 
the heart of more general industrial reconstruction matters. Here some 
officials favoured solving the productivity question within the context 
of a much wider package of macroeconomic measures.43 Others, 
however, argued that, though such an approach might no doubt yield 
benefits, overall success would not be achieved unless there were 
parallel interventions at a micro level, particularly over what was seen 
as the key question of management. The case put forward by this latter 
group and the policy initiatives that followed form the subject of the rest 
of this chapter. 
The Board of Trade first began to examine the management question 
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during the summer and autumn of 1943, as a response to growing 
government interest in a wide range of reconstruction problems.44 
Officials believed that, within firms, good management was the key to 
general efficiency. They observed, as well, that standards of manage-
ment varied considerably: while some bigger companies had done much 
to introduce modern practices, the situation as regards 'the majority of 
small firms', in particular, remained deeply unsatisfactory. This meant, 
as one adviser put it, that the potential impact of any advance here would 
be considerable: 'there is more scope for improvement at this level than 
is generally realized' .45 What appeared most necessary, officials 
concluded, was a government-backed body which could promote best 
practice and thus raise overall standards.46 
To test the water on this proposal, the Board's Internal Recon-
struction division decided that they should raise it with the Steering 
Committee on Post-War Employment, a high level body of senior 
officials which had been created by the Cabinet Committee on 
Reconstruction Priorities to adjudicate on a whole range of post-war 
economic policy questions.47 After some deliberation, the Steering 
Committee agreed that the Board had made a good enough case to 
warrant it making further investigations.48 The problem for officials 
was now to see how their ideas could be translated into practical 
recommendations. 
In developing their strategy, the civil servants recognised that no real 
progress would be likely without the active support of industry. A new 
official body could not, in other words, just be foisted on manufacturers, 
but must be created with their consent.49 In the light of this, the Board 
decided that its first move should be to consult in confidence with a 
variety of figures who were known to hold progressive views on the 
management question. How would they react to the idea of a 'Business 
Advice Bureau', set up and financed by the Government, which would 
involve itself not only in propaganda but also in research, and even 
in activities such as vetting the growing number of industrial 
consultants?50 
The information uncovered by these enquiries was both encouraging 
and daunting. Those questioned agreed that management standards were 
often rather poor, particularly in smaller firms.51 Moreover, it was 
generally accepted that Westminster should do something about this; 
that, as B.S. Rowntree put it, 'there was room for Government assistance 
in the development of scientific management in industry' .52 The investi-
gators even found a reasonable degree of support for their specific 
recommendations. L.J. Cadbury was not particularly keen on the 
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Business Advice Bureau (he wanted resources to be used on teaching 
management, especially in the provincial universities) but several other 
respondents emphasised the need for some central co-ordinating body.53 
Against this, however, the Board had its attention drawn to a whole 
range of practical difficulties which stood in the way of any kind of 
intervention. It was clear, for example, that the trade unions would be 
somewhat suspicious of what was being proposed. A Ministry of Labour 
official noted that the term 'scientific management' would, at any rate, 
have to be avoided in discussions with the unions since it was 
'associated with the worst faults of the industrial consultant' .54 More-
over, the Board's business advisers warned that their own views were 
probably untypical, and that many employers might actually be hostile 
to the measures proposed. In part, this stemmed from the widespread 
belief that the less the Government had to do with industry the better.55 
But it was also reported that many employers held more specific 
reservations about the whole idea of improving the management 
function. Management, in this view, was an art and not a science, and so 
research and education were hardly appropriate. The end product was a 
general indifference to the whole question of amelioration, as the 
prominent industrial consultant L. Urwick reported: 
My own experience is that it is extraordinarily difficult to persuade 
even comparatively enlightened business people that scientific 
management is just as important to them as engineering or chemical 
or physical research. They always tend to regard it as a fad which 
they pursue in an amateurish sort of way and along cheap lines.56 
In the light of all of this, the Board decided to widen its enquiry to 
encompass existing management organisations. If one could be found 
that was sufficiently influential, it might be boosted with government 
help into a new nucleus, thus avoiding the problems of a full-bodied 
intervention. Did any have the right potential? 
The prospects here looked unpropitious. Most of the ten or so 
functional associations (the Institute of Production Engineers, the 
Institute of Labour Management, etc.) were very small (with between 
one and three thousand members) and so were impecunious and had 
limited impact.57 Moreover, petty rivalry seemed to be endemic: as a 
Board informant put it, 'Each association was interested in its own 
particular branch of management and tended to be jealous lest other 
associations should encroach on its field. ' 58 Finally, it was apparent that 
taken together, these organisations had most contact with big business, 
and much less with medium and small-sized firms. 
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Better prospects for the Board seemed to lie with three quasi-
umbrella institutions: the Institute of Industrial Administration (IIA), 
Management Research Groups (MRG) and the British Management 
Council (BMC). However, on investigation it was clear that there were 
problems here too. The IIA appeared to be the most vigorous of the 
management organisations, having grown from 550 members in three 
branches at the beginning of the war to 1,400 members in 14 branches 
by 1943.59 The aim of this body was to raise standards, principally by 
providing a well-developed system of examinations for its members to 
progress through, and this certainly had something in common with the 
spirit of the Board's own thinking. On the other hand, it could not be 
denied that the IIA was still rather small, with an income of only around 
£3,500 per annum. At the same time, the composition of its member-
ship provoked unease. There was a sprinkling of directors in the 
organisation, which the Board liked, but not all that many functional 
managers of the highest grade, which it did not. Additionally, members 
tended to be drawn from a relatively narrow range of sectors - 'the 
munitions industries in the wider sense' - and, once again, the bigger 
firms. The Board could only conclude, therefore, that the IIA, though it 
was certainly a worthwhile organisation, would not be suitable in any 
wider role. 
The MRG were a collection of 119 firms in eight sub-sections which 
ran regular meetings and some research on questions of mutual 
interest.60 What made this aggregation attractive was its high level of 
activity and the fact that counted among its members were a number of 
notably progressive companies. Board officials were told, further, that 
the Federation of British Industries (FBI) looked on the MRG with great 
favour and often referred management queries to them. On the other 
hand, there were obvious problems with Group 1, the most prominent of 
the sections, and the one containing the biggest firms. 61 It was known 
that many Group 1 members had very good track records on 
management innovation and research, but close investigation revealed 
that few wanted this knowledge made public, a factor that dramatically 
diminished the usefulness of the organisation in any new project. 62 On 
top of this, the Group 1 Secretary, who had much influence through the 
MRG, proved at best uncompromising when approached by the Board. 
As one official recorded, dealing with him could be both complicated 
and vexing: 
The trouble is that he is inarticulate and exceedingly odd in his 
manner. Yet he has acquired a great and detailed knowledge of 
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management affairs through his long association with . . . Group 1 
firms. He is slightly mad, I think, but there is possibly a germ of sense 
in his madness.63 
It appeared unlikely, therefore, that the MRG would fit easily into any 
government scheme. 
This left the BMC. Yet here, again, there were problems. The BMC 
had been formed after the Sixth International Management Conference, 
held in London during 1935, in order to help to prepare the British 
contribution to the Seventh Conference, scheduled for New York three 
years later.64 Subsequently, some useful work had been done, promoting 
education in management and attempting to reduce the overlap between 
the different management associations, especially in the regions. 
Activity had been suspended during the early years of the war, but it was 
now understood that Lord Leverhulme, always the key figure in the 
BMC, wanted some kind of relaunch. However, as with the other 
organisations, surface promise hid fundamental problems. Board 
enquiries revealed that the BMC had never been able to recruit many 
members from industry. There were doubts, too, about Lord 
Leverhulme, whom one leading BMC figure described as 'not a suitable 
person to develop a live co-ordinating body' .65 Finally, potential 
difficulties seemed to surround the organisation's relationship with the 
FBI, which had apparently been far from uncomplicated. A Board 
official put the situation as follows: 
I gathered the impression ... that the Council was backed in the first 
place by the FBI (closely associated in this matter with Management 
Research Group No. 1) because there was a degree of national and 
international dignity attached to it, but that the interests which were 
prepared to back it for this purpose were not enthusiastic about the 
genuine promotion of the management movement - in fact, I suspect 
they were anxious to prevent it becoming too strong, but the war 
conveniently intervened. 66 
Reviewing its enquiries, therefore, the Board recognised that it was 
facing a rather uncomfortable dilemma. Information gathered on 
management standards suggested that these were often abysmally poor. 
In fact there was a widespread ignorance of modern methods, especially 
in small firms, typified by the fact that there were 'scarcely any good 
British textbooks on industrial management' .67 On the other hand, it was 
not easy to see what could be done to improve things. Progressive 
manufacturers and experts agreed that there was probably a good case to 
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be made for some kind of state-supported Business Advice Bureau. Yet 
much of the rest of industry was indifferent or hostile to this idea, and 
that included the most important representative body, the FBI. One way 
out of this difficulty might have been to use an existing management 
movement organisation as a core for the Board's initiative, but investi-
gation of this possibility had provided little encouragement. Most man-
agement institutions were too small and introverted; as one civil servant 
put it, 'there are many organisations but too little organisation ... there 
is confusion (chaos might not be too strong) in a clamour of separate 
interests each striving for special recognition of its own subject or form 
of organisation. ' 68 In addition, the one or two that might have formed a 
new nucleus had, on closer inspection, enough unattractive features to 
render each of them unsuitable. 
One way out of this quandary would have been to drop the whole idea 
of any government-backed initiative on management, but civil servants 
recognised that this was not really an option, given the future economic 
difficulties which the country faced. The only possibility, therefore, was 
to try to maximise support for the Board's general ideas and hope that 
the details of any necessary policy could be worked out as things went 
along. Specifically, as G.L. Watkinson, the Under Secretary who had 
co-ordinated much of the enquiry on management expressed it, the 
baton would now have to be handed to Board allies. 'We have to get 
from outsiders', he concluded, 'a strongly backed request for action on 
these lines to which the Government can accede.'69 
In the end, it was decided that the best way to achieve this would be 
through a high-powered independent committee, which could 
investigate the whole question of management in British industry and 
make recommendations to the President. Civil servants agreed that the 
best person to chair this body would be Sir Cecil Weir, a leading 
Business Member who had been very successful in the pre-war world of 
Scottish commerce.70 Other names floated included R. Rootes, 
B.S. Rowntree, G. Marchand (Chairman of the ITA) and A. Loughlin of 
the TUC.71 The suggestion of this latter figure provoked some con-
troversy in the Board and, on reflection, it was agreed that her name 
should be withdrawn, since, though she was certainly well qualified 
to contribute, the employers' associations would not be represented 
and it was 'important to avoid a political tinge' .72 In further 
deliberations with the President, it was agreed that a safety-first 
policy would be best all round, and so the final committee line-up 
featured two further Business Members (B.H. Peter and G. Cunliffe) 
alongside the chairman Weir.73 
The rise of the management question 37 
The Weir Committee began work on 29 December 1943, with the 
following terms of reference: 
(a) To consider whether it is necessary to set up a central body to be 
responsible for improving the standard of management generally 
and to link the work of existing organisations specialising on 
particular aspects of management and, if so, what assistance 
Government should give. 
(b) To consider the function of such a central body and the difficulties 
of organisation which may be encountered in the course of its 
establishment. 
(c) To consider what steps could be taken to make advice on 
management problems available to small firms.74 
Its first priority was to assess the main protagonists and to gather 
information, and over the following two months it met with 43 
individuals and representatives, ranging from management consultants 
to official deputations from bodies such as the FBl.75 These con-
sultations covered essentially the same ground as the earlier Board 
enquiry and revealed a similar pattern of enthusiasm and doubt. Urwick 
once again backed an interventionist approach, arguing that 'the time 
had come to persuade the existing associations to sacrifice part of their 
identity in a central body'. But he warned that the Government's 
relationship with the new organisation would have to be carefully 
arranged; it might be a good idea to provide premises at nominal rent, 
but 'Treasury control resulting from financial aid should be very 
remote' .76 Against this, a number of informants were markedly less 
enthusiastic. The highly rated Treasury 0. & M. expert, I.J. Pitman, was 
not in favour of establishing a central body for management and argued 
that industry should sort out its own problems, using the accountancy 
profession in a new role. 
At the annual audit accountants could point out that other firms in the 
same industry were producing goods of equal quality at a lower price 
or with a smaller amount of labour .... He suggested that the trade 
organisations should collect information of interest to efficiency 
which should be available in confidence to accountants.77 
Several of the industrialists interviewed also expressed doubts, almost 
always on the grounds of their dislike of any extension of government 
intervention. A representative small businessman thus emphasised that 
he 'did not agree with the idea that any central body which might be set 
up should control management, and saw great danger in this'. The 
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answer, once again, was to leave industry to sort out the problem itself, 
on the basis that the 'art of management' was in any case 'a highly 
practical thing' .78 
More seriously for Weir, the peak associations also made it clear that 
they were not really interested in what the Board was suggesting. R.B. 
Dunwoody, representing the Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce, told the Committee that 'he regarded the principle of 
government grants to be a dangerous one to establish, since so many 
organisations could claim to be of national importance'.79 The FBI was 
equally negative. One of its representatives stated that 'his members felt 
that it had not yet been proved that there was a body of doctrine behind 
management as there was in technical subjects'. Sir Guy Locock, 
Director-General of the FBI, was more circumspect though in the end 
just as damning: 
Sir Guy said that the opinion of industry was that some instruction [in 
management] was needed, though there was a strong feeling that 
management was a subject that could only partly be taught, and it was 
felt that exchange of information between firms would greatly help 
in the right direction. 
He added a personal belief that encouragement must come through some 
central body, but noted that 'the FBI were unable to give their views on 
this matter since it had not been fully considered' .80 
Such attitudes were depressing and prompted Weir and the Board to 
do some stocktaking, to decide how best to proceed. A confidential 
memo revealed that 'staunch supporters' of the Board proposals were 
few and far between: the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 
B.S. Rowntree, J. Ryan (an influential director of Metal Box who was 
active in MRG 1), L. Urwick, the IIA 'possibly' and the BMC 
'possibly' .81 The need was clearly to win over some of the doubters. It 
was therefore decided that Weir should hold a meeting of repre-
sentatives of all of the interested associations in order 'to get their 
general co-operation on the project'. This occasion could be stage-
managed, with some exhortatory speeches and an intervention from a 
trusted 'plant' on the floor rallying those present behind a suitably 
worded resolution. It was agreed that an ideal statement of intent should 
read: 
That this meeting would welcome the setting up of a central 
organisation, sponsored by the Government, to stimulate the 
development and adoption of good management practice in 
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association with industry and with the existing organisations 
interested in management questions. 82 
The date fixed for this meeting was 9 February 1944, and invitations 
were issued accordingly. However, it was very soon obvious that things 
were not going to go as planned. Most of those invited to attend, 
including the TUC, responded positively, but this was not true of the 
employers' organisations. A National Union of Manufacturers repre-
sentative told Weir that he would be unable to come, 'but would be 
interested to see a note of what had taken place'. The FBI, too, reacted 
negatively, with Locock informing Weir 'that he would be most 
interested to hear the outcome of the meeting next week' but that 
'Unfortunately none of his members would be able to be present as they 
had another engagement' .83 
All of this was something of a blow, but worse was to follow at the 
meeting. Weir himself opened the proceedings with a speech outlining 
the need for what he now termed 'the British Institute of Management'. 
He was followed by a number of generally positive contributors, 
including Lord Leverhulme, Marchand, Ryan, Urwick and Rowntree. 
Things seemed to be going well, and so Marchand and Ryan introduced 
the agreed resolution from the floor. However, this did not have the 
desired effect, because many of those present still felt uneasy about the 
degree of government intervention that seemed to be implicit in what 
was being proposed. One speaker suggested that the words 'sponsored 
by' be amended to read 'associated with', while another felt that the 
right formula here was 'initiated and supported by'. After some debate, 
those present accepted this second amendment, passing a resolution that 
read: 
this meeting would welcome the setting up of a central organisation, 
initiated and supported by Government, to stimulate the development 
and adoption of good management practice, in association with 
industry and with existing organisations interested in management 
questions. 84 
This outcome may have pleased some of the less progressive elements 
present, but it angered those who actually wanted to get the whole 
problem resolved. P. Lindsay, of Morgan Crucible, wrote to Weir 
complaining that the sole result of the meeting was a decision 'to put old 
wine into a new bottle'. He added, 'I presume the greater and much more 
vital question as to how industry is to be persuaded to partake of the 
wine, will be debated on another occasion.' 85 Harry Ward, closely 
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associated with MRG 1, was even more critical. He recorded that the 
whole proceedings had been carried out 'in an air of naivete', with the 
real problem being neither formulated nor remotely resolved. He 
appended a list of specific complaints: 
1 There was no real representation of industry .... No FBI repre-
sentative was there. . . . The relation of the new body to these 
organisations was not even realised. 
2 No mention of trade and employers' associations was made ... 
3 The relation of the organisation to the Ministry of Labour, the 
Ministry most concerned, was not touched upon ... 
4 It was clear from Sir Cecil Weir's comments that he was not well 
briefed, and that he has no real appreciation of the job to be 
done.86 
Weir himself saw the meeting as a partial setback, though in many ways 
an inevitable one. He had come to the conclusion that industry would 
only be converted to the measures proposed in the medium term. The 
first priority was therefore to win over the specialist management 
organisations; they had 'done useful work ... and naturally they should 
be given an opportunity of contributing to the work of any new central 
body'. If the meeting had achieved nothing else, it had at least allowed 
this process to begin. The aim now, which the Board agreed with, was 
to write a report which would be sufficiently persuasive to convince the 
Treasury that the British Institute of Management deserved to be 
supported - an essential precondition if any further progress was to be 
made.87 
The Weir Report on Industrial Management was forwarded to the 
President, Hugh Dalton, on 23 February 1944. It began from the premise 
that management was a crucially important function which had all too 
often been inadequately developed. Indeed 'some' large firms and 
'many' of their smaller competitors were inclined to be 'self-satisfied' 
about the quality of their management.88 This situation demanded both 
'carefully planned propaganda' and 'a growing volume of information 
and advice' on modem management methods. Existing professional 
bodies had done good work in propagating ideas, but they were not up 
to what was now required, for a number of different reasons: 
The professional character of many of these bodies limits the extent 
of their propaganda and precludes the participation of the firms not 
large enough to employ highly specialised managers. Small firms, 
even if they were willing to subscribe to a sufficient number of the 
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twenty or so specialist bodies to cover the range of their operations, 
would rarely employ managers qualified for membership. Further, 
the ability of the organisations to undertake research ... is severely 
limited by lack of funds. 89 
The answer was to set up a new body supported at least partly by 
Government finance which 'would be the central stimulating force for 
raising the standards of management in the United Kingdom, and ... the 
authoritative spokesman for British management at international 
conferences and discussions'. This, it was suggested, might be called the 
'British Institute of Management' (BIM).90 
Having justified this key proposal, Weir next went on to sketch out in 
detail what the new organisation might look like. The Committee felt 
that membership of the BIM should be open to everyone who could pay 
a modest fee, and not conditional on involvement in an existing 
functional association, as some of those bodies wanted.91 As regards 
finance, Weir unsurprisingly came down in favour of government 
assistance. The success of the whole venture would only be likely if 
there were some large-scale activity very quickly, which a newly 
created organisation could hardly be expected to fund. Consequently, 
the Committee recommended that the Treasury be asked to make 
grant-in-aid of £75,000 for each of the BIM's first five years, with the 
hope that subscription income would be increasing all the time as the 
organisation established itself.92 
Finally, Weir moved on to look at the wider aspects of the BIM's 
relationship with the Government. The Committee recognised that so.me 
kind of supervision from Whitehall would be necessary, to make sure 
that public money was being spent properly and that the organisation 
was evolving on the right lines. But beyond this, it was stressed, 'the 
Institute should be free to work out its own policy and programme'. A 
similar perspective informed Weir's recommendations on how the BIM 
should actually be run: the Minister responsible (probably the Lord 
President) would appoint the first 12-person governing Council, but in 
later years some of this body were to be provided by elections of the 
membership. 93 
In presenting this report, Weir did his best to convince Dalton that the 
management issue was now fully resolved. The specific recom-
mendations in the document, he wrote, had been endorsed by 'a 
unanimous resolution at a very representative meeting of Management 
and other organisations'. In addition, it appeared that large sections of 
Whitehall were equally in favour. As Weir observed: 
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We have discussed the matter with representatives of interested 
Government Departments, and while the officials whom we met 
made it clear that they would not commit their Ministers, it seems 
more than probable that our recommendations and the general lines 
of the report will be warmly supported.94 
However, it was quite evident that many others of those who had been 
involved in the discussions did not share this view. Thus, opinion in 
departments of state remained quite divided, whatever Weir believed. 
The Board of Trade was, of course, behind the proposals, as were the 
Ministry of Labour and the Board of Education. But officials in the 
Ministry of Production made it clear that they were by no means 
necessarily sympathetic. A typical reaction came from N. Kipping, who 
felt that the BIM might easily be 'yet another management organi-
sation', albeit 'one perhaps of higher quality than the others'. The real 
answer, in this view, was for the Government to 'stimulate the existing 
organisations to set up a Council themselves' .95 
Outside Whitehall, too, doubt lingered on. The specialist manage-
ment associations felt that their prestige was threatened, especially 
given Weir's insistence that membership of the BIM should be open to 
all and not just confined to accredited experts.96 Moreover, it was an 
open secret that the FBI's position remained essentially unfriendly. 
After the completion of the Weir report, Sir Guy Locock had thought it 
advisable to seek the views of Sir George Beharrell from the Dunlop 
Rubber Company, who was the FBI's acknowledged expert on 
management matters. Beharrell's reply urged caution: he supported the 
resolution passed at the February meeting but wanted more details 
before making a further recommendation. It was essential, he added, 'to 
prevent the new Institute, if formed, from becoming the plaything of the 
so-called "efficiency experts"'. Furthermore, interference from 
Whitehall or Westminster must be sharply curtailed: 
I feel that the success of the proposal will depend on the limitation of 
Government interference .... 
If the Institute were to be run as a kind of Government Department I 
would not expect it to be very successful. It must be run by Industry 
and the sooner Industry could run it without Government help, the 
sooner would be its great success.97 
Such advice was very similar to that provided by the MRG's Harry 
Ward, who had already urged FBI opposition to the Weir report on 
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the basis that it was 'wrongly conceived and based on errors of 
judgement' .98 
All of this left the Board of Trade in a rather difficult position. Dalton 
was convinced by much of the Weir argument, and in fact wanted his 
department to be the link with the BIM if it were formed. On the other 
hand, he recognised that, given the opposition, if a strong enough case 
were not made out for the new initiative, then the crucial element of 
government support - finance from the Treasury - would not be 
forthcoming. To avoid this outcome, Dalton decided that the Board's 
next move must be the collection of further information on the poor 
level of British management, with the emphasis on concrete examples. 
Only when this task was completed would the whole question be put to 
the Cabinet. 99 
To conclude, how did the productivity question stand at the 
beginning of 1944? As this chapter has shown, interest in productivity 
had first been stimulated by the production crisis of 1941-2. This had 
generated ameliorative measures and at the same time changed attitudes. 
Most importantly, it had encouraged the belief, at least in Government 
circles, that the key variable in relation to productivity was 
management. Without better management, it was believed, all other 
possible reforms would fail. The end-product was the train of initiatives 
which led, as has been shown, to the Weir proposals. 
In all of this, the key players had been, of course, a small group of 
Ministers and civil servants. However, it was becoming obvious that 
others held views on the subject - sometimes strong views - and that 
these would almost certainly have to be taken into account during the 
reconversion period. The following chapter looks at what happened in 
the final year of the war, as outside interests began to play a more 
prominent part in influencing events. 
Chapter 3 
Debates and initiatives, 1944-5 
Until 1944, public discussion of Britain's post-war industrial future was 
fairly muted.1 During that year, however, and in the early months of 
1945, this situation changed considerably, as many came to recognise 
the severity of the country's economic circumstances. All sides accepted 
that Britain would need to export well above the pre-war level once 
peace was declared, and that consequently home industry would have to 
become very much more efficient. But there was far less agreement 
when it came to proposing how exactly this latter objective should be 
attained. The Labour Party believed that Britain's plight was desperate 
- so stark that Morgan Phillips could declare before the 1945 election, 
'We must modernise orperish'2 -yet doubted if private enterprise alone 
was up to leading a recovery. The answer was for the state to become 
involved in industry and to force the adoption of up-to-date methods. 
The Conservatives, on the other hand, argued that capitalist entre-
preneurs were, for the most part, more than fit to conduct the 
reconstruction process; the main danger was of Whitehall's bureaucrats 
stifling native initiative. In peacetime Britain, the Tories asserted, the 
state might be the servant of industry, but never its master. This chapter 
looks in more detail at these contrasting approaches; examines how they 
were received by others involved in the debate; and concludes by 
considering what the widening political divide meant for policy 
formation in the Coalition Government's final year. 
It is appropriate to start with Labour thinking on production and 
production-related issues because, of all of the participants in the 
argument about Britain's industrial future at this time, it was Labour that 
more often than not made the running. The party's ardour here stemmed 
from a number of different factors. One influence was a growing 
understanding among its leaders and supporters that desired welfare 
reforms would not be possible in a bankrupt country. At a more prosaic 
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level, there was, too, the hard experience of key figures such as Cripps, 
Bevin, Morrison and Dalton, Coalition Ministers who had seen Britain's 
industrial ills at first hand and in some detail. Out of these influences 
came a distinct and coherent set of policies, designed above all else to 
boost economic efficiency as soon as possible once the war had been 
won. 
Labour approached the peace, of course, with a long-standing 
commitment to a range of social reforms. Yet its leaders recognised that 
the economic foundations on which welfare policies would be built had 
become distinctly shaky. There was, most obviously, much bomb 
damage, and a greater amount of war-related disruption. Moreover, a 
crippling lack of recent investment meant that even relatively untouched 
facilities often seemed dilapidated and wholly unsuited to efficient 
production, as Cripps reported in early 1945: 
Our factories are many of them completely out of date, and we are 
years behind in their equipment with ... up-to-date machine tools 
and machinery of all kinds. 3 
It was clear, certainly, that Britain's trading pre-eminence had gone 
forever, even if Germany and Japan were temporarily removed as 
competitors. The country, to quote Cripps again, was 'no longer the 
workshop of the world, but merely one of many workshops' .4 
This meant that, for Labour, economic and social objectives became 
more and more related and intertwined. Morrison could thus tell readers 
of the Daily Herald during May 1945: 
Social security and social reform and a permanent advance in the 
economic life of our people can only proceed with greater efficiency 
in industry, greater production and a greater national directive to 
national economic ends.5 
Lord Latham made the point even more bluntly when he argued in the 
same paper that 'Socialism will only succeed if we make it pay in a 
greater national income' .6 
In such circumstances, it was inevitable that for many in Labour's 
ranks the key questions were increasingly about how the desired 
measure of economic growth could best be engineered. One line of 
thinking here focused on various macro policies.7 Nevertheless, it was 
also widely accepted that there would have to be micro interventions, 
too. Labour argued that this was inevitable because private enterprise 
was simply not up to the tasks at hand, whatever the wider framework: 
one could not gain, as Morrison put it, 'a quart of Socialist prosperity out 
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of a miserable pint capitalist pot' .8 The reasoning employed here was 
coloured partly by ideology, but mainly by experiences gained in 
conducting the war. Thus, at an abstract level, Labour believed that 
some important branches of industry were dominated by monopolists, 
who were essentially interested only in preserving their own bloated 
earnings. 9 Yet even if this argument were put on one side, the weight of 
evidence still came down against unregulated private enterprise. The 
war had revealed starkly, for example, that many small capitalists were 
indifferent to technical innovation. The simple fact, as Cripps, a veteran 
of over 500 wartime factory visits, constantly reiterated, was that the 
typical entrepreneurial outlook remained profoundly conservative, 
revealed most damagingly in a deep suspicion of 'so-called-new-
fangled methods' .10 Moreover, the existing type of employer would, it 
was felt, find it particularly hard to adapt to changes that were taking 
place in popular attitudes on the shop floor. Labour analysts believed 
that workers were now, largely because of the war, better educated and 
more confident than ever before. If full employment were achieved in 
the first years of peace, these characteristics would be greatly 
reinforced. There could be no going back, therefore, to the kinds of 
harsh industrial discipline prevalent in the 1930s, and new, more 
progressive methods would have to be tried. Again, it looked as if 
private enterprise, if left to itself, would be neither willing nor able to 
make such a change.11 
In the light of these difficulties, Labour suggested that optimal 
reconstruction would only be achieved through, in Morrison's idea, a 
'ladder of control' .12 The party was determined to regulate some sectors 
directly, through nationalisation, and others very closely, using 
anti-monopoly legislation.13 On the other hand, it accepted that these 
types of policy would only be feasible or applicable in a minority of 
cases - wholesale nationalisation, for example, was simply politically 
impossible, even if in fact really desirable.14 Further down the ladder, 
therefore, Labour would have to develop strategies which, while 
respecting private ownership as a fact, nevertheless tried to move 
industry in a progressive direction. Given the wider resource position, 
such strategies could not mainly be about, for example, pumping in 
subsidies to aid re-tooling. Measures were needed which could boost 
efficiency as quickly as possible and as cheaply as possible. This 
inevitably meant some reliance on techniques that had been used in the 
war. 
The package that Labour finally proposed included several different 
components.15 One idea, which had first been proposed by Morrison in 
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March 1943, 16 was for a set of enquiries into various backward 
industries. These investigations would hopefully facilitate thinking 
about what Whitehall interventions would be most beneficial in each 
circumstance and in parallel contribute to the spreading of good 
practice, by identifying techniques used by the more efficient firms in 
each sector.17 Secondly, Labour made it clear that it remained convinced 
about the merit of JPCs, and expected that they would have an important 
role to play in promoting productivity growth after the war. 18 The 
party's position on this subject rested on several foundations. Observers 
on the Left generally believed that JPCs had been a success in the war, 
achieving what was expected of them. 19 At the same time, the JPC idea 
fitted in with wider Labour ideals about how people should be treated, 
at work as much as in society. Bevin was a particular proponent of this 
view: 
Men will follow when they know they are getting a fair deal, and at 
this time in our development this means that they must be treated as 
equal partners and must be given the facts. 20 
On a more technical level, finally, the JPC could be seen as an institution 
whose time was very much just about to come. Labour observers, to 
repeat, believed that old forms of industrial discipline would most likely 
be inappropriate in the first years of peace, because of the impact of full 
employment. In this scenario, linking the worker to the enterprise 
through participation was one of the best instruments left for ensuring 
labour commitment. Cripps was not alone, therefore, in believing that 
the JPC' s crucial role would be 'in stimulating the individual worker's 
interest in output, and thereby increasing his efficiency'. 21 
The third component in Labour's package was concerned with 
management. The war had, of course, focused attention on management 
as never before, and this was as true in the ranks of the Left as elsewhere. 
Amongst Labour Ministers, there was a growing awareness that 
managers could play a vitally important part in making or breaking an 
enterprise.22 What was needed for the future was a cohort of managers 
who were both technically competent and attuned to (once again) what 
were predicted as the coming industrial relations realities. This meant 
that there would have to be a departure from the 'old haphazard idea that 
anyone with some technical know ledge could be the boss'. 23 In future, 
as Cripps in particular tirelessly argued, the function must be thoroughly 
professionalised. Anything else was unacceptable: 'there is really no 
more right for an unqualified person to manage a factory than for an 
unqualified doctor to perform an operation. ' 24 
48 Industrial efficiency and state intervention 
In practical terms, therefore, there would be a need for what the Weir 
Committee had already recommended - a strong central institute of 
management, backed by the government, which could build up the 
necessary professional and educational standards.25 
This was a significant departure for Labour, and, within its own 
ranks, quite a controversial one. In the inter-war period, the party had 
done relatively little thinking about management, hazily assuming that 
the Webbs' nouvelle couche sociale would play its part with compe-
tence and integrity should any industry ever actually be nationalised.26 
Perhaps consequently, there remained many in Labour's ranks who 
continued to see management as the enemy, merely the most clearly 
identifiable face of the capitalist class. In part this was nurtured by trade 
union attitudes, gut feelings against those who gave the orders on the 
shop floor. But there was also a more theoretical underpinning at play 
here, derived from James Burnham's recently published The Managerial 
Revolution.27 This book, with its quasi-Marxist jargon, had caused quite a 
stir amongst Left intellectuals, and was viewed by some as a timely warning 
of the totalitarian consequences which would result from allowing 
managers too much power. Nicholas Davenport added an extra twist to 
such anxieties by predicting, in the columns of the New Statesman, that the 
managerial state was most likely to develop during a period of Labour rule, 
because of the party's stated intention of placing large blocs of industry 
under nationalised, and therefore bureaucratic, control.28 
Naturally, such propositions could only vex those of Cripps's 
disposition, and so there was a steady stream of counter-argument. 
Much of this came from the pen of Austen Albu, one of the few Labour 
supporters other than Cripps to have had management experience. 29 In 
Albu's view, the growth of the large-scale joint stock enterprise in the 
pre-war period had caused profound changes in the relationship between 
owners and managers, such that the latter had in many cases come to see 
themselves as independent experts, dedicated to efficiency rather than 
the narrow profit and loss mentality of the capitalist. The war had 
strengthened this trend if only because so much responsibility was now 
placed on management's shoulders. As a group, therefore, managers 
could not be seen as having inherent social and political interests. On the 
contrary, they could be won to Labour, given the right approach. One 
essential of this, for Albu, was that there would have to be a new kind of 
outlook in the Labour Movement. The days of purely oppositional 
politics were past; Labour and the unions must become involved in 
shaping the fate of the enterprise, and act in an intelligent and informed 
way, so as to complement management skills.30 
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This was a powerful case, and it gained from being both optimistic 
(certainly in contrast to Burnham's prognostications) and apparently 
congruent with what was known of recent Soviet experience.31 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, much of what was being proposed soon found 
its way into the official party view. Thus, 'Licinius', in Vote Labour? 
Why?, a propaganda booklet issued just before the 1945 election, could 
suggest that, of all of the parties, only Labour wanted the manager 
merely to be him/herself. Indeed socialism meant precisely 'carrying the 
managerial revolution to its logical conclusion' .32 
The fullest exposition of Conservative views on the country's 
manufacturing prospects was the 1944 report, Work: The Future of 
British Industry, a document that had emerged, under Henry Brooke's 
guidance, from the Tories' Central Committee on Post-War Problems.33 
The argument presented here was based on a sober assessment of the 
nation's likely post-war trading position: 
When peace returns, for the first time in our history we shall find 
ourselves facing the prospect of an adverse balance of payments not 
likely to be less than £200,000,000 a year or nearly half the average 
annual value of our pre-war exports.34 
In these circumstances, it followed that the government had an 
over-riding duty to help industry in whatever ways were possible. Much 
effort would have to be put into perfecting international agreements 
which were capable of generating prosperity. At the same time, it was 
also accepted that Whitehall had a part to play at home. However, this 
was very different from the one outlined in Labour plans. 
The Conservatives began from the belief that over 'the whole broad 
field of industry, private enterprise generally best serves public 
service' .35 Quick reconstruction and economic survival therefore 
depended upon giving entrepreneurs their head: 
It was private enterprise that designed and built the Spitfire and the 
Lancaster. The same qualities of brain, hard work and courage are 
what we shall need most, when the time comes to turn Britain's great 
productive capacity back with all speed from war production to meet 
the world's peacetime needs.36 
Two observations followed from this. The first was that direct govern-
ment control of industry must be avoided at all costs. Nationalisation 
remained deeply objectionable on ideological grounds, but its major 
fault was that it encouraged inefficiency. Nevertheless, and here was the 
second conclusion, accepting this did not mean that the state should 
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simply be banned from the whole industrial sphere. The crucial point 
was that Whitehall should see itself in a supporting role, as the provider 
of the best possible climate in which private enterprise could thrive. 
There was no room for a repetition of the pre-war pattern, when the 
attitude of government towards industry had allegedly been 'narrowly 
regulative, restrictive, [and] negative' .37 
In practical terms, therefore, the central focus of state-industry 
relations was to be around a new 'Ministry of Industry and Commerce', 
an institution 'inspired by a more positive and constructive conception 
of its duty to help British industry to grow healthily, make good any 
weaknesses, sell its goods, and provide employment' .38 In addition, state 
agencies might play a part in promoting scientific research and technical 
education; developing and enforcing a location policy; and policing 
monopoly abuse (though this was not seen as a major threat). The report 
recognised that unity of purpose within firms would be important during 
reconstruction and it endorsed joint consultation ('The principle 
inherent in Joint Production Committees ... should continue to find a 
place in British industry in peacetime'),39 though it implied that 
Whitehall should do no more than proselytise over such matters. 
Brooke's document received a good deal of attention in Conservative 
circles,40 and was broadly endorsed by leading figures such as Lord 
Woolton, who took up the refrain that a post-war Tory government 
would not intervene across the board, but merely 'give such encourage-
ment as properly felt within ... [its] competence' .41 Nevertheless, the 
tenor of the analysis was felt to be too complacent by some on the left 
of the party, and efforts were made to develop an alternative set of 
proposals. The outcome was the Tory Reform Committee's Tools For 
The Next Job, published in early 1945.42 This document began with a 
much more pessimistic account of Britain's economic circumstances 
than had appeared in Work, focusing especially on the productivity gap 
which existed between home and US industries. Nor did it share the 
official document's great faith in unregulated private enterprise, 
suggesting that business was often slump minded and most interested in 
restriction.43 The end product was a set of policy prescriptions which 
involved the state far more than Brooke had felt necessary. 
The Reform Committee began from a belief that the country's 
problems were related essentially to its lack of up-to-date capital 
equipment and plant. The situation was so serious that it could only be 
resolved with some government involvement. What this meant in detail, 
the Committee argued, was that Whitehall officials should sit down with 
industry and decide upon a national programme of modernisation. 
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Individual firms would then be expected to decide the details of how 
they were going to reach the specified targets, with the necessary 
expenditure financed partly from the centre (through a mixture of grants 
and tax concessions). Meanwhile efforts would be made to secure 
labour's co-operation by allowing workers to participate in the formu-
lation of the overall policy, always provided that they dropped 'arid 
political discussion' and instead dedicated 'their intimate knowledge of 
industrial practice ... [to] the cause of expanding productivity' .44 In this 
proposal, therefore, the government was to act as both facilitator and 
ringmaster. The Committee hoped that compulsion, though it might be 
necessary, would never become widespread. In the worst cases, 
recalcitrant firms might have to be forced to pursue national goals but, 
in normal circumstances, bolstering the entrepreneur's bank account 
and promising him or her full independence would be enough to ensure 
compliance.45 
Measured against previous Conservative policies, this sounded quite 
radical, and so there was a measure of debate within the party as to 
whether it was at all acceptable. Some critics of business conservatism 
were clearly impressed by the proposals, and even succeeded in getting 
a degree of support for them from the rank and file. 46 Nevertheless, at 
the top of the hierarchy, attitudes remained essentially unchanged, and 
so Conservative leaders entered the election campaign urging measures 
of a much more traditional type. Typical here was an article in July 1945 
by Oliver Lyttelton, which accepted that Whitehall had some role to 
play in promoting productivity growth, but emphasised again that the 
mainspring of change must be private enterprise. Above all, the Minister 
concluded, the government 'should not concern itself with the actual 
running of any industry, a function for which it has no aptitude or 
experience' .47 
Thus far, it has been suggested that in the last year or so of the war, 
there was a growing divide between Labour and Conservative Parties on 
future industrial policy, with the former proposing a much greater 
degree of state involvement. The following paragraphs extend the 
argument somewhat by looking at how other institutions, interest groups 
and commentators reacted to this polarisation. Could one or other 
political party claim to represent a wider consensus, or was the cleavage 
inside politics replicated without? 
The press, to begin with, took quite a lively interest in industrial 
affairs at this time,48 though much of the comment, in line with various 
long-standing allegiances, simply reiterated party positions. On the 
Right, therefore, The Daily Telegraph came down strongly in favour of 
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the Tory approach. The paper was in no doubt about the severity of 
Britain's economic plight, even to the extent of questioning whether the 
country could really afford the Beveridge reforms.49 Nevertheless, it 
was equally certain that private enterprise would rise to the challenge, as 
long as labour behaved itself (dropping forever the restrictive practices 
that had been suspended for the duration of the war) and the government 
provided the right kind of support.50 This latter condition was crucial, 
since too much interference might smother initiative. To achieve the 
right balance, the Telegraph concluded, administrators must remember 
the 'principal lesson' of the war: 'that Government should be the active 
ally of industry, not its repressive tyrant, nor the conductor of one vast 
State monopoly' .51 
Against this, on the Left, the News Chronicle broadly supported the 
Labour case. There should be, it warned, no 'delusion' about the state of 
British industry. Nor could plans for new kinds of welfare provision 
'conceivably fructify' unless exports were increased. Entrepreneurs 
might be able to achieve this latter objective on their own, but the 
prospects were not encouraging. The government must therefore hold 
itself ready to intervene: 'If our industries cannot themselves attain a 
reasonable degree of efficiency, there will be a strong public demand for 
State interference; and this demand Parliament will find it difficult to 
resist.' 52 
Amongst less partisan commentators and publications the balance of 
support was more complicated, though there was certainly a drift to 
Labour as the Allied victory approached. The Economist was 
particularly concerned by the productivity gap which had opened up 
between Britain and America (quoting Rostas), and editorialised at 
some length about possible solutions. Efficiency, it argued, should 
become a national priority: 'To the two existing slogans of "Full 
Employment" and "Social Security" there ... needs to be added a third, 
"Productivity", on which the first two depend.' 53 This might or might 
not mean central government involvement, according to the circum-
stances; but Labour statements on measures to improve efficiency were 
'indeed welcome' as at least pointing in the right direction.54 Scope, the 
business journal, took a similar line, though concentrating on the 
narrower question of industrial management. There was, it argued, 
much to criticise in the way in which British firms were run, though 'a 
highly trained, highly professional management' would be the first 
essential if recovery were to be achieved. In these circumstances, 
Cripps's speeches on management were wholly laudable: what he had to 
say 'needed saying' and would bear 'repeated emphasis' .55 
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Labour case also received some 
backing from Edward Hulton, the influential publisher. Hulton observed 
that in pre-war days, it had been assumed, on the subject of growth, that 
the owner would be 'the driver' while the trade unionist would be 'the 
guard and the brakesman'. The position was now very much more 
complicated, because big business tended to be run by a new class of 
managers. At one level, this was a wholly welcome development, 
because managers were primarily concerned with efficiency. Yet, 
Hulton insisted, the situation needed to be watched closely, because it 
might easily degenerate, as Burnham forecast, in a totalitarian direction. 
Given this danger, the argument ran, there was every reason for a 
prominent government and trade union presence in the administration of 
business.56 
Turning to industry itself, it is again evident that division rather than 
consensus was the most prominent characteristic in debate. Labour's 
plans received support from the unions, and from a number of 
progressive managers. On the other hand, the plans were strongly 
opposed by most employers, who wanted nothing less, when it came to 
issues such as the state's relationship with industry, than a quick return 
to the pre-war status quo. The reactions of each of these groups will now 
be elaborated on in tum. 
In looking at what was going to happen once the war ended, there was 
a strand in union opinion that argued for what was seen as a return to 
basics. The unions had been drawn into all kinds of unusual 
arrangements because of the national emergency bµt, when the war was 
over, they would be best off returning to what they really knew, the fight 
for the rights of their members. Thus, the official-tumed-MP Tom 
Fraser could argue, for example, that the management of industry was 
'not the function of the Trade Union Movement': 
Trade Union leaders ought to be experts in their own industry, but 
their chief function must remain that of serving their members by 
representing their grievances to management and employers.57 
Against this, there were others who believed that the lesson of the war 
was that unions should become more involved in industry, building on 
their recent admission into the corridors of power to influence decision-
making over a wide range of issues beyond mere wages and conditions. 
G.D.H. Cole was a particularly keen proponent of this latter view, 
because he felt that there was no real alternative. Britain would be in 
economic crisis after the war, necessitating an increase in efficiency 'at 
a great rate'. Industry, in these circumstances, could not remain static: 
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It must modernise its processes, and it will have to change the use 
which it attempts and is permitted to make of its labour force and the 
relations which exist between employers and workers.58 
Thus, the unions would be confronted with a new set of problems, and a 
choice as to how they should react to them. Cole hoped that the outcome 
would be fresh, more flexible and imaginative union strategies. 
Certainly, he warned, a refusal to change would be economically 
damaging and politically disastrous: 
I am afraid of the Trade Unions and the more restrictive type of 
employer coming together in such a way as to perpetrate 
[restrictionism] ... and hold the consuming public to ransom by 
acting jointly in defence of standard margins of profit, standard 
wages, standard conditions.59 
Different parts of the union movement reacted to these arguments in 
different ways. Nevertheless, at leadership level there was a growing 
acceptance of the Cole position. 60 This meant, in terms of the industrial 
policy debate, that an older union rhetoric demanding public control of 
business on grounds of moral equity was now recast so as to reflect fully 
the importance of the efficiency issue. The end product was strong 
support for the type of policies in Labour's programme. 
The most authoritative exposition of this new union thinking came in 
the TUC's Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction, which was 
accepted by the Blackpool conference of 1944.61 The authors of this 
document conceded that the union movement's primary purpose must 
be the pursuit of bread and butter issues - wages and conditions, full 
employment, perhaps an advance in industrial democracy - but went on 
to insist that action here must be accompanied by activity on broader 
issues. This wider focus was necessary, they argued, because real 
advances in everyday standards for the membership would be unlikely 
so long as the entire economic system remained unplanned and to some 
extent dominated by the whims of selfish monopolists. The need, 
therefore, was to reform industry in such a way as to promote expansion, 
which in practice meant adopting a package of measures similar ( though 
not identical) to those proposed by Labour: nationalisation of key 
sectors, tripartite boards regulating those industries that were left in 
private hands, and JPCs.62 Only these kind of policies would, it was 
claimed, be able to break the log-jam and thus guarantee popular gains: 
One of the strongest arguments for ... forms of public control which 
we propose is that these changes are essential for efficient industrial 
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organisation and to ensure that industrial efficiency serves its proper 
purpose of improving the standard of life of the community. 63 
The Interim Report represented quite a bold departure in trade union 
affairs, but its adoption was clearly the reflection of a trend rather than 
an isolated occurrence. In fact, new thinking was surfacing over a 
number of issues and in a variety of places. There were, therefore, 
several locally produced alternative industrial plans, in which individual 
unions attempted to apply the approach of the TUC document to their 
own particular circumstances.64 Typical of these was a National Society 
of Pottery Workers' reconstruction report which explicitly recognised 
both that growth in efficiency was crucial and that its achievement 
would necessitate institutional reforms which were designed to curtail 
the power of some individual entrepreneurs.65 Symptomatic, too, were 
changes in union views on management. A significant number of 
ordinary members continued to see managers as the enemy or, at least, 
as the visible representative of the enemy. But this hostility - as in the 
ranks of Labour - was no longer all pervasive and had been replaced in 
some quarters by more open attitudes, similar to those advocated by 
Cripps and Albu. In this view, it was 'no part of the responsibility of 
management to associate itself whole-heartedly with . . . private 
capital'; rather managers should come over and join 'the community 
against vested interests'.66 Nor was this merely a rhetorical com-
mitment, as can be seen from the considerable growth of ASSET (the 
Association of Supervisory Staffs and Engineering Technicians) over 
the war years - from 1,786 members and 44 branches in 1939 to 11,000 
members and 220 branches in 1945.67 
It may be concluded from this brief examination that, when it came 
to industrial policy matters, Labour and the unions were marching for 
the most part broadly in step. On the other side of industry, however, the 
position was very different. Some managers and owners were, it is true, 
inclined to more liberal attitudes on issues such as state intervention and 
labour representation, often as a result, they claimed, of wartime 
experience. Yet this group remained a small (if vociferous) minority. 
The vast majority of business people wanted nothing more or less than 
a return to their pre-war prerogatives, especially to having the time and 
space to make a reasonable profit away from state or union interference. 
Exponents of the progressive case first came to the fore with the 
production crisis of 1941-2. During this period, as has been shown, 
management was faced with problems on all sides and at the same time 
bombarded with criticism. These were traumatic circumstances, which 
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provoked some people into arguing that the real problem was the system 
under which they worked, with all that this implied about the future 
arrangement of industry. One manager could assert, therefore, that there 
was a 'spirit of revolution ... abroad in England', epitomised by the 
'great many young men of all ages in the ranks of ... authority' who had 
decided that 'the old order must go'. In future, those at the top of 
industry should devote themselves not to profit but rather to 'the welfare 
of the country and ... its people' .68 Such a perspective might, of course, 
lead management into some strange alliances, but this would be no bad 
thing, as another executive candidly accepted: 
If Management ... really does feel that its primary responsibility is 
to the community, it is marching towards the same ultimate goals as 
organised labour - even, with few exceptions, as extremist labour 
organisations .... Industrially, as well as politically, internecine 
warfare means national suicide. 69 
This kind of histrionic comment fitted the mood of 1941-2, but gave 
way to more sober reflection once Britain's victory seemed assured. 
Two themes dominated the later analyses. One related to the practical 
lessons that could be learned from the great industrial push. Here, the 
major propositions tended to be about labour and its management. Thus, 
E.F.L. Brech, a colleague of Urwick's, argued in an influential article 
that the production front had shown that 'effectiveness in work' tended 
to be essentially 'a function of personnel relations', and therefore corre-
lated 'primarily with morale'. The logical consequence of this was 
that firms would in future have to take human relations very much 
more seriously, which, amongst other things, meant democratising 
decision-making: 
The only way in which full regard can be paid to the contribution 
which employees can make to the morale of their organisation is to 
invite them to share in its governance.70 
Such speculation about intra-firm relationships fitted into a wider 
framework of propositions about ownership and control. These, once 
again, revolved around doubts about the suitability of unregulated 
private enterprise. The war had demonstrated at a general level, the 
argument ran, that capitalism would not provide for social or national 
objectives without strong state involvement. The partnership between 
industry and government so recently evolved must therefore be 
extended to the peace, a point emphasised by the general manager of 
Osram to readers of Industry Illustrated during mid-1944: 
Debates and initiatives, 1944-5 57 
though I want to see private enterprise survive, I believe noblesse 
oblige is not a principle good enough to secure the harmony that we 
want. It is not enough to try to convince the people that private 
enterprise has had a change of heart and that it realises in a sort of 
feudal spirit its responsibilities towards its 'tenants'. I think whether 
we like it or not industry has got to be knit in with the State by some 
measure of Government control, which need not be hostile and need 
not be harsh, but must be something which will to some extent ... 
fortify the unaided consciences of those of us who are trying to 
manage industry.71 
All of this added up to a fairly moderate package, yet it was not one that 
the reform-minded found easy to make popular. In part, this was simply 
a logistical problem. Most of the leading progressive figures were 
associated with the fledgling management movement, and could 
therefore easily reach a number of like-minded enthusiasts. On the other 
hand, to communicate with those outside this circle remained very much 
more difficult. Many employers were biased against anything even 
remotely connected with the management movement, because they 
feared that the arrival of a third grouping might easily disrupt a 
laboriously built up network of bilateral agreements linking them to 
labour.72 Moreover, the prevailing feeling in boardrooms tended to be 
that managers had no business dabbling in industrial politics anyway, 
since their only responsibility should be to their companies. Indeed, 
Scope went so far as to claim that: 
the majority of employers do not recognise the right of their 
managers or paid executives to exercise any independent influence 
on industry: they pay them (so they say) to carry out the policies of 
the employers.73 
This was not an environment that encouraged the spread of liberal ideas. 
But what made the reformers' task considerably more difficult was the 
fact that even when their voices were heard, they tended to be 
accompanied by a barrage of counter-propaganda. Typical, here, was 
material emanating from the National Union of Manufacturers (NUM), 
an organisation supported by Austin, Dunlop and Courtaulds, as well as 
many other firms in lighter branches of industry. 74 The NUM' s position 
was that private enterprise had not failed the nation, in the war or before 
1939. Indeed, the suggestion of a 'decadent body ... somehow 
galvanised into life by the lightning flash of war and by association with 
government departments' was mere propaganda. 'Most people' knew 
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that British industry was 'thoroughly sound at heart and full of life and 
vigour' during the 1930s, and that this explained why it had been able to 
play so successful a role in a 'war of machinery and production'. 75 
The inevitable consequence of ali of this was that the larger slice of 
business opinion remained wholly untouched by the reformers' case. 
Nowhere was the mainstream's conservatism more in evidence than 
over questions relating to reconstruction. The FBI' s cautious position on 
post-war industrial issues had been signalled in its comprehensive report 
of 1942, and was now confirmed (as has been shown) in the jockeying 
over the Board of Trade's management initiative.76 Outside the 
employers' peak organisations, the key concerns were also of a highly 
traditional kind. Business opinion, observers noted, was usually quite 
complacent about post-war markets, and often most agitated by the kind 
of wage drift and extension of union power that had been a feature of the 
last two or three years.77 There was, certainly, no desire to experiment 
any further on issues such as control, and most employers, as an 
authoritative Ministry of Production survey found in 1945, saw little 
future even for the existing JPCs ('There is ... a pretty general opinion 
that the workers really have very little to contribute ... I do not think we 
should blink [from] the fact that unless ... encouragement is active the 
Committees will tend to fade out').78 Efficiency was sometimes 
mentioned as an issue - usually in terms designed to castigate 
government red tape - but more often than not was simply ignored. 
Thus, when The Times reviewed an FBI policy document on industry in 
late 1944, it was shocked to have to report: 'Searchers for a pronounce-
ment from this authoritative source on the efficient modernisation of the 
mechanical apparatus of British manufacturing . . . will look here in 
vain.' 79 
The conclusion that emerges from this survey is that there was no real 
consensus at this time when it came to discussion about future industrial 
policy matters. Labour had arrived at a fairly definite position, which 
seemed broadly congruent with statements emanating from the unions 
and from some progressive managers, but it was faced by a highly 
antipathetic bloc, consisting of the Conservatives and the majority of the 
employers. To complete the picture, it is necessary to ask how this 
political division was handled inside the Coalition Government. In 
practical terms, this means looking at the Board of Trade, since, of all of 
the departments, it was the one most involved over industrial 
reconstruction issues. The Board, as the previous chapter has shown, 
had already been converted to a measure of interventionism. How did it 
fare with this policy during 1944-5? 
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Board activity over this period was of two main kinds. Some of the 
department's effort went into intra-government politicking: the whole 
business, as an official described it, of trying to make others realise 
how unsatisfactory the position was before the war, why it may be 
worse and not better after the war, the very great importance of 
increased efficiency and, above all, the futility of expecting increased 
efficiency unless the Government takes energetic action'. 80 
On the other hand, it was always recognised that this battle would never 
be won unless the Board could come up with more than just general 
exhortation, and so great importance was placed on drawing up a 
realistic programme of ameliorative measures - 'a closely integrated 
policy for tackling and relating all the various aspects of efficiency and 
development' .81 This led officials to examine a wide range of possible 
options, relating to various questions of research, design, production 
and, as has been described, management. 82 
At first, the search for solutions appeared to proceed fairly smoothly, 
producing some valuable results such as the Weir Report. Nevertheless, 
by the beginning of 1945, it was becoming obvious that the Board had 
become bogged down, with all specific initiatives, as one senior 
participant complained, subject to 'continued delay ... due to circum-
stances that we cannot control' .83 The position over a proposed re-
equipment subsidy was typical. The idea had originated in the Board and 
then been put to other departments, but the result was only endless 
prevarication, as a report of January 1945 indicated: 
Ministers decided in February [1944] that the Treasury should work 
out a scheme with an estimate of costs. There was some official 
discussion in March, April and May, but since then no progress has 
been made. In July, the Chancellor wrote to the President saying that 
he thought the proposal should be dropped. Draft reply awaits 
President's consideration. 84 
What had gone wrong? Clearly, part of the problem was that all civil 
servants at this time continued to be greatly over-worked, since too 
many proposals were being pushed at what was, in any case, very 
cumbersome reconstruction machinery. Nevertheless, it is also apparent 
that other, more deliberate factors were in play, notably a variety of 
pressures from elsewhere in Whitehall which were aimed at 
emasculating the Board's position. To illustrate what was going on here, 
it is apposite to focus once again on the management question, since, as 
Chapter 2 has shown, Board initiatives over this issue were from the first 
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well developed, relatively high profile and quite controversial. What, 
then, had happened to the Weir proposals after their presentation to 
Hugh Dalton in February 1944? 
The President's first move on receiving the Weir Report, it will be 
remembered, was to ask his civil servants to contact other departments 
in order to collect hard information on cases where improved 
management had boosted productivity. The idea behind this exercise, 
Dalton explained, was to augment his hand if and when it was decided 
that the proposals on management should go before a full Cabinet 
committee. 85 
The Board's enquiries were completed by the middle of July, and 
confirmed the picture that Weir had already painted. Some businesses 
were efficient, while others had been made so with government help. On 
the other hand, the most striking finding was just how poor general 
standards were. As the report summarising the replies explained, 'the 
general experience of the Departments' was that there existed 'great 
scope for improvement in all branches of management'. Moreover, the 
'deficiencies in the field of management' were not confined to 
'particular aspects' but extended 'through the whole' .86 
While considering exactly how to proceed in the light of these 
findings, Dalton decided that he should alert his ministerial colleagues 
about the Board's wider perspective on the crisis facing Britain. 
Accordingly he put together a paper which pulled no punches in 
describing the urgency of the situation. One of the great dangers, he 
wrote, 'perhaps the main danger', was that the country would not see 
'clearly and easily enough' the grave difficulties that lay ahead of home 
industries in the transition. There was prevalent 'a hazily optimistic 
assumption' that Britain could easily secure an increase in the export 
trade, but hard evidence to suggest that this would happen was minimal. 
In this scenario, an increase in productivity was plainly indispensable. 
As the paper concluded, 'If we achieve the American standard of 
efficiency, we can, on British wages, look to the future with some 
confidence. But ifwe fail, we cannot.' 87 
Dalton's analysis was presented to the War Cabinet Reconstruction 
Committee's Sub-Committee on Industrial Problems at the end of July, 
together with a note from him which underlined the 'pretty bleak' 
prospects before the country and the need for 'vigorous and varied' 
action.88 However, despite all of his effort, most of the Ministers present 
were not impressed. In fact, several Conservatives went so far as to 
question the very basis of the President's view. Since Britain would be 
faced by a sellers' market after the war, they argued, much of Dalton's 
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pessimism was misplaced. If industrialists were holding back now, this 
was only because they needed reassuring about the Government's 
intentions. Given the correct leadership, all would come right, as Lord 
Woolton's 'private conversations' with various entrepreneurs had 
shown him: 'There was no lack of enterprise in a number of industries 
and if an export drive were initiated by the Government there would be 
a ready response. ' 89 The message was rammed home further a few 
weeks later when Dalton presented a second paper, listing possible 
measures which could be taken to promote exports and productivity; this 
was met, once again, with almost total indifference from most of his 
ministerial colleagues.90 
In the light of these setbacks, the President decided that he ought to 
move cautiously on Weir, and that his best tactic would be to collect 
official views on the Report itself, in order to identify any weaknesses 
in the proposals, and to rally support. Opinions were, therefore, 
collected from all of the departments concerned. This exercise showed 
that there was general backing for Weir in the Admiralty and in the 
Ministries of Works, Labour, Supply and Education.91 The Ministry of 
Aircraft Production, too, was in favour, with Cripps writing that he was 
'extremely anxious' that something should be done about the report 'as 
soon as possible' .92 On the other hand, Lyttelton' s Ministry of 
Production registered its opposition. The disagreement here was not 
with the substantive proposal (there was 'room for a properly 
constituted central organisation to study the problems of management') 
but rather with the suggested level of government involvement. As a 
Ministry official explained: 
we feel that an attempt to set up an organisation of this kind under 
direct Government auspices would be foredoomed to failure since a 
Government sponsored organisation would start with so serious a 
handicap of suspicion and distrust that it might never succeed in 
making good however sensibly and conservatively it were run. 
A better option, in the Ministry's view, was that there should be 'an 
endeavour ... made' to establish an independent organisation on a 
voluntary basis, capitalising on the experience and wealth of large firms 
that were already involved in the management movement.93 
Much more worryingly, the Board's enquiries also revealed that the 
Treasury position was far from helpful. It had always been recognised 
that support from this direction would be crucial, and so, when the 
Board put its case to the Treasury, it did so in very moderate terms. The 
Board noted that a management institute would not be viable if left to 
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private enterprise, since, as Weir continued to emphasise, industry in the 
main had still to be convinced of its usefulness. What was needed, 
therefore, was government start-up money - perhaps £50,000 - which 
could be added to subscriptions from big firms (possibly £5,000) to get 
the new institution functioning. Exchequer resources should only be 
provided, the Board emphasised, on the understanding that they would 
be temporary, and that the Government expected industry to respond 
and quite quickly take over funding altogether. 
This was a carefully argued case, but it proved inadequate to shift the 
Exchequer's scepticism. The Treasury's central objection was that 'the 
financial balance of the proposals' seemed 'wrong': 
In our view, the efficacy of the scheme very largely depends on the 
degree to which Industry itself is prepared to finance it. It follows that 
the Government's contribution should be a minor, not a major, 
proportion of the expenditure of the Institute; and should be 
conditional on funds being found from industry for whatever 
additional sum, on close and realistic consideration, is agreed to be 
the minimum necessary to make the project worth pursuing. 
The Treasury was therefore prepared to provide £5,000-£10,000 per 
annum, and to see the Board 'active in encouraging the promotion' of 
the proposed institute; but it wanted industry and the management 
movement to make the detailed arrangements about getting the project 
started, and the same sources to provide the bulk of the funding.94 
The extent and character of this opposition made it difficult to see 
what should be done next; in some frustration, Dalton asked Sir Charles 
Bruce-Gardner, one of the Board's most senior industrial advisers,95 to 
review possible options. The end product was a report, delivered in 
mid-January 1945, which essentially came down in favour of the 
Ministry of Production's earlier advice. Bruce-Gardner agreed that 
management had often been weak during the war, though he emphasised 
several mitigating factors such as the very rapid expansion of production 
and a loss of capable men to the forces. The need for the future must be 
to reach medium and small-sized firms (the most inefficient), but it also 
had to be recognised that these would be loath to involve themselves 
with any government-backed body. The Board, therefore, should forget 
the Weir proposals (which Bruce-Gardner felt to be poorly formulated) 
and instead do all it could to get industry involved in helping itself, 
which in practice meant encouraging big, progressive firms to share 
their knowledge and resources.96 
Dalton, beset by other problems at the Board,97 told his officials that 
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he was inclined to accept this advice. However, a last-minute inter-
vention from Cripps led to the Ministers agreeing that they should make 
one final effort on behalf of Weir and should suhmit his proposals to the 
Cabinet Reconstruction Committee's Sub-Committee on Industrial 
Problems.98 Accordingly, Dalton drew up a paper detailing the different 
possibilities over the management institute and underlining his own 
support for Weir.99 
This was presented to the Sub-Committee in early March 1945 but 
did little to change existing attitudes. Cripps recorded his support for 
Dalton but ran into sustained opposition. Indeed some (un-named) 
adversaries among the Ministers present were now prepared to argue not 
only that state intervention in management matters would be pernicious 
but also that management was not, in any case, a science that could be 
perfected. The end product was an instruction to Dalton that he should 
explore possibilities within the following highly conservative 
guidelines: 
A better course than that proposed in the [Weir] Report would be to 
suggest to employers' associations that the Government would 
welcome the combination in a central body, with council, of the more 
valuable of the existing management organisations .... This would 
provide the advantages of a central focus for study of management 
problems, a library and other needed facilities .... There would ... 
be no question of the Government providing finance. 100 
Some days later, when this outcome was discussed in the Treasury, a 
senior official minuted that the Weir Report's condition was now 
'grave', while another added the written comment that it should 
'R.I.P.•.101 
In the light of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Coalition 
Government was as divided on productivity related issues as interests in 
the rest of the country. Again, the key issue concerned intervention. 
Labour Ministers such as Cripps and Dalton argued that the state should 
be used to force change, but they were continually frustrated by their 
Conservative colleagues, who took a more laissez-faire approach. The 
next chapter looks at what happened once this impasse was resolved 
with the resumption of electoral politics. 
Chapter 4 
Early post-war efforts, 1945-7 
The election campaign in 1945 revolved around a number of issues, but 
Britain's industrial future was certainly at the centre of debate.1 The 
electorate was confronted with a fairly clear-cut choice. Labour was 
pessimistic about the state of industry, and therefore stressed the need 
for drastic measures. Some sectors, it was true, had performed well 
during the war, and could be left to develop on their own. But others had 
'wholly or partly failed' and would therefore need careful attention. 
Policy prescriptions here ranged from outright nationalisation in a 
minority of cases to 'constructive supervision' in the majority, the aim 
being always to increase efficiency.2 The Conservative approach also 
stressed the need for greater productivity, but there was a much greater 
belief in the Tory ranks that private enterprise could rise to the 
challenge. The essential condition, the party argued, was that 
entrepreneurs should be allowed to operate freely. Controls must be 
dropped as quickly as possible. There could certainly be no question of 
long-term state involvement, as Mr Churchill's Declaration of Policy to 
the Elector emphasised: 
As against the advocates of State ownership and control, we stand for 
the fullest opportunity for go and push in all ranks throughout the 
whole nation. This quality is part of the genius of the British people, 
who mean to be free to use their own judgement and never intend to 
be State serfs, nor always to wait for official orders before they can 
act.3 
Given this division in approach, it was inevitable that Labour's final 
triumph on 17 July would provoke intense speculation amongst the 
owners of industry. Was Britain now headed down an entirely new 
industrial road, featuring wholesale nationalisation and coercion? In 
the business press, some stressed Labour's realism and essential 
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moderation. The party had a distinctive approach, and it would deal with 
industrialists gently but firmly. However, there would be no rush to 
impose ideology for its own sake; the 'wiser heads in the party' were 
'keeping policy in line with the brittle facts' .4 Yet such soothing opinion 
did little to calm nerves in the boardroom. The Financial Times noted 
that the new government's arrival was causing 'apprehension' across 'a 
wide area of private enterprise' .5 A journalist writing for Business was 
also struck by the fear and hostility that existed in some quarters, noting 
that 'our investors and business leaders' could now be divided into three 
categories: 
1 The Defeatists, who are living partly on capital, clamouring for 
higher dividends, and exclaiming 'Apres nous le deluge!'. 
2 The Die-hards, determined to fight to the last ditch for the return 
of the 'good old' order of society. 
3 The Progressives, who, with faith in the country's future, are 
striving to reach a compromise with the new spirit of our 
times.6 
Within the incoming government, the lead role in promoting industrial 
policy was immediately given to Cripps, appointed President of the 
Board of Trade. Cripps had, of course, guided MAP' s initiatives on 
productivity during the war and was certainly the Minister most clearly 
identified in the public's mind with industrial modernisation, being 
described, for example, by one periodical as 'a fanatic for business 
efficiency'. 7 Moreover, the Board of Trade's general remit gave plenty 
of scope for innovation: it had responsibility for about 70 manufacturing 
industries outside of engineering, which covered nearly half of the 
factory workers in the country.8 
Cripps certainly recognised that he faced a challenge and immed-
iately set out to brief his department on Labour's policy objectives. The 
new administration would have to play a more interventionist role: 'It is 
the policy of the Labour Government to take a much closer interest in 
the performance of British Industry than has been done hitherto.' No 
Board industries were to be nationalised, so this meant effective 
supervision. The aim had always to be improved functioning: as Cripps 
emphasised, 'We must in every possible way, staff, buildings, 
machinery, management, research and design, make our industries as 
comparatively efficient as possible.' 9 Specifically, the immediate focus 
was to be on setting up Working Parties, reactivating the idea of a 
central management institution and ensuring the continuation and 
broadening of MAP' s efficiency advisory service. 
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In initial discussion at the Board on Working Parties, it was agreed 
that a small number should be set up as quickly as possible, in order to 
provoke a quick improvement in actual industrial practice and at the 
same time provide a factual basis for determining longer term policy. 
Cripps was in favour of a common format - equal number of employers 
and workers under an independent chairperson - and it was agreed that 
an initial batch of target industries might include pottery, wool, 
footwear, furniture and hosiery, all sectors that would be vital in 
providing exports. Consultation with both the FBI and the TUC revealed 
that neither body was immediately hostile, though Board officials 
recognised that they would have to move carefully if any kind of 
consensus was to be maintained.10 
In discussing the immediate aspects of this policy, Cripps became 
aware that he needed to be thinking about where tripartite investigations 
might lead in the longer term, and he therefore asked his officials to 
inform him about previous Board thinking on this theme. This inquiry 
revealed that a group of civil servants had been working on an Enabling 
Bill for Coalition Ministers, under which there was provision for 
Industrial Boards (on the lines of the Cotton Board) to assist in the 
co-operative development of, for example, research. But the big 
problem here had been the attitude of industry itself: when a circular 
soliciting views on the idea had been sent to over 100 employers' 
associations in late 1944, only about a dozen were in any way positive, 
with the majority not even bothering to reply. Moreover, the FBI had 
clearly indicated that it was against this type of legislation. 11 
This latter point reinforced Cripps' s perceptions about the 
conservatism of much of British industry, but he indicated that if Labour 
was going to set up some kind of permanent machinery in various 
sectors, it would not be of the kind envisaged in previous Board 
proposals. Labour, he emphasised, did not agree with 'so called 
"self-government" for industry' and wanted much more democratic 
structures. Officials were therefore instructed to do some further 
thinking on the whole subject, 'bringing the workers fully into the 
picture'. Indeed, Cripps's determination on this point was so strong that 
he was not even willing to consider any qualifications. Thus, when 
Raymond Streat of the Cotton Board urged him to be more flexible, he 
would not relent, leaving Streat to record in his diary: 'He seemed to be 
quite set on his tripartite conception and nothing I could say moved 
him.' 12 
The Board's recommendations on Working Parties were put to the 
Lord President's Committee on 27 August, exactly one month after 
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Labour's election triumph. Cripps based his case on the perception that 
'a high degree of industrial efficiency' was 'a national interest of the 
first importance'. In the light of this, he argued that a useful starting 
point would be investigations into various trades, with the object of 
generating 'agreed and considered' statements about how practice might 
be improved. These enquiries should be conducted by joint teams and 
should focus only on 'major questions', so that they would be completed 
very quickly. Cripps repeated the list of industries that he felt were 
suitable for treatment (all 'highly important from the point of view of 
consumer needs' and perhaps 'export significance'), adding that he now 
favoured handling cotton in a similar fashion. The President also 
included some indication of his thinking on longer term policy, 
suggesting the establishment in each industry of 'a permanent advisory 
body which would be the channel through which the Government would 
keep in touch with the progress of the efficiency plan'. These bodies 
would be tripartite and advisory, like the Working Parties. Compulsory 
action might be necessary in extreme cases, but it would be for the 
government, and the government alone, to exercise such powers.13 
Much of this was quickly endorsed by Cripps' s colleagues, but there 
was one area of disagreement. Cripps had argued, to repeat, that 
Working Parties should be made up of equal numbers of trade unionists 
and employers, under an independent chairperson. However, other 
Ministers were doubtful of this formula, suggesting that, with only one 
outsider present, the two sides of industry might collude against 
considering any radical recommendations. The Working Parties should 
therefore be made up entirely of impartial members or at least with 
independents predominating. Cripps's reply to this was that he did not 
want sectors to feel that the government was 'imposing schemes of 
reorganisation on them without full knowledge of the conditions in the 
industries'. Consequently, there could be no question of excluding those 
from the various trades involved. Nevertheless, the President agreed that 
an augmented independent presence would be acceptable, and it was 
decided that the final formula should involve each of the three 
constituencies in equal proportion. 14 
With his ministerial colleagues behind him, Cripps next turned to the 
task of convincing industry about the merits of the Working Party idea. 
He had, as mentioned, received indications of co-operation from the FBI 
and TUC but, while the unions continued to support the new initiative, 
it was quite clear that employers were far more hesitant. The President's 
statement about the future of the cotton industry on 13 August, which 
promised no nationalisation if industry co-operated in modernisation, 
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was designed to calm nerves and according to the Financial Times had 
something of the required effect.15 Yet it was quite evident that 
apprehension and even hostility still remained. 
Thus, opinion in the upper reaches of the FBI turned out to be rather 
mixed. In discussions during August, Sir Clive Baillieu (President of the 
FBI) argued that Cripps was not to be feared. He had gained the 
impression from talking to the Minister 'that the great bulk of 
industry ... would continue to be run by private enterprise'. Moreover, 
even in relation to Working Parties, there was no suggestion that the 
government wanted to impose solutions, only stimulate industry to 
provide its own. As Baillieu concluded, Cripps's 'primary purpose as 
regards these industries was to make private enterprise work more 
efficiently'. However, others were more suspicious. There was, for 
example, a feeling that the Working Parties would interfere with 
management's right to manage and would boost the trade unions. 
Worse, the new bodies might be the first stop on the road to national-
isation. In this situation, the majority concluded, the FBI should move 
with stealth. There were dangers in outright opposition on 'purely 
political grounds' both because it might alienate public support and 
because it might provoke the government into stronger action. The right 
strategy must involve two prongs. On the one hand, the FBI must use the 
'first class opposition' to put the public case for unrestricted private 
enterprise. On the other, it should engage in a campaign of discreet 
lobbying to influence those at the Board. As Beharrell insisted, every 
effort should be made 'to see that His Majesty's Government was 
carried out in accordance with what appeared to industry to be the wisest 
policy' .16 
In the industries where Working Parties were scheduled to be 
implemented, opinions also varied. Private contacts which the Board 
had with the hosiery manufacturers suggested that, though they disliked 
being classified with the cotton industry (a notorious bastion of 
inefficiency) and being given only equal representation with the trade 
unions, majority opinion was 'not unfavourable' to the idea of the 
enquiry itself.17 Against this, the cotton employers continued to 
emphasise their opposition to the whole Working Party idea. According 
to The Times Trade and Engineering, there was 'a strong feeling ... 
[that it] was not desirable and ... would not serve any useful purpose' .18 
Similar views held sway in the Potteries. Thus, the Stoke Evening 
Sentinel warned that the Working Party plan was 'insidious and sinister' 
and added: 'This is not nationalization, which purports to pay "fair 
compensation" for what it takes. It is pure and unadulterated 
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confiscation. It is political brigandage.' 19 Moreover, familiar fears 
surfaced when a Board emissary met the Pottery Manufacturers' 
Federation. The employers claimed that they had nothing against an 
enquiry, but rejected Cripps's format. They argued that the suggested 
body had been deliberately designed to keep them in a permanent 
minority position. More seriously, it seemed to push the industry ever 
nearer state control: 
The manufacturers ... feared that as a result of the recommendations 
of the Working Party they would be committed to a permanent Board 
or Council which would, through the Government, impose 
unwelcome and undesirable interferences with the business of 
individual firms. 20 
Given these attitudes, Cripps concluded that he ought to proceed with 
caution and diplomacy. He recognised, first, that as his advisers argued, 
the choice of chairpersons to lead the Working Parties might be crucial 
in determining employer attitudes21 and took care to ensure that the high 
profile appointment for cotton - Sir George Schuster22 - was a figure 
who would be acceptable to the Manchester employers.23 At the same 
time, Cripps made something of a concession over the question of how 
the employers' representatives on the Working Parties would be chosen, 
agreeing not to nominate as he saw fit but rather to accept the 
recommendations of manufacturer bodies, provided that at least one half 
of those put forward were under 45 years of age (a stipulation that 
would, it was hoped, curtail the influence of the older and more 
reactionary).24 Finally, the President was also prepared to provide more 
direct reassurance, going out of his way to visit key manufacturing 
centres of the industries in question and to talk to those involved. In each 
case, Cripps emphasised that he did not aim to replace private enterprise 
and that the Working Parties were only temporary institutions. His 
speech at Stoke was typical: 
Sir Stafford ... told them that his plan did not mean nationalisation, 
and that he did not want to 'boss' the industry. He said that the 
Working Party was a device which had been used during the war and 
indicated that it would be dissolved when its work was 
accomplished.25 
These tactics seemed to bring results, so that by early autumn the Board 
felt that it could detect a definite softening in employers' attitudes.26 
Thus, when Cripps came to announce the first five Working Parties 
(covering boots and shoes, cotton, furniture, hosiery and pottery),27 in 
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mid-October, he prefaced his remarks by stating that he had received 
'the most cordial co-operation from both sides of industry' .28 
Nevertheless, it was quite clear that industry did not see itself as a 
willing convert to the Minister's views. Indeed, some manufacturers 
l:>elieved that it was they, and not Cripps, who had emerged with most 
from the first round of negotiations. A leading figure in the Hosiery 
Manufacturers' Association made this point clearly, and also revealed 
the extent of the inter-industry collusion that had been going on, when 
he told his members in private: 
Many of the fears that we had in mind have been dispelled by the 
assurances which we have received and I think it is true to say that 
they are far removed from our original conceptions of the Board of 
Trade's intentions. We have worked closely with other industries and 
this approach has been fully justified and has contributed effectively 
towards removing some features of the original proposals to which 
we should have taken strong exception.29 
The decision to revive the idea of a central management institution 
attracted rather less controversy than had occurred with the Working 
Parties. Cripps was, of course, a long-term supporter of profes-
sionalising management and so, on taking office, he immediately wrote 
to Dalton, the new Chancellor, arguing for the creation of an Institute of 
Management 'as soon as possible'. The new initiative would be crucial, 
Cripps declared; 'an essential weapon of attack upon inefficiency in 
Industry'. The only outstanding decision concerned finance: while the 
Weir recommendation of £75,000 p.a. for five years seemed 'excessive', 
it might be necessary to provide a £150,000 start-up loan and then 
£25,000 p.a. to 1950.30 
Dalton's response to this estimate was caution. He knew by experi-
ence that 'a lot of the bodies, individual and corporate, now active in this 
field' were 'very second rate' and agreed that Weir's figure was far too 
high. At the same time, he was also under pressure from some of his 
officials, who still believed that 'the Institute must be of industrial, not 
of Whitehall, paternity' .31 Nevertheless, in the end Dalton, too, felt that 
a fresh start was necessary and agreed to provide £150,000 over five 
years on the understanding that the Institute would then be 
self-financing. 32 
Cripps's final initiative was the creation of the Production Efficiency 
Service (PES). The President had, of course, supervised MAP's 
Production Efficiency Board and Technical Costs Branch during the 
war and he felt that 'the reception by industry of these services was 
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co-operative, and the results were valuable' .33 It was an obvious step, 
therefore, to create a consultancy service in peacetime. Cripps's first 
move, once again, was to consult the TUC and FBI about their reactions 
to such a plan. 
The TUC recognised that the position had changed somewhat with 
the ending of hostilities, because improvements in efficiency would 
now 'in many cases, tend to increase private profits'. However, the 
country's perilous economic situation was such that a PES would be 
acceptable so long as it kept any joint consultation machinery 
informed of its activities and did not concern itself with piece rates 
or time studies.34 The FBI's position was equally hedged in by 
conditions. Some employers were worried that firms might be 
pressured into accepting consultancy and stressed that the scheme 
would only be successful if it were voluntary ('It would be resented if it 
were supervisory or with a concealed baton'). Others argued that the 
whole scheme was misplaced: it would swallow up qualified experts 
who were already doing a good job in industry and perhaps sustain 
inefficient outfits that really deserved to die. The outcome was a 
resolution that expressed somewhat conditional support. The FBI was to 
recommend that employers co-operate with the Board over the PES, 
provided that the scheme was 'voluntary and advisory'. At the same 
time, the President would be reminded of the staffing problem and the 
'danger of keeping the hopelessly inefficient alive' .35 
These reactions were hardly unexpected and did little to deter Cripps. 
He had always intended that the initiative should be built on consent and 
stressed to his colleagues that 'the first incisions into any industry' must 
be 'through firms who would volunteer'. However, the President had 
already been contacted by many undertakings wanting assistance, and 
so felt that this was hardly a problem. In fact, the only point raised in 
relation to the President's idea when he presented it to the Lord 
President's Committee concerned the charges that the PES should levy, 
but Cripps's emphasis on the important role that the service might play 
convinced the Ministers that it must in fact be free.36 
Much of Cripps's early work at the Board was, therefore, about 
creating institutional structures. However, the President was also aware 
that his policies needed to be explained to the public at large, and so a 
part of his first few months at the job was spent in what was really public 
relations work. Typical of this was a keynote speech, widely reported in 
the press, to the Lancashire and Cheshire Federation of Trades Councils 
at Blackpool on 9 September. Cripps began his address on this occasion 
by reminding his audience of the 'extreme difficulties that confronted 
72 Industrial efficiency and state intervention 
the nation'. 'They were not', he emphasised, 'on the eve of entering 
Utopia.' Britain had fought a war which had effectively 'destroyed' its 
economy. The country might borrow its way out of its immediate 
predicament, but it was necessary to look further ahead than that and to 
opt for 'the much harder but more honest and self-reliant way of 
working out our own salvation'. 
On the basis of this sobering assessment, Cripps went on to outline 
what was required in practice. He emphasised that British industry was 
often very backward. Inefficiency, in tum, had led to a poor industrial 
relations climate. The end product was a 'vicious circle' of decline. 
What was needed, therefore, was for someone to break the circle, and 
this meant government action ('it was for the Government to see that it 
was broken, and broken quickly'). Cripps wanted the Board to be the 
agent that helped private industry to modernise. It was in these terms 
that his specific initiatives - the Working Parties, the management 
institute, the Production Efficiency Service - could be justified. 
However, there was no question of coercion or of taking advice only 
from manufacturers. The government wanted to proceed on a tripartite 
basis and hoped that 'a great and important part would be played by 
trade unionists' .37 
This was a moderate and conciliatory message, and it gained from the 
fact that it was so obviously fully compatible with wider government 
policy. Thus, all Ministers were convinced that enhanced production 
was absolutely essential if there were to be any advance to socialism.38 
Moreover, there was also agreement with Cripps's key conception that 
the government should be 'a helping partner' to industry. Labour 
certainly wanted to nationalise some sectors, but it recognised that 
ownership in most of manufacturing would remain undisturbed. There 
could be no quarrel with private enterprise, only with, in Morrison's 
phrase, 'private unenterprise' .39 The need was to get all parts of each 
industry to work as efficiently as the best in their industry. 
By October 1945, therefore, Labour had arrived at a definite set of 
policies in relation to what it wanted from industry and had made its 
objectives widely known. Neutral commentators remarked upon the 
administration's clear intent, with Industry Illustrated, for example, 
observing: 
There can be no question of the present Government's serious 
determination to make British Industry the most efficient instrument 
possible for restoring the country to an early condition of solvency.40 
The next part of this chapter will look at how these intentions fared over 
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the period to the end of 1947, looking in tum at the Working Parties, the 
management institution and the PES. 
The first batch of Working Parties, to repeat, were created in mid-
October 1945 and, in the wake of this launch, Cripps had immediately 
to decide how the whole scheme might in future develop. He had 
originally envisaged a rolling programme, telling the Daily Herald: 'We 
propose month by month to pick out new ones [i.e. new sectors suitable 
for the working party treatment] until we have been through all the 
major industries ... not dealt with by other Departments. ' 41 Yet he was 
now advised by some of his senior officials that such an agenda might 
be politically unwise. 
Civil service caution was founded upon the perception that the 
Working Party idea was provoking rather mixed comment in media and 
interest group circles. The Economist and the Financial Times generally 
welcomed Cripps's innovation, though each felt that the enquiries 
should have been given more of a co-ordinated focus (as the Economist 
put it, the Working Parties had been sent off 'into the wilderness of 
industrial policy without any course to steer or any compass to assist 
them in holding to it'). Industry Illustrated, too, was broadly favourable, 
though rebuking the President for not including managers as a part of his 
conception.42 Yet there was also a bloc which argued that the whole 
scheme should be terminated. Thus, The Daily Telegraph talked of 
'committees of outsiders thrust upon industry from above', a theme 
embroidered further by the Statist, which warned: 
There is a strong possibility that working parties will in fact 
degenerate into groups of busybodies whose interference in the 
domestic affairs of industry will merely make for reduced efficiency 
and wholesale resentment.43 
More worrying still was the open hostility being shown by the National 
Union of Manufacturers. This organisation's position was founded upon 
general and specific logics. On the one hand, the Union did not accept 
Labour's basic premise that industry was often very backward: after all, 
Britain had 'put up a magnificent show during the war', and it could do 
so again in the post-war years 'if our people. are allowed to get on with 
the job'. Anyway, the Working Party idea as currently conceived was a 
poor one because it put the employers in 'the position of a criticized 
minority'. In fact, the Union predicted that the new bodies would 
degenerate into 'factions of sectional interest' - 'far too much like the 
ugly things which reared their heads on the Continent and which we 
have defeated with so much suffering and loss'. 44 
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Given this variable comment, the civil servants concluded that 
Cripps would be wise to proceed with some care. The President could 
not ignore his critics; moreover, on the best reading, he could assume 
only that he had received 'acquiescence, not full support, from 
industry'. The sensible course, as the Board's Permanent Secretary, Sir 
John Woods, carefully outlined, was to institute a pause: 
Personally ... I should prefer, before being publicly committed to 
particular enquiries in a second batch, to have seen a report or two 
and to have got the public reactions to those reports. This, it is true, 
might involve a delay of as much as two or three months. But this 
would not necessarily be an excessive premium to pay against the 
risks.45 
Cripps obviously considered this advice closely, but in the end decided 
to persevere with his original conception of the programme. As he 
explained, five industries did not provide a large enough sample on 
which to build a long-term industrial policy. Equally, there could be 
adverse political reactions from the Government's own supporters if 
there were any delay in setting up further Working Parties. The only 
option, the President decided, was to press on down the road that was 
already being followed.46 
Over the following few months, therefore, there was a considerable 
expansion in the dimensions of the programme, with Working Parties 
being established in a further twelve industries - carpets, china clay, 
heavy clothing, light clothing, rubber-proofed clothing, cutlery, 
glassware, jewellery and silverware, jute, lace, linoleum and wool.47 
This meant that by April 1946 the Working Party apparatus had reached 
quite impressive proportions. The new institutions covered industries 
employing over one million workers, a third of those in manufacturing 
industries other than metals and chemicals or a sixth of all Britain's 
factory population.48 Moreover, Cripps had been able to draw in some 
fairly impressive names as chairs or independent panellists, including 
General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam (Adjutant General to the Forces), C.R. 
Morris (Head of King Edward's School, Birmingham), N. Pevsner (the 
architectural historian) and L.S. Sutherland (Principal of Lady Margaret 
Hall, Oxford).49 However, none of this stilled the critics, and much 
antagonistic discussion of the Working Party idea continued inside and 
outside Parliament. Churchill was quoted as saying that Cripps was 
'putting Socialist nominees' on to Working Parties, an unsubstantiated 
allegation but one that received much press coverage.50 Lord Woolton 
told the Sunday Times that the President was almost daily acting 'the 
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schoolmaster to industry', lecturing it on 'the need for improving 
efficiency and management'. He concluded with a broadside at the 
whole Labour stance: 
The truth is the Government has taken on more than it can do; the 
business of Government is to lay down the broad principles for the 
well-being and good conduct of a country. When it attempts to 
determine the detail of operations it is taking on a task for which it 
has neither competent staff nor the quick machinery that detailed 
commercial decisions demand. The great trade drive of Britain is 
being stifled at its birth.51 
The first two Working Party reports were published at the end of May 
1946. The document on pottery appeared first and contained thirty 
specific recommendations.52 The Working Party began from the view 
that the existing employers were still vibrant enough to solve the 
problems that they faced: 'The present state of the ... industry is not 
wholly satisfactory, but it has retained sufficient strength and enterprise 
to set itself on its feet without intervention by the Government in the 
operation of free competition. ' 53 Nevertheless, a number of reforms 
were urgently required, and these the Working Party proceeded to 
identify. There should, it argued, be strict enforcement of the Factory 
Acts, statutory minimum wages and a much simpler remunerations 
structure, so as to improve the conditions oflabour. Secondly, there was 
a clear need to modernise the manufacturing process in many 
establishments, in particular by introducing flow-production methods 
and reducing the number of lines on offer. Furthermore, most ancillary 
functions in the industry were inadequate: all firms should improve their 
research and art and design activities, and systemise their costings 
techniques. Finally, the Working Party turned to considering how these 
changes could be encouraged. Manufacturers had in the past, it was 
recognised, been involved in a degree of collusion and this would now 
have to be discouraged by public scrutiny of financial data. The specific 
recommendation here was summarised as follows: 
Because of the existence of voluntary price agreements in the 
industry all firms should be required to supply the Government with 
regular information about their profits and, as soon as a costing 
system can be worked out, their costs of production.54 
In addition, the Working Party felt that there was a need for a 'standing 
Pottery Advisory Board', constituted, once again, on a tripartite basis 
under an independent chairperson. Such a body would, it was argued, be 
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able to follow up points raised in the course of the existing enquiry; 
'initiate and pursue investigations to further the efficiency of the 
industry'; and 'communicate to the Government matters that the 
industry [ wished] ... to put before it' .55 
The Working Party report on cotton was a much longer and more 
complex document, running to 278 pages and 34 recommendations.56 It 
was also notably marked by a division of opinion: while Schuster, one 
employer and all of the trade unionists were fully behind the main 
report, three independents (led by John Jewkes of Manchester 
University) and three manufacturers accepted only a proportion of its 
recommendations and had added a 21-page 'Memorandum of 
Dissent'. 57 
The 28 points on which all agreed covered a number of different 
subjects. There was a need, it was stressed, for a comprehensive survey 
of existing plant and an independent enquiry into the textile machinery 
industry. Furthermore, many ancillary functions, as with pottery, needed 
improvement. Firms must introduce better and uniform methods of 
costing, and enhanced training schemes to improve the quality of their 
managements. Market research activity, too, needed to be expanded and 
focused around a newly created central marketing company, owned 
co-operatively. Moreover, some effort was required to make the 
industry more attractive to labour, with the minimum condition here 
being an immediate review of wage arrangements. Finally, all on the 
Working Party were also convinced that little progress on these specific 
recommendations would be made without some central body to chase 
them up. Accordingly, again as with pottery, there was backing for a 
new tripartite body, 'The Cotton Council', with specific responsibilities 
over, for example, the plant surveys, market research and training.58 
Where opinion divided was over the issue of what to do with the 
industry's spare and out-dated capacity. Schuster and his allied 
signatories of the main report believed in a substantial degree of 
rationalisation, which was to be achieved using compulsory powers. 
Their recommendations therefore outlined schemes for amalgamation, 
the scrapping of redundant machinery and the provision of re-equipment 
subsidies. Jewkes's group, on the other hand, were completely against 
this kind of interventionist policy and felt that the free market should be 
left to ensure that the industry would reach an optimum size. Unwanted 
combination could only introduce the abuses attendant upon an 
oligopolistic market structure.59 As the trade union members of the 
Working Party sourly observed, this boiled down to a pair of 
long-standing laissez-faire propositions: 
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Firstly: 'You must trust each employer to know what is best for his 
own business and leave him to settle his course without any 
suggestion of fitting in to a common plan.' 
Secondly: 'If you want to get more production, the chief way to do 
that is not to improve mechanical equipment, but to get more out of 
the workers.' 60 
Because these were the first two Working Party reports to appear, their 
publication generated much attention in the newspapers and periodicals. 
Both The Times and The Economist gave considerable space to the 
pottery document, praising its thoroughness. Each felt that the report 
was unlikely to prove contentious (indeed The Economist went so far as 
to call it 'anodyne').61 Others were quick to emphasise the enquiry's 
apparent backing for private enterprise. The NUM Journal found the 
report 'refreshing' because it was 'a complete vindication' of the 
existing owners - it pointed to 'deficiencies, but not inefficiencies' .62 
The Financial Times made a similar point. The Working Party had done 
'a businesslike job' and its recommendations were 'without detectable 
political bias'. Employers could collectively feel much reassured: 
'Despite proverbs about single swallows, the fear that working parties 
necessarily foreshadowed radical Government interference in the affairs 
of non-nationalised industries should be slightly allayed by the first 
report to be published. ' 63 The cotton report provoked even more 
comment. All were agreed that the enquiry had been worthwhile, with a 
correspondent in Industry Illustrated calling the report truly important 
and 'justifying the Working Party mechanism in no uncertain manner' .64 
Perhaps surprisingly, there was also a measure of consensus against the 
Jewkes approach. The Economist, it is true, believed both cases on the 
issue of intervention to be not proven, and regretted the lack of 
agreement.65 However, the New Statesman, Manchester Guardian and 
the Spectator were roundly critical of the 'Memorandum of Dissent', 
with the latter going so far as to characterise it as a 'sentimental search 
for some Victorian elysium' .66 
In Government circles, most attention focused inevitably on the 
cotton report. Cripps had had to interrupt his Board duties and go on a 
mission to India, but he was kept fully informed of the position that was 
developing. His officials were upset by the dissent in the report, fearing 
that it would encourage 'the recalcitrants' in the industry and hide what 
had been agreed.67 As they informed Cripps, the situation was now very 
delicate: 
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The employers, fortified by the independent members, have taken a 
stand in opposition to Schuster that probably goes beyond their real 
feelings. A wrong move now might harden the opposition into a 
continuing policy of non co-operation. Operatives naturally enough 
have moved in the opposite direction .... Stage is therefore set for a 
period of clash and antagonism, employers saying 'Hands off the 
industry', operatives saying 'Nationalize', moderate elements on 
both sides being submerged. The industry cannot afford the time for 
sterile and embittering controversy.68 
This left Cripps with very little room for manoeuvre, and he therefore 
decided to buy time. The Government, it was announced, would wish 
'before final decisions were reached, to have the opportunity of 
discussing some important aspects of the proposals with bodies 
representing employers and operatives in the industry'. Meanwhile, 
immediate action would be taken where there was no controversy, for 
example over the planned enquiries into existing plant and textile 
machinery supply. At the same time, recognition would be given to the 
Working Party's recommendation about a new tripartite body by asking 
the existing Cotton Board to take on new functions.69 Here, Cripps was 
able to provide further reassurance, since he had managed to convince 
Sir Raymond Streat, widely respected on both sides of industry, to 
become both chairman of the Cotton Board and of any successor body. 70 
With these immediate points settled, Cripps turned to consider what 
he should do about the Working Party strategy in general. All at the 
Board were agreed that as many people as possible should read the 
reports, and so each was issued at very modest price (the pottery 
document cost ls 3d, the cotton document 3s 6d). There was general 
recognition, too, that many of the recommendations needed to be 
followed up and so the Board formed a small but high-powered 
'Working Squad' to monitor what was being done on each specific point 
and to encourage progress.71 More generally, the Government had to 
decide whether any new legislation would be required, now that both 
Working Parties had come out in favour of a centralised board with a 
degree of power. On this issue, however, Cripps turned out to be fairly 
determined. He had resolved that 'a short four or five clause Bill 
empowering the Board of Trade to set up Industrial Boards etc.' would 
be included at the beginning of the next parliamentary session, in 
November 1946. All that now remained was to consult the peak 
organisations on their views about this, since the President 'agreed on 
the importance of carrying the FBI, etc.' with the Board's thinking. 72 
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The FBI had played a waiting game during the early months of 1946 
but, with the publication of the first two reports, its leadership 
recognised that the time was now right to come up with a definite policy 
statement. The FBI had, of course, always believed in trade associations 
administering trade interests, and it was obviously necessary to think 
closely about whether the suggested tripartite bodies would jeopardise 
what was really a rather fundamental principle. Accordingly, 
representatives from 13 Working Party industries were called together 
and questioned about their views on the enquiries and future 
developments. This consultation revealed that six groups of employers 
were favourable about the Working Parties and the rest lukewarm. More 
significantly, opinion about the next step was also divided. Some, 
including those from the furniture, glassware and pottery industries, 
argued that permanent tripartite bodies were desirable. They would 
carry weight in negotiations with the government and allow trade union 
officials to be educated about the real problems of doing business. 
Moreover, there was need for an 'entirely different outlook if 
nationalisation was to be avoided', and so the new institutions should be 
accepted for pragmatic reasons if no other. Against this, there were 
others present who could see no good in going down this road. The 
worry in this camp was about boosting the authority of the unions and 
allowing government officials a foot in the door. In addition, there was 
a gut feeling that the existing owners knew best and should not be 
hamstrung: 
He deprecated the idea of handing over the responsibility for an 
industry to an outside body on the grounds that it was in the national 
interest that it should be done when in fact all the experience and 
knowledge of the industry were in the hands of those who, in the past, 
had built up the business of which the industry consisted. 
These were feelings that, at any rate, found favour with those from boots 
and shoes, linoleum and heavy clothing. 73 
In this situation, the FBI leadership had little alternative but to set up 
a committee to examine the whole question further, and this started 
meeting in mid-July.74 By mid-September, it was agreed that another 
meeting with Working Party representatives would be opportune, and 
the different groups were once again called in to face the leadership. 
However, the intervening months had hardly healed the division of 
opinion. No one was in favour of a single model of tripartite body, 
applicable in all situations, and all agreed on the need for keeping the 
government's influence in whatever transpired to the absolute 
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minimum. But there was, as before, disagreement about whether any 
kind of new body was necessary. Some again repeated warnings about 
the unions and argued that the existing trade associations would be 
perfectly able to organise initiatives, such as boosting research, which 
the Working Parties had suggested be devolved on to the tripartite 
boards. Others felt that to do nothing would be politically inept. A 
member of the Hosiery Working Party underlined the case for tactical 
concessions: 
The hosiery industry had found it impossible to resist the setting up 
of a Working Party but the dice were somewhat heavily loaded 
against the employer members. Unless they were prepared to make 
certain concessions in regard to a continuing body, they would have 
been looked upon as completely reactionary, a view which the public 
would have been taught to share. If the employers had stood out 
against a continuing body, the ... majority of the Working Party 
would have favoured a very different kind of continuing body 
than ... was now recommended .... By conceding a continuing 
body, the employers had been able to secure that it was relatively 
innocuous, and possessed no statutory powers. 75 
The consequence of this was that when the FBI finally came to deliver 
its verdict to Cripps in early October, expediency seemed very much in 
evidence. Baillieu stressed to the President that his organisation 
continued to believe that trade associations should remain the 
fundamental institutions in representing the needs of industry to 
government. They were, he insisted, 'over a large area of industry, 
adequate for the purpose' and, in consultation with the Board, could 
'carry through any developments which ... [were] needed to meet the 
present and future situations'. However, he admitted that other solutions 
might on occasion be justified, particularly in cases where the trade 
association was weak. There might be need in some situations for 
advisory councils, though these should never have executive powers: 'I 
was asked to underline the fact that these bodies should be advisory and 
not executive. Any executive action that is needed should be left to the 
established organisations in the industry.' There might be cause even, in 
a 'very small number of cases', to go further and create a 'Statutory 
Supervisory Board with executive powers'. But, Baillieu warned, 
pursuing this latter course would be impossible unless the employers in 
question had already sanctioned it. Implementation without consent 
would render impotent whatever was created.76 
This declaration left Cripps in a rather difficult position. Board 
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opinion did not rate trade associations highly. They had, after all, done 
little in the past to aid modernisation. Furthermore, their essential 
character did not encourage the belief that they could be transformed 
into engines of progress. As one Board official noted on reviewing the 
FBI's policy: 
The emphasis on Trade Associations completely ignores the extent to 
which they are governed and their activities limited by trade politics 
and personalities, and the influence of large firms. So long as their 
officials are directly dependent on voluntary contributions for their 
salaries and on this or that manufacturer's backing for their chances 
of advancement, I do not see how one can hope to get very far with 
real co-operative enterprise. 77 
Yet Cripps was also aware that simply ignoring the employers' opinions 
might provoke significant political difficulties. 
Some factors did, it is true, seem to encourage persistence with the 
existing strategy. Press coverage of the FBI position was in some 
important cases rather critical. 78 All of the next batch of Working Party 
reports - covering boots and shoes, hosiery, furniture and heavy 
clothing79 - once again recommended some form of continuing tripartite 
body. Moreover, there was now increasing pressure from the TUC not 
to back down. From the trade union point of view, the Working Party 
reports were by no means perfect, but they did at least seem to represent 
an advance.80 On the other hand, the FBI policy was understood to be 
nothing more than an attempt to scare the government into submission.81 
Cripps must therefore stand firm: as the TUC emphasised to him, he 
should prepare legislation which would allow the creation of what were 
now being talked of as Development Councils with statutory powers, 
regardless of whether those in an industry felt that such a body was 
desirable or not. If necessary, 'various methods of persuasion' should be 
used to bring the employers into line. 82 
However, it was also clear that the employers were becoming more 
hostile the nearer the Minister came to introducing legislation. Pressure 
was being exerted at two levels. One line of attack involved attempting 
to influence the Board about the final shape of the Bill, by, for example, 
insisting on a clause ensuring that a Development Council could never 
be imposed.83 More generally, employers' organisations continued to 
argue that legislation was quite superfluous, since Working Party 
recommendations could be carried out by current institutions. A Board 
official recorded in early 1947: 
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It looks as if the BEC are working with the FBI in their opposition to 
the Bill. The idea is ... to show that many of the functions proposed 
for Development Councils are unnecessary because they are being or 
could be performed by existing joint machinery ... [or] Trade 
Associations; therefore there is no place for Development Councils 
at all and the Bill should be dropped. 84 
In fact, some groups of manufacturers in Working Party industries had 
taken this tactic a stage further by setting up allegedly joint organi-
sations to deal with, for example, the recommended expansion in 
research. 85 What made all of this even more serious, as Cripps had to 
recognise, was the fact that because employers were spending so much 
time and effort on trying to thwart legislation, progress with imple-
menting the technical changes that were highlighted in the enquiries 
remained in most cases very slow. 86 
This was clearly a rather disheartening scenario, but Cripps decided 
in the end that the best course of action was to proceed as planned, and 
during February 1947 the Industrial Organisation Bill was presented to 
the Commons. In introducing this legislation, Cripps returned to many 
of the themes that had marked Labour policy since the end of the war. 
The Working Party reports, he noted, showed once again that much of 
British industry needed to be modernised. Big firms were often very 
efficient, but smaller units required help in improving their standards. 
The state needed to play a part here because industry's performance was 
a national question. Moreover, no other institution or set of institutions 
could do what was necessary. Trade associations were certainly not 
acceptable substitutes: 
Trade associations are, essentially, bodies representing employers 
only, just as trade unions represent employees only. For the purposes 
which we have in view, and which the working parties had in view, 
it is essential . . . that both employers and employees . . . be 
represented .... It is, therefore, out of the question for anyone with 
an up-to-date realisation of the development of relationships in 
industry to imagine that any body could be acceptable for such a 
purpose, unless it included both employers and employees.87 
The legislation was designed to 'provide methods for enabling private 
enterprise industries to bring themselves up to date' .88 But it was framed 
so that new initiatives would be introduced with the agreement of all 
sides and not, as in the past, at the whim of employers. 
Turning to the details of the Bill, Cripps noted that what he proposed 
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was enabling legislation, since proceeding by introducing specific 
statutes for each industry would only mean disabling delay. The new 
Bill allowed for the government to be able to create Development 
Councils after consulting with everyone in an industry. The new bodies 
would be charged with increasing efficiency and improving the service 
which the industry could render to the community. Each was to be made 
up of members drawn from three constituencies - employers, employees 
and independents. Much of the work to be done would be essentially 
advisory. Nevertheless, the Development Councils were to have some 
statutory powers, so that, for example, they could maintain a register of 
persons carrying out business in the industry and raise levies to cover 
their expenses. Parliamentary control would be ensured because the 
House was to vote on each specific order for setting up a Council. 
Moreover, the Councils themselves would have to present annual 
reports to the Minister responsible.89 
The Conservatives' reaction to Cripps's proposal was not favourable. 
Lyttelton explained that his party, too, wanted British industry to be 
efficient but did not believe that this was the way to go about ensuring 
progress. The Conservatives were anxious about the form of the 
legislation - they felt an enabling bill gave too much power to the 
Ministers - and the new bureaucracy that it might help to create. Most 
of all, they opposed the basic assumption involved, that the government 
had a direct role to play in modernising industry. As Lyttelton saw it, 
The fundamental question is whether we abandon the voluntary 
method of negotiation, and undermine the voluntary organisations 
which exist in this field, in favour of State machinery such as the 
development councils.90 
For Conservatives, therefore, the issue was at bottom about preserving 
employers' rights to determine their own futures. Mr Sidney Shephard, 
MP for Newark and a hosiery manufacturer, made this point very 
clearly. After calling the Bill 'thoroughly bad and mischievous', and 
arguing that it would not increase productivity, he went on to note that 
it would 'perpetuate permanent control': 
I was always a little suspicious that this was what would happen. 
When the President ... set up his working parties, I thought that there 
was a little more in it than mere efficiency of industry. I thought he 
was after closer control over industry, and I think we all realise that 
by this Bill he has achieved his object.91 
Given such feelings, it was not unexpected to find the Conservatives 
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opposing the Bill on its second reading and harrying it through the 
committee stage. During the final reading, their tactics changed 
somewhat, with the focus now on the introduction of modifying 
amendments. The most important of these was presented by Lyttelton 
and involved restricting the Minister's right to form a Development 
Council: he was not to be allowed to make an order if 'a large majority 
of the persons carrying on business in the industry, representing the 
greater part of the production in that industry, and a large majority of the 
workers in that industry' were opposed to it. This quite clearly struck at 
the heart of the Bill, and was thus unacceptable to Labour. Cripps had 
always stressed that orders would be issued only after consultation, but 
he was not prepared to drop the right to proceed as he saw fit if 
circumstances demanded it. What could be achieved, after all, if the 
least progressive elements in the industry were actually in the 
majority?92 With such opposition brushed aside, the Bill now became 
law.93 
Nevertheless, even with legislative backing, the Board still found that 
making progress over this issue was extremely difficult. Cripps faced 
problems in obtaining adequate numbers of trained staff to prepare 
Development Council legislation, 94 but his biggest obstacle remained 
the attitude of the employers. The Board agreed that its best chance of 
success would be to pass orders for only one or two sectors at first, in 
order to put pressure on the more recalcitrant,95 but it was soon clear that 
even this rather modest objective would be rather difficult to see 
through. Some groups of manufacturers (for instance, those in pottery) 
simply refused any kind of co-operation, insisting that their industries 
did not need the new institution.96 Others continued with the tactic of 
developing apparently alternative forums for activities such as research, 
in the hope that this would undermine any kind of case that the Board 
was putting together.97 By the end of 1947, therefore, the situation 
remained essentially deadlocked. The TUC was reportedly becoming 
restive, fearing that the Board might finally retreat from its original 
purpose.98 Yet the Board recognised that it had little room for 
manoeuvre. As one official explained, 'in one industry after another' the 
civil servants were meeting 'the same opposition from the Employers' 
Associations'. Moreover, to those officials involved it was quite clear 
that the resistance was being co-ordinated and that, in fact, 'the FBI 
were behind it' .99 All that the Board could do, it seemed, as Harold 
Wilson replaced Cripps in the President's job, during the autumn of 
1947, was to pledge that it would 'have a go' again at 'particular 
industries'. 100 
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What of the other two Board initiatives? Taking the question of the 
management institute, first, it will be remembered that Cripps and the 
Cabinet had quite quickly agreed after the 1945 General Election that 
the Weir recommendations should go ahead on the basis of a £150,000 
five-year grant. Soon after this decision, Cripps determined that his next 
move must be to consolidate support amongst industrialists. He felt that 
an influential committee was needed in order to examine exactly how 
Weir should be implemented. To head this committee, Cripps turned to 
Sir Clive Baillieu, President of the FBI. 101 Baillieu accepted, and in 
ensuing discussions it was decided that his committee should be 
composed of as many leading businessmen as possible, in order to 
diminish the scope for the kind of wrangling - with management 
consultants, management associations and small business interests -
that had been evident to some extent in previous discussions. 102 In the 
end, 15 of the 23 appointments came directly from the world of big 
business (they included the Deputy Chairman of ICI, the General 
Manager of Barclay's Bank, the Chairman of Courtaulds and the Vice-
Chairman of Morris Motors), while several others were indirectly 
connected in that they held high office in various employers' 
associations. 103 
The Baillieu Committee reported in early March 1946. It accepted 
that the need for a central institute was 'urgent' 11l4 and then went on, as 
requested, to outline what the new institution should look like. Since, as 
Baillieu emphasised, the suggested British Institute of Management 
(BIM) was not to replace existing management bodies, one of its prime 
responsibilities would obviously concern co-ordination. But the BIM 
was also to have wider duties, especially in relation to research, 
education and propaganda.105 Moreover, it would, as a professional 
body, be able to offer an appropriate system of qualifications.106 
However, the Committee did not want this latter function to mean that 
the BIM should only service an elite, and it underlined the fact that the 
membership base must be as wide as possible, encompassing the 
management associations, industrial and commercial firms, trade 
associations and trade unions, and interested individuals.107 Finally, on 
finance, it was agreed that the Cripps/Dalton formula was the right one, 
though a rider was added that if the BIM were still not self-financing in 
year six but if it had proved its worth, 'Government aid on a moderate 
scale for a further period would be warranted in the national interest' .108 
Cripps generally welcomed these recommendations and took them to 
the Lord President's Committee, where they were accepted with very 
little comment. 109 Outside the government, much of the interested 
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periodical press was equally positive. Favourable editorials appeared in 
Industrial Welfare and the Engineer, while Industry Illustrated was 
enthusiastic enough to claim: 
The plan is far and away the most shapely and robust so far 
produced .... It has a positive air about it, it is sponsored by a very 
determined member of the Government and above all it has 
substantial Treasury backing. 
'The establishment of this new body', the journal predicted, would 'give 
an immense stimulus to scientific management' .110 
However, elsewhere old prejudices remained potent. N. Kipping 
(now Director-General of the FBI) warned Cripps that the Baillieu 
Report, whatever the composition of the Committee, was a 'com-
promise'. In the management field, he reiterated, there was a profound 
cleavage between the 'operative side and the Institutional side', with the 
former viewing the latter as 'of little value'. Baillieu' s conclusions were 
seen by the institutions as on balance against their interests, and so 
Cripps could expect considerable opposition from this direction. 
Furthermore, Kipping added, it was by no means certain, again in spite 
of the way in which the Baillieu Committee had been put together, that 
industry would in fact provide the required support, and so the 
government should be prepared to have to continue funding after the 
fifth year. Kipping ended by advising that Cripps should stand firm but 
that he could not expect an easy next few months as far as this project 
was concerned. 111 
More worrying from the Board's point of view was lobbying that 
continued to emanate from the secretariat of the old Management 
Research Group 1, now renamed the Industrial Management Research 
Association (IMRA). This involved a series of 'confidential reports', 
circulated to members and to non-members such as the TUC, and 
reaching as far as the USA, which ridiculed the Baillieu recom-
mendations and condemned the 'quackery' that would arise from 
them.112 What made this particularly serious was the fact that IMRA was 
known to have close links with the FBI. Not all FBI leaders agreed with 
the kind of criticism being offered - indeed one went so far as to call it 
'ridiculous' 113 - but it remained unarguable that the IMRA line had 
found considerable support amongst many of that organisation's major 
industrial subscribers. 114 
The upshot of all of this was that when the Board came to begin 
implementation of Baillieu's scheme, it found it extremely difficult to 
make much progress. The first task was to form the BIM's ruling 
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Council, but the Board was hindered here by a lack of willing 
volunteers. 115 In the end, Cripps had to settle for a group that was 
essentially a permutation oflong-term Board contacts: a few consultants 
alongside such veterans of state-industry deliberations as Baillieu, 
Kipping, Schuster, Streat and the new Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation Chairman, Piercy.116 This was clearly a set-back, 
and it reflected a wider sense of drift, commented on by Industry 
Illustrated in July 1947: 
What has happened to the much-vaunted proposals for a central 
Institute of Management? It is now over 15 months since the 
President . . . made his statement in the House . . . accepting the 
recommendations of the Baillieu Committee, and it is more than 6 
months since the appointment ... of the Council .... The only sign 
of life that has since appeared was a recent advertisement for a Chief 
Executive.117 
Indeed, even when a Chief Executive was finally appointed in the 
autumn of that year, the nomination did little to raise spirits. The man 
picked to do the job, the Hon. Leo Russell, no doubt had many fine 
qualities - being an ex-Etonian, veteran ofMontgomery's staff and then 
Assistant Secretary at the Board of Trade and gentleman farmer118 - but 
he could hardly be presented as the obvious choice to galvanise a new 
management institution, since he had not even applied for the job. The 
BIM, like the Working Parties, seemed to have become bogged down in 
intrigue. 
Cripps's third area of interest, the PES, by contrast developed fairly 
smoothly. The service was launched in March 1946 and had built up its 
establishment to nearly thirty by April of the following year.119 The 
approach taken remained strongly influenced by human relations. The 
PES, Industry Illustrated reported, could give 'technical assistance in 
connection with any production difficulty' but, as its Director F.E. 
Chappell remarked, technical efficiency alone would not necessarily 
produce the desired results. There must be 'special attention . . . 
accorded the human problem' .120 This was clearly a message which 
some firms were interested to hear, and so the PES found itself almost 
continually busy, handling, for example, 121 major and 254 minor 
enquiries over its first eight months of operation. The type of work 
undertaken varied enormously: 
At one end of the scale the function of the Service has been to steer a 
problem that has been worrying ... [a] firm into the appropriate 
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Department channel; at the other end one or more officers have 
sometimes been involved in days or weeks on the factory floor. 121 
This was hardly sufficient to transform the economy, as a later FBI 
assessment recorded; but it did nevertheless represent clearly 'useful 
activity' .122 
Cripps would, therefore, look back on his years at the Board of Trade 
with some frustration. The President had been able to raise the 
productivity issue in front of many different audiences but he had found 
it much more difficult to create dynamic institutions with which to 
tackle Britain's real problems. Indeed, two out of his three initiatives 
were proceeding only very slowly, opposed at every turn by various 
groups of employers. Had other Labour Ministers been able to make any 
better progress on the productivity issue? 
This is not an easy question to answer because all of the non-Board 
of Trade strategies to improve efficiency were essentially small scale 
and therefore not subject to much publicity. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
other departments were not without their successes. Thus, for example, 
the Ministry of Labour was continuing to gain some notable results with 
its Training Within Industry (TWI) programmes. TWI, which originated 
in the USA, was aimed at supervisors and involved showing them how 
to be better communicators. The advantage of the scheme was that it 
could be completed very quickly, since it usually involved only five 
two-hour training sessions. Moreover, TWI seemed to bring results. 
Thus, almost as soon as the Ministry of Labour had set up its TWI 
facilities at the end of the war, the technique was being described as 
'arousing ... extraordinary enthusiasm amongst managers'. Soon 
thousands of supervisors were being shown TWI each month, and in fact 
as many as 100,000 may have been schooled in the method by the end 
of 1947.123 Like the PES, TWI did not transform Britain's productivity 
position, yet neither can its impact be described as negligible. 
This largely concludes the discussion of Labour's policies on 
productivity in the first two post-war years. But it would be wrong to 
conclude this chapter without drawing attention to a fresh emphasis that 
was increasingly evident in the Government's approach to productivity 
as the period drew to a close. Labour's initial programme, to repeat, had 
mainly been concerned with creating new institutions in order to raise 
standards. As the months of 1947 passed, however, there was growing 
recognition that such an approach alone might well be inadequate. It was 
all very well to open up the production process and to educate managers, 
supervisors and workers as to how things could be done better, but all of 
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this effort would be wasted unless there was some mechanism to ensure 
that such people would want to work in the improved ways. What the 
Government needed, the argument ran, was more knowledge about 
motivation and incentives and a set of policies to match. This change of 
approach is explored in all of its dimensions during the course of the 
following chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Human relations and productivity, 
1947-51 
Much of the change in emphasis about the productivity issue that 
became evident during 1947 stemmed from, and was shaped by, the 
growing influence of the 'human relations' approach to industry and its 
management. The term 'human relations' embraced a number of 
different perspectives and was in some ways nebulous, but its central 
thrust hinged upon an admonition that the workers needed to be treated 
as more than just a factor of production, especially if real gains in 
efficiency were to be made. 1 This chapter looks in detail at why the 
'human relations' approach surfaced in 1947, and then examines how it 
shaped government policy over the ensuing years. Particular emphasis 
is placed on two official initiatives - the Committee on Industrial 
Productivity (CIP) and the relaunching of Joint Production Committees 
- though some attention will also be given to the question of incentives, 
seen by some contemporaries as very much a related issue. 
The turn to 'human relations' as a key to the productivity question 
occurred for a number of reasons. One general factor that encouraged 
the change was the fact that many people were increasingly inclined to 
talk of productivity in general as if labour productivity were its only 
component. This stress on the workers' efficiency was partly 
conditioned by wartime experience, when manpower planning had been 
so important. However, it was also encouraged by current economic 
circumstances: everybody recognised, after all, that in the post-war 
world, with resources constrained, growth must depend to some extent 
on how well the existing workforce did its job. What made the idea of 
labour productivity all the more appealing was the fact that it seemed to 
be fairly easily quantifiable, as Rostas's work for the Board of Trade 
apparently demonstrated.2 
More specifically, the growing popularity of a 'human relations' 
perspective was also linked to a particular perception of what was going 
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on in the workplace. Most on the Left believed that labour discipline had 
traditionally been enforced by the fear of unemployment. Moreover, it 
had long been predicted that once this 'stick' was removed, workers 
would respond positively, intensifying effort as a mark of gratitude for 
'their' government's wider reforms. Unfortunately, however, there was 
little real evidence that this was actually happening. In fact, reports from 
the production front seemed often to suggest that apathy rather than a 
new zeal was the most common condition. 
Of course, some of this comment could be dismissed as Right-wing 
exaggeration, but there were enough authoritative observations on this 
theme to indicate that it was not all the product of uninformed prejudice. 
Some credence had to be given to a Times Review of Industry report in 
April 1947, for example, which described 'many managements' as 
feeling that 'the actual effort put forward by the individual worker' was 
'less than ... before the war'. Nor was it possible to ignore a Nature 
editorial on incentives which concluded: 'while fear is happily 
disappearing as a goad to work, no positive enthusiasm is taking its 
place'. Indeed, Government Ministers could hardly fail to be aware that 
there was some substance here, since their exhortatory 'Work or Want' 
campaign in the spring of 1947 had achieved so little that it was openly 
being described as disastrous.3 
For many on the Left, therefore, the important questions about 
production were increasingly to do with topics such as motivation. The 
general consensus was that 'capitalist discipline' had broken down; 
workers were, in other words, no longer afraid of their bosses' power, 
largely because unemployment had ceased to exist. In this situation, as 
G.D.H. Cole explained, there was 'no adequate feeling in the factories 
in favour of reaching the highest possible level of efficiency'; indeed, 
there could well be reasons why workers might be becoming more 
attached to a type of 'unconscious, or half conscious, restriction'. What 
Labour needed to do, therefore, was to encourage the growth of a new 
understanding, which would provide those on the shopfloor with 
self-discipline. For Cole, this meant talking to the workers directly: the 
administration must give 'clear indications' to workers that it wanted 
not just their 'acquiescence' but also their 'positive collaboration in 
organising to achieve the required result' .4 
Inevitably, Ministers reacted to these promptings in somewhat 
different ways. Cripps had long been an enthusiast for involving the 
worker, though others were certainly less positive on this score. 
Nevertheless, during 1947 there was growing agreement in all quarters 
that, as one periodical put it, the 'peculiar circumstances' that affected 
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productivity in Britain related 'as much to human relations as to 
technical efficiency' .5 In these circumstances, it was inevitable that the 
Government should begin considering what it could do to ameliorate the 
situation. 
One decision was to launch a formal investigation into the whole 
question of the human factor. The origins of this development lay with 
a committee that Morrison had formed in early 1947. The Advisory 
Council on Scientific Policy, under Sir Henry Tizard, was charged with 
finding the 'most appropriate form of research effort to assist the 
maximum increase in ... national productivity during, say, the next ten 
years, including research in natural and social sciences'. The Tizard 
Committee, as it was popularly known, was not considered to have been 
very successful in general, but it had come up with one significant 
finding, that the human factor was extremely important. Indeed, a 
sub-committee of the main Committee had gone so far as to argue: 
Current fundamental research in physical and biological sciences is 
unlikely . . . to have any material short term effect on increasing 
productivity .... The blunt fact ... is that the problem is essentially 
psychological in the short term.6 
Clearly such a conclusion fitted the mood of late 1947 and so Ministers 
began discussing what it meant in practical terms. Officials reported that 
quite a number of organisations were already working on aspects of 
human relations - the Tavistock Institute, the National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology, etc. - but their efforts tended to be un-
coordinated. In these circumstances, Ministers agreed that their best 
option would be to form 'a good steering body', a central organisation, 
to be named the Committee on Industrial Productivity, with several 
offshoots examining specific questions. Crucial amongst the latter 
would be a panel on human factors, which might be headed by Sir 
George Schuster.7 
Schuster was in agreement with this proposal, and, as the year ended, 
approached both the FBI and the TUC to gain their co-operation. The 
TUC was generally acquiescent, though the General Secretary, V. 
Tewson, emphasised that he did not want all of the emphasis in the new 
enquiry to be on labour. Nor should public statements on what was 
intended lend themselves 'to misrepresentations, such as that the 
workers were to be psychoanalysed' .8 The FBI, on the other hand, was 
more cautious. It was not prepared to obstruct Schuster in public, but 
behind the scenes remained highly suspicious. The FBI's leadership felt 
that it should have been consulted at an earlier stage and did not really 
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like the whole idea anyway. An enquiry might perhaps be useful, but 
there were great dangers, particularly with the subject Schuster was 
tackling, 'of doing harm', particularly if 'theorists' became too 
involved.9 
Given this climate of suspicion, those involved in an official capacity 
clearly felt that it was their duty to 'talk up' the whole project and so, 
during 1948, both Tizard (by now in charge of the whole CIP exercise) 
and Schuster were to be heard singing its praises. The former felt that he 
was directing a 'survey on survival'. Britain must catch up with best 
overseas practice, or perish: 'We've got to do it quickly, too .... I've set 
a time limit of two years. If we haven't got results in that time we shall 
have failed.' Schuster made much the same kind of point, arguing that 
something must be done 'to bring the laggards into line': 'You will be 
starting a new era if you can get British industry to depart from its old 
traditional methods of secretive individualism and join in co-operative 
effort.' 10 
This was a powerful message, and it at first seemed to bring results. 
Thus, Schuster's panel was quickly operational and boasting a 
prestigious membership, including L. Russell from the BIM, J. Tanner 
and E.P. Harries from the TUC, and representatives from the National 
Institute of Industrial Psychology, the Medical Research Council and 
the Tavistock Institute.11 This, in tum, allowed a quick start with actual 
investigations, the majority being joint ventures directed by the panel 
and carried out by teams of experts drawn from existing organisations.12 
Within a relatively short time, therefore, enquiry was being undertaken 
on such diverse subjects as work load and machine control (involving 
the Cambridge Psychological Laboratory); morale (involving the 
Medical Research Council's Industrial Psychology Research Unit); and 
human relations within particular settings (for example, the Glacier 
Metal Company project run by the Tavistock Institute). 13 
This was an impressive performance but, in the end, it proved 
difficult to sustain. Schuster's relationship with bodies such as the 
Medical Research Council remained less than easy, complicated by 
administrative and funding problems.14 Moreover, the condition of the 
wider CIP organisation continued to be unsatisfactory, undermined by, 
amongst other things, a rapid turnover of personnel. 15 In fact, Tizard' s 
first report was given an almost universally poor reception, with 
Industry concluding that it did 'not inspire confidence'. 16 The final blow 
to the whole initiative came as a result of the success of the Anglo-
American Council on Productivity: as that body blossomed, the CIP was 
left requesting its own liquidation, convinced that the work that it had 
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started could best be finished by others. 17 The CIP had bequeathed a 
legacy of detailed studies and had reinforced some general points about 
productivity. It could not be said, however, to have galvanised either the 
public or the two sides of industry. 
The second major development on human relations came with the 
relaunching of Joint Production Committees. The initial impetus here 
came from the TUC, and reflected that organisation's perception of the 
role that JPCs had played during the war period. The committees' 
contribution had been 'uneven', but there was 'little doubt that when 
they were worked with enthusiasm by both management and labour they 
produced excellent results' .18 This appreciation was the basis for an 
approach to the employers that together they should recommend to the 
National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) - the major 'peak' tripartite 
body for industrial relations - that it should encourage the relaunch of 
JPCs. At the NJAC such a policy was agreed in the following terms: 
The NJAC approved the principle of the setting up of joint 
consultation machinery, where it does not at present already exist, for 
the regular exchange of views between employers and workers on 
production questions provided it was clearly understood that: 
(a) The machinery would be purely voluntary and advisory in 
character; 
(b) It would not deal with the terms and conditions of employment; 
( c) It would be up to each industry to decide the appropriate form of 
machinery .19 
In advocating this policy, S. Bagnall from the TUC argued that 'JPCs 
were fundamental if the workers were to be made to feel that the state of 
the nation was their personal concern' .20 As this suggests, the TUC had 
come to put a great deal of weight on JPCs. 
In part, this resulted from the TUC's general support for the 
Government's campaign to increase output. The organisation's 
commitment here was demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, 
in response to the production crisis in 1946, the TUC called a conference 
to encourage trade union executives to pursue the production drive; in 
1947 it agreed to the partial reintroduction of labour direction under the 
Control of Engagements Order.21 Thus, the TUC was willing to go a 
long way with the Government's production policies. At the same time, 
the TUC saw JPCs giving rein to the workers' perceived desire to be 
involved in production issues, as they were thought to have been in 
wartime. There were worries about the scope that JPCs might give to 
'disruptive' behaviour by Communist shop stewards but, by and large, 
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the TUC nailed its colours firmly to the mast of extending the joint 
committees. Successive Congresses in the late 1940s saw calls for JPCs 
to be made compulsory, a demand that was accepted by many unions 
and by Labour Party Conferences.22 
Employers' views on JPCs were mixed. Even whilst accepting the 
TUC proposal for their expansion, Sir Alexander Ramsay of the FBI 
played down their role: 'While agreeing that JPCs were valuable [he] 
could not agree that they were fundamental and that their general 
adoption would solve the problem of the productivity of labour.' 23 This 
scepticism was grounded on a number of worries about what JPCs 
would do. 
First, employers were concerned to prevent the emphasis on JPCs 
directing attention away from their own view that the constraints on 
productivity were primarily excessive taxation, too many controls and 
other features of government policy. This was the agenda of issues 
which they emphasised when asked what could be done to raise output 
and productivity.24 Second, employers were worried that JPCs would 
tend to trespass on areas of managerial prerogative, hence the emphasis 
on their purely advisory character. Employers bridled at the 
productionist rhetoric of some of the unions, believing that JPCs were 
seen in some quarters as the thin end of the wedge of workers' control.25 
Nevertheless, many employers' organisations in this period took up 
the urging of the NJAC to come to agreements on JPC machinery with 
the relevant unions. By 1949, employers and unions in ten industries 
(including engineering, iron and steel, shipbuilding and woollens) had 
recommended JPCs with a model constitution, while in another sixteen 
industries (including chemicals, furniture and tobacco) recommend-
ations without a model constitution had been made.26 By and large, 
employers' national bodies were willing to endorse the extension of 
joint consultation. 
But this support was subject to clear conditions. These included the 
three that were listed in the original NJAC agreement, noted above. In 
addition, employers were very concerned to keep JPCs as purely 
factory-level bodies, and resisted any wider role for them. In particular, 
they rejected the idea that JPCs might be involved in inter-plant visits, 
or might form part of local or regional networks. Hence employers 
opposed the idea that Regional Boards for Industry should do any more 
than encourage JPCs where a national agreement on their role already 
existed. They were wholly hostile to the view that JPCs might become 
part of an official system transcending the gates of the factory. This was 
commonly expressed by saying that joint consultation was a purely 
96 Industrial efficiency and state intervention 
'domestic' matter, and certainly not part of the national planning 
machinery. 27 
At the level of the peak associations the picture is one of support for 
JPCs, albeit qualified in a number of respects amongst the employers. 
This common support was accompanied by an agreement on both sides 
that JPCs should not deal with issues of wages and conditions. Hence 
productivity questions were to be clearly demarcated from those relating 
to wages and conditions. In many ways this was a strange position: 
clearly many productivity-related issues (most obviously payments 
systems and work reorganisation) impinged on wages and conditions. 
However, this dichotomy was shaped by deeply entrenched attitudes 
and practices. Most importantly, it reflected the strength of voluntarism 
in industrial relations: the belief that wages and conditions should be 
negotiated by a process of free collective bargaining between employers 
and organised workers. On the union side, support for such a view 
wavered only briefly under the Attlee Governments, when some (mostly 
on the Left) argued that the logical corollary to the planned economy 
that they desired was wage planning. But this position never won 
majority support, and quickly disappeared when the Government 
pursued its incomes policy from 1948 and most of the Left swung round 
to support free collective bargaining. This later view, too, was endorsed 
by employers. 28 
Support for voluntarism meant that unions and employers together 
continually sought to limit the role of Government in the productivity 
drive, because of the recognition that such activity would always be 
likely to impinge on the sphere of voluntary union-employer agreement. 
Thus, for example, both sides resisted the idea of local conferences of 
employers and unions addressed by politicians on productivity issues, 
because, it was suggested, they would cut across the established pattern 
of industrial relations.29 
On the employers' side, the separation of issues posed a difficult 
problem because the British Employers' Confederation (BEC) dealt 
with wages, and the FBI with production questions. This split was 
reproduced at a higher level, since the National Joint Advisory Council 
(where the BEC represented employers) dealt with issues related to 
collective bargaining, while the National Production Advisory Council 
for Industry (NPACI) addressed issues related to production (with the 
FBI representing employers). Both the BEC and the FBI were adamant 
in maintaining these distinct channels, but JPCs posed a dilemma. On 
the one hand, their establishment was clearly seen by Government as a 
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production question while, on the other, both employer bodies wanted 
to keep them within the framework of collective agreements. The FBI 
accepted that this latter consideration meant that JPCs should come 
under the BEC and the NJAC. In consequence, FBI discussions of 
productivity explicitly excluded labour-related issues as being the 
preserve of the BEC.30 
The TUC de facto accepted this division. Whilst keen to promote 
JPCs as a production and productivity issue (indeed, the key to that 
issue), it was equally concerned to maintain the tradition of voluntary 
collective agreements. This posture could have eccentric results, as, for 
example, when the TUC accepted motion study as helpful to improved 
production but resisted time study as impinging on wage issues. 31 More 
generally, the issue of JPCs illustrated the tension between a strong and 
continuing commitment to voluntary collective bargaining and a 
commitment to seeking improvements in productivity. 
This tension was also very much present in the Government's 
approach to JPCs. The initial impetus for their revival came from Cripps 
and others who were concerned with increasing output and efficiency in 
the short run. To this end the production Ministries tried to use all 
available possibilities for the encouragement of the committees. In 
particular they attempted to utilise the Regional Boards for Industry for 
this purpose, aided by initiatives from within some of those Boards. 
However, the NJAC only accepted this role for Regional Boards subject 
to strict conditions, especially the existence of a prior national 
agreement relating to the relevant industry.32 
In part this employer resistance stemmed from antagonism to any 
governmental intervention in what employers (and, to a degree, unions) 
regarded as their domestic matters. Thus, both sides were unenthusiastic 
about alternative proposals for the Ministry of Labour rather than 
Regional Boards to encourage JPCs; the employers, for example, 
refused to supply the Ministry with the names of the firms where joint 
consultation had not been established. But there was acceptance that if 
regional agencies were to have any role in this area, it should be the 
Regional Industrial Relations Officers of the Ministry of Labour who 
should be involved, rather than the Regional Boards associated with the 
production Ministries. 33 
The Ministry of Labour's approach to JPCs was increasingly diverging 
from that of the production Ministries. By the beginning of 1949 this 
position was quite explicit, a memorandum from the Ministry arguing that 
the establishment of joint consultation machinery 'should be regarded as a 
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principal long-term industrial relations objective, and not simply a 
short-term objective in the interests of increased productivity' .34 
As part of his enthusiasm for JPCs Cripps encouraged the Ministry of 
Labour to find a senior official to spearhead the policy of encourage-
ment. In 1948 the Ministry concurred and appointed Lloyd Roberts from 
ICI, whose background was in personnel management. In effect the 
Ministry took the opportunity to involve someone who would encourage 
their view of JPCs and discourage the 'productionist' approach of 
Cripps. Lloyd Roberts argued that employers' hesitancy in establishing 
JPCs was encouraged by the fact that the campaign was 'primarily 
sponsored by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of whose views and 
intentions as to the future control of industry they have some suspicion'. 
He felt that: 
It would have a beneficial effect on this aspect if gradually the 
Ministry of Labour came to be recognised as the sponsoring 
Ministry, and if, simultaneously, the emphasis in the campaign were 
put on the industrial relations value of joint consultation rather than 
on its contribution to increased productivity as a direct objective.35 
The Ministry of Labour's strategy was to emphasise joint consultation 
as a matter of good industrial relations, to be established by negotiation, 
and to be pursued (gently) by means of the Ministry's own Personnel 
Management Advisory Service. This approach was not unproblematic, 
as the BEC sometimes regarded the Ministry's personnel management 
role as an attempt to 'teach employers their business'. Nevertheless, 
from 1948 onwards, the long-term industrial relations aspects of JPCs 
tended to dominate over the production aspects. One indication of this 
was the way in which the 1949 Ministry of Labour document on Joint 
Consultation ended up being incorporated within the Ministry's 1953 
Handbook on Industrial Relations in a chapter entitled 'Personnel 
Management and Joint Consultation' .36 
Cripps resisted this downgrading of joint consultation in relation to 
immediate productivity objectives. But his position in this context was 
weak. On the one hand, as noted above, the Ministry of Labour's view 
fitted more readily with the positions of the employers' organisations 
and the TUC about voluntarism and the sanctity of collective 
agreements. On the other hand, Cripps's own attachment to the 
Tavistock view of joint consultation as being about building a consensus 
in the workplace ruled out any idea of imposing JPCs on unwilling 
employers. With this option ruled out, the Ministry of Labour's 
slow-but-sure approach was greatly strengthened.37 
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In sum, JPCs became a major issue in 1947 because both senior 
Ministers in the Government and the TUC saw them as tying together 
the immediately compelling issue of achieving more output and the 
feeling that a new deal for the workers in the factories was both 
desirable and necessary under conditions of full employment. In the 
initial enthusiasm, human relations appeared to link these two things in 
a manner that was politically congenial to the Government. But human 
relations notions which were taken seriously were an ambiguous basis 
for a campaign on JPCs which had the intention of rapidly raising 
productivity. In fact, human relations doctrine, along with the structure 
of British industrial relations, facilitated the incorporation of the 
committees into a quite different project, where they would be but a 
small addition to the armoury of good industrial relations practice, 
encouraged (but no more) by a Ministry of Labour determined to 
maintain the voluntarist basis of those relations. 
How did all of this impact on another traditional Left-wing aim, the 
achievement of industrial democracy? Industrial democracy was 
certainly an important element in the political rhetoric of the Labour 
Government. In the 1945 Manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, the issue 
was not mentioned, but by the time of the 1950 Labour statement of 
principles, Labour and the New Society, 'democracy in the workplace' 
was said to be central to the creation of a 'live democracy' .38 What was 
the relation between Labour's notions of industrial democracy and the 
policy emphasis on joint consultation? 
The institutional implications of industrial democracy had, of course, 
long been argued about within the Labour Party, especially in the 
context of proposals for nationalisation. In the early 1930s the crucial 
battles were fought out in relation to Morrison's concept of the public 
corporation in which management would be appointed on the basis of 
expertise rather than interest representation. Advocates of workers' 
control fought this approach, but were decisively defeated.39 
These discussions were re-opened in the late 1940s as the process of 
nationalisation took place, but the Ministerial commitment to the 
Morrison model never wavered; although trade unionists sat on 
nationalised industry boards (and the Central Electricity Board was 
chaired by Lord Citrine, ex-General Secretary of the TUC), they were 
explicitly there as experts not worker representatives. Coupled to this 
was the fact that joint consultation systems were enshrined in most of 
the nationalisation statutes. As purely consultative mechanisms with a 
limited agenda some of these seem to have had a degree of success.40 
Policy on the nationalised industries showed how the concept of 
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industrial democracy became almost synonymous with joint 
consultation and its human relations logic under the Attlee Government. 
Certainly, official policy statements reflected this conflation. For 
example, Labour Believes in Britain included a section on 'Democracy 
in Industry' which read: 
Industrial Democracy is advancing. Increasingly, the government 
consults with industry and industry puts its own difficulties before 
the Government. Development Councils, Joint Production 
Committees, Pit Committees and Works Councils are growing in 
importance in our industrial life. But these are only a beginning. 
More has to be done. The worker is still too often treated as a mere 
cog in the machine. Management must therefore be willing to bring 
workpeople into fuller consultation. And the worker must be ready to 
shoulder responsibility as well as claim rights.41 
Labour did regard industrial democracy as very important in this period. 
For example, when the National Executive set out priorities for research 
in October 1946, the second item (after 'criteria for nationalisation') 
was 'economic democracy'. This was, however, defined as an 'exami-
nation of methods whereby workers can take a constructive part in the 
formulation of industrial policy and be induced to feel that they are 
working for the good of the community'. The Research Department 
document which followed, whilst suggesting a need for more experi-
mentation in forms of industrial democracy, concluded: 'meanwhile we 
shall push ahead with the instrument the Labour Movement has now 
chosen for the participation by every worker in industrial democracy -
joint consultation at all levels' .42 
This position was not without its opponents. As already noted, the 
late 1940s saw unsuccessful pressures to reopen discussion about the 
workers' role in the management of the public corporation. This was 
linked to a wider debate on the meaning of industrial democracy and 
joint consultation. For example, the Union of Post Office Workers 
(UPW), long an advocate of workers' control, proposed a system of joint 
management for the Post Office, based on 50 per cent union 
representation on a managing board. The debate over this brought out 
some of the difficulties of those who wanted industrial democracy to 
mean something rather more than joint consultation. Perhaps most 
interestingly, G.D.H. Cole, long Labour's most important advocate of 
radical forms of such democracy, accepted the UPW view that joint 
consultation was different from joint management. But he also argued 
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that the UPW scheme was about trade union control, rather than 'real' 
workers' control, which made it undesirable.43 
More equivocally, even Cole was willing to see joint consultation as 
embodying 'the spirit of democracy', and as something to be pursued 
independently of whether managers were elected or worked in public or 
private sectors. For him, joint consultation was a basic element in the 
social application of democracy; and some measure of joint consultation 
was therefore 'an economic corollary to the admission of democratic 
rights for everybody on the political plane'. This argument of Cole's 
reflected both his rather pessimistic assessment of the current strength 
of belief in workers' control within the labour movement, and, more 
broadly, the lack of a coherent doctrine of such control in the new 
circumstances of the 1940s. 44 In this he was typical. Though there was a 
pervasive undercurrent of discontent about the collapse of industrial 
democracy into joint consultation, this discontent did not cohere into a 
significant theoretical argument or political force. Joint consultation and 
its human relations underpinnings therefore faced no significant 
opposition within Labour ranks over this period, and in fact tended to 
'crowd out' any alternative vision of what industrial democracy might 
mean. 
How, therefore, did the campaign to establish JPCs progress in this 
period? There is no doubt that some success was achieved, in the simple 
sense that many such committees were formed during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. As noted above, by 1949 a significant proportion of 
industries had national agreements which encouraged JPCs or other 
forms of joint consultation, and the evidence, though imperfect, 
suggests that many firms responded to this encouragement. 
The latest extant enquiry on the whole subject was conducted by the 
BEC in the middle of 1950. This suggested that most large industries 
had discussed and found agreement on joint consultation and that, 
within those industries where agreement had been reached, over 50 per 
cent of firms had instituted mechanisms for such consultation. Whilst 
this particular survey had no figures on the point, it recognised that the 
existence of JPCs was highly correlated with size. Slightly earlier data 
suggested that, on 'rough estimates', in firms with over 1,000 workers, 
75 per cent had JPCs; in those with 500-1,000 workers, 50 per cent had 
JPCs; and in those with 150-250 workers, 30-40 per cent had JPCs.45 
Evidence on the industrial distribution of JPCs is also imperfect, but 
some material survives. A survey covering a representative sample of 
600 firms in 1949 found that JPCs were most prevalent in engineering 
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Sou,r;e. W. Robson-Brown and N.A. Howell-Everson, Industrial Democracy at 
Work.· A Factual Su,vey(London, 1950), pp. 7-9. 
(see Table 5.1). This was perhaps unsurprising. Wartime JPCs had been 
concentrated in this industry, and the employers and unions in 
engineering had been the first to agree to revive them in 1947. Another 
estimate suggested that JPCs covered 782,000 out of a possible 1.25m 
workers in the industry. On the other hand, some sectors almost entirely 
lacked JPCs - perhaps most notably cotton, where they were favoured 
by neither employers norunions.46 Elsewhere, finally, though both sides 
were willing, progress was delayed because of disagreement on the 
terms on which the bodies would function. Especially controversial was 
the issue of whether all of the workers' representatives should be union 
members. This led to a long wrangle in the chemical industry, 
eventually settled on the employers' terms.47 
Whilst substantial progress was made with the creation of JPCs, from 
the point of view of Ministers this occurred too slowly. Who was to 
blame here? Unsurprisingly, perhaps, each side criticised the other. 
Trade union leaders pointed out that insistence on the participation of 
non-unionists inhibited expansion, while there were also general 
complaints about employer resistance. Nevertheless, union leaders, too, 
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recognised that rank and file workers often lacked enthusiasm for JPCs. 
Employers' organisations bemoaned the apathy of local union officials 
and rank and file workers, though it is clear that their own members 
were often quite hostile as well.48 
The Ministry of Labour's opinion was that both of these views 
reflected an element of the truth. As Lloyd Roberts noted: 
My general conclusion is that the basic reason for the slow progress 
being made in establishing joint consultation machinery is the apathy 
of the general body of workers and district and local trade union 
officials, an apathy of which employers are quite willing to take 
advantage. 
These attitudes were explained in the following terms: 
Some employers still feel that joint consultation has a political aspect 
and is the thin end of the wedge, leading to joint management or 
workers' control. Probably there are not many workers who understand 
the principle of joint consultation. If they are militant they may regard it 
as a step toward further control; if they are of a more average type, they 
may regard the idea with suspicion as a means of earning profits for the 
employer. In other cases both employers and workers confuse joint 
consultation with ordinary wage negotiating machinery.49 
Independent sources, whilst bringing out regional and sectoral 
variations, also suggest that, broadly speaking, enthusiasm for joint 
consultation was inversely related to status in the hierarchy on either 
side of industry (though with the TUC always more enthusiastic than the 
BEC), so that national agreements were much easier to reach than those 
at factory level. If JPCs were established this usually arose from 
management rather than worker/union initiative.50 
The BEC survey of 1950 also analysed the level at which employers 
and unions had agreed to implement joint consultation. The evidence 
from this confirms that almost all of the arrangements were for factory 
level bodies, perhaps with national councils as well. Most clearly 
excluded regional or district machinery. The only agreement relating to 
the regional level was in building, where a major stimulus to this kind of 
organisation seems to have been material shortages. This was coupled to 
an absence of agreement on site committees, which the BEC strongly 
resisted. Furthermore, district agreements were entirely absent except in 
the very special cases of farming and ports.51 
What did the JPCs do? Here evidence is even more sparse and 
difficult to interpret. A large-scale survey by the National Institute of 
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Industrial Psychology found, like other studies, that welfare issues 
occupied a large part of the deliberations ('all tea and toilets' was a 
popular, dismissive view), though this survey also noted that such an 
emphasis was disliked by the workers' representatives on JPCs, who 
were critical of rank and file concerns. 52 
This focus did not seem to draw objections from the employers. They 
did not like JPCs degenerating into 'complaints committees', but a more 
common problem from their point of view occurred when the forums 
became mere platforms for the political propaganda of subversive 
elements. This latter situation worried Ministers as well, though there is 
no way of telling whether it was ever really prevalent.53 
Perhaps more significant was the complaint by employers that 
workers and unions tended to try to get the JPCs to encroach on the 
sphere of collective bargaining. This fits in with some independent 
evidence, which reported workers as viewing the joint consultation 
forum as a suitable medium for negotiating benefits.54 That employers 
(and union leaders) so strongly resisted this cannot have helped to offset 
the very rank and file apathy that was so frequently diagnosed. 
Did JPCs succeed? The BEC survey of 1950 found a generally 
favourable response from employers, though presumably those who had 
established the committees were predisposed to see their benefits. The 
nature of those benefits was impressive - 'In the main replies indicate 
that the Committees have been of general utility' - with some firms 
reporting a better team spirit, a fall in absenteeism and an improved flow 
Table 5.2 Management assessments of Joint Production Committees in 
216 engineering firms, 1950 
Verdict 
Issue Favourable No Effect Unfavourable 
Output 129 87 
Morale 183 33 
Discipline 131 85 
Absenteeism 117 99 
Turnover/personnel 72 144 
Reduced friction 196 20 
Sourr:e. W. Robson-Brown and N.A. Howell-Everson, Industrial Democracy at 
Wont:· A Factual Su,vey(London, 1950), p. 42. 
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of information to the workers.ss A survey of 216 JPCs in engineering 
examined management assessments of their effect; the results are shown 
in Table 5.2. 
These figures certainly suggest a positive outcome from JPCs, 
though the emphasis on morale-raising effects perhaps gives some 
substance to the Ministry of Labour view that the committees had their 
greatest impact as an element of improved personnel management. 
Certainly, by 1950 the Ministry believed that: 
A noteworthy feature is that a number of firms are now displaying 
interest in joint consultation not as an aim in itself but as one of the 
techniques of modern personnel management and therefore helpful 
in attracting and retaining the better type of employee.s6 
Looking at the question of assessment in a wider context, it is clear that 
against the history of claims for industrial democracy and workers' 
control, the joint consultation movement in Britain in the 1940s was 
really a fairly conservative programme. Compared to the claims of guild 
socialists in the early years of the century, or to the Bullock proposals of 
the 1970s, this was a mild policy. Similarly, in comparison with what 
happened in, for example, France and Germany during the 1940s, the 
JPCs hardly appear radical. In France, a 1945 decree established 
Comites d'entreprise as compulsory in enterprises with more than 100 
workers, with a remit which covered both welfare and production issues 
(though, as in Britain, they were to be essentially consultative, and 
fenced off from questions of wages and conditions). In Germany, the 
British Government pushed through even more radical measures, 
establishing a system of co-determination, with a parity of workers' 
representatives on company supervisory boards and a sub-structure of 
compulsory works councils.s1 
In Britain, however, the doctrine of human relations acted as a 
blockage to such radicalism. It ruled out compulsion as inappropriate, 
because the machinery of joint consultation was not an end in itself but 
essentially the representation and reinforcement of a pre-existing 
consensus in the workplace. In fact, the Ministry of Labour went so far 
as to refuse to collect systematic data about the existence of JPCs on the 
grounds that the 'criteria of success in joint consultation lies in the 
degree to which it assists in the development of a sense of co-operation 
and mutual responsibility, rather than in the mere existence of works 
committees' _ss 
Perhaps even more significantly, such a doctrine cut across notions 
of industrial democracy in any strong sense of the word 'democracy'. 
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Radical solutions here must always to some degree challenge 
managerial/employer legitimacy, in that they stake a claim for workers as 
by right having a say in running enterprises. Such rights can be grounded in 
different ways. They may be based on the Marxist labour theory of value 
(as in much syndicalism and guild socialism), or on a notion of democratic 
rights as in political democracy (the Bullock Report's position). But, 
however argued, they always dispute the unfettered right to manage. By 
contrast, human relations doctrine and its institutional representation 
through forms of joint consultation explicitly endorsed the right to manage, 
albeit in a particular way. As one of its leading ideologues in the 1940s and 
1950s expressed this, the fundamental problem was 'how to combine 
authority and participation - leadership and co-operation'. And this was at 
bottom a problem for management. Such a view was accepted quite 
explicitly, too, by the TUC: 
Joint consultation machinery is essentially advisory as distinct from 
executive in its scope. In the last resort, and after full discussions 
with their employees, the responsibility for policy decisions must rest 
on the Boards concerned. The limitation, which is inherent in the 
policy of Congress, must be recognised and accepted and joint 
consultation machinery must not be expected to give executive 
power to worker representatives.59 
Trade union acceptance of this doctrine was not, of course, just a 
question of 'ideology'. It was founded on the well-entrenched practices 
of adversarial collective bargaining, which had become the raison d'etre 
of British trade unions. There could not be any blurring of the lines of 
responsibility between the rights and duties of workers and those of 
employers. This had long been the major basis of union objections to 
any form of industrial democracy, and it remained well entrenched into 
the 1940s (and beyond).60 
The impact of human relations and joint consultation have, therefore, 
to be seen in the context of the absence of fundamental change in the 
structure of industrial relations during the Attlee period. Whilst some 
traditional features of those relations were suspended over these years -
for example, by the continuation of compulsory arbitration, bans on 
strikes and the pursuit of an incomes policy (albeit non-statutory)- little 
was permanently altered.61 As noted above, 'wage planning' was never 
accepted, and the attempt continued to maintain a sharp distinction 
between wage bargaining and productivity issues. 
In the long run this latter distinction was probably fatal to joint 
consultation. As Alan Flanders wrote: 
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The strict separation of joint consultation from collective bargaining 
is difficult to maintain in practice, certainly within individual 
establishments. Moreover the attempt to do so invariably destroys the 
workers' interest in it. The really successful experiments in joint 
consultation appear to have developed in firms where the close 
connection between the subject matter of consultation and 
negotiation has been recognised, and the same or similar committees 
have been used for both purposes.62 
Flanders's diagnosis is supported by what happened in the 1950s. 
Despite continued enthusiasm for joint consultation under the 
Conservative Governments after 1951 the evidence is reasonably clear 
that the machinery involved suffered a serious decline during that 
decade. By 1957 a Ministry of Labour official felt 'chastened' by a 
survey which suggested that less than one third of firms with 250 or 
more workers had mechanisms of joint consultation. The cause of this 
decline had much to do with the growth of shop stewards as a potent 
force at workplace level. With an alternative focus for shopfloor trade 
unionism, joint consultation simply withered away. 63 
As noted above, in the 1940s joint consultation had been pressed 
from 'on high', the TUC being notably more committed than local 
officials or the rank and file. The shop steward movement had been 
weakened by demobilisation and conversion to civilian production at 
the end of the war, and there is some evidence that where stewards 
survived as a force in the late 1940s this inhibited the growth of joint 
consultation, though undoubtedly some shop stewards did try to use the 
consultative machinery. 64 
The attempted severance of wage issues from joint consultation not 
only affected the enthusiasm of the workers for the latter but also 
narrowed the range of productivity issues which consultation could 
encourage. Perhaps most importantly, it curtailed the possibility of 
using wage incentives as a means of obtaining higher production and 
productivity. 
As has been shown, much of the emphasis on human relations 
derived from the view that, in the absence of the 'stick' of 
unemployment, high production and productivity would require the 
'carrot' of better treatment for the worker in the factory. Such an 
approach could be endorsed from a managerial perspective, and also 
remained compatible with the Leftist belief concerning the intrinsic 
desirability of better treatment for the workers; in fact, in the 1940s there 
was a substantial rapprochement between these two views. But this did 
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not answer questions about the other obvious 'carrot', higher pay by 
wage incentives. 
For some on the Left, wage incentives were inappropriate in the new 
post-war regime: raising production and productivity was to be seen as 
a social duty, not something fuelled by individual payments. However, 
such a view was always confined to a small minority. Ian Mikardo 
voiced the typical attitude of both the political and union wings of the 
Labour Movement in 1947 when he attacked 'extremists' who believed 
either social duty or wage incentives would alone encourage better 
output.65 
Mikardo went on to argue that traditional piece rate systems had been 
discredited by their arbitrary, complicated and often regressive 
character. He also tried to bridge the gap between 'human relations' and 
wage incentives by arguing that piece rates often affected output not 
because they directly raised incomes, but rather because they set the 
workers a clear task and informed them how well or badly they had 
achieved it. His attempted 'middle-road' thus included favouring small 
group incentives as against those that were individually oriented.66 
Whilst Labour's ideologues and management experts conducted a long 
debate about material versus moral incentives,67 in practice the 
extension of incentive schemes seems to have met with little resistance. 
For example, discussion about the issue between employers and the 
TUC at the NJAC found both sides resisting a direct role for the Ministry 
of Labour in propagandising such schemes, but only on the grounds that 
these things should be done by collective agreement without 
government interference, not because of any hesitancy about principle.68 
The Government's direct role in wage payment systems was 
therefore rather limited by employer and union hostility. However, the 
problem also came up in other areas of official policy. For example, 
during the wage freeze of 1948-50 it was accepted that wage increases 
linked to such incentive schemes would be exempt from control.69 At the 
same time, the Government remained sensitive to the claims that high 
income tax rates acted as a deterrent to effort, and various ideas were 
floated on this, including the exemption of overtime pay in some 
industries from income tax (though such breeches in the general 
character of the income tax rules were successfully resisted, not least by 
the Inland Revenue).7° Finally, the Government also worried that the 
rationing and the general shortage of consumer goods was a disincentive 
to effort, though here its hands were substantially tied by the 
macroeconomic imperative to divert the bulk of resources into exports 
and investment.71 
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Ministry of Labour figures suggest that payment by results did 
increase in this period. Calculations for 1951 demonstrated that 28 per 
cent of adult males and 32 per cent of all workers were paid in this way, 
compared with 18 and 25 per cent respectively in 1938. In some 
industries, too, there was evidence of a concurrent, significant shift in 
union attitudes towards piecework.72 But this change largely took place 
on a separate track from the issue of joint consultation. This separation 
of discussion about incentive issues and the joint consultation 
machinery gave an air of unreality to the proceedings of the latter. Here 
was an area where workers were most likely to be highly interested in 
the implications of raising productivity, yet it could not be discussed in 
the consultative mechanism. 
A similar point can be made about restrictive labour practices. In 
Chapter 8 we argue that the importance of these practices in inhibiting 
productivity growth has been exaggerated in much recent literature, 
without warrant from contemporary evidence. But whatever the 
importance of restrictive practices, they, like wage incentives, had to be 
primarily addressed in the context of wage bargaining, separated off 
from most of the debate about productivity. Typically, it was the BEC 
which produced a report on these practices, whilst the FBI's discussions 
of productivity explicitly ignored them.73 Thus, coupling the 
productivity drive so strongly to human relations was far from an 
unqualified success. It highlighted certain themes - consultation, works 
information, the role of the foreman - whilst tending to sideline others, 
such as the array of issues under the heading of 'Americanisation' that 
is discussed in Chapter 7. That the drive was pursued in the context of a 
largely unreformed industrial relations system also raised tensions, by 
excluding certain pertinent issues from the debate on productivity. 
Moreover, whilst not wishing to over-emphasise one facet of the 
problem, it is surely plausible to say that a more radical policy to raise 
productivity could have been pursued if wage issues had not been 
regarded as 'off limits'. 
Finally, it should be noted that emphasis on human relations also 
caused tensions within Labour's ideology and politics. The attractions 
of human relations to certain Labour positions at this time is surely 
clear. It provided the basis of a rapprochement with 'progressive' 
managerial circles in a context where Labour gave a high priority both 
to consensus and co-operation in general and to its links with 
progressive middle-class opinion in particular. Thus, for example, a 
Labour Party document on industrial democracy of this period cited 
G.S. Walpole's Management and Men, a classic 'progressive 
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management' text, as embodying exactly the right approach to social 
relations in the factory.74 
Yet this posture was problematic for Labour. Human relations 
ideology was based on a 'unitary' notion of the enterprise, as the 
(potential) site for the pursuit of common purposes between workers and 
owners. No doubt more sophisticated versions of the doctrine could 
accept the inescapability of some conflict of interest in the enterprise, 
but the basic thrust was clear.75 Yet this emphasis on co-operation and 
consensus in the factory co-existed with an undiminished commitment 
to an adversarial form of wage bargaining. In the immediate post-war 
period, with the trade unions willing to go a very long way to 
accommodate government policy, this tension remained containable. 
But with the revival of shop-floor trade unionism in the 1950s, the 1940s 
'package' proved to be an unsustainable basis upon which Labour could 
even consider building a new politics of the enterprise. 
Chapter 6 
The management question again, 
1947-51 
A central part of Labour's approach to the productivity issue was an 
almost entirely new concern with management. As shown in the 
previous chapters, during the later years of the war and after there was a 
widespread belief that British management was inefficient and that 
something must be done to remedy this. Prominent in the attempts at 
reform were leading Labour figures such as Dalton and Cripps. These 
Ministers were central to the'Attlee Government's decision to create the 
British Institute of Management, and this is highly significant as a 
symbol of Labour's new relationship with management. 
But there were other important features of that relationship. Not all 
government activity on management was channelled through the BIM. 
In the late 1940s there were a range of other institutional expressions of 
concern, such as the Personnel Management Advisory Service and the 
Urwick Committee on Management Education. A desire for reform was 
also expressed in the context of the newly nationalised industries which 
posed almost unprecedented management problems. Outside govern-
ment, the unions, too, were called upon to play a part in management 
improvement. But above and beyond these specific initiatives was a 
general process of reflection on the status and meaning of management 
and Labour's relation to it. Was there a 'managerial revolution', it was 
asked, and, if so, what were its implications for Labour's traditional 
view of the economy and how it should be reformed? 
This chapter looks at the institutional aspects of Labour's concern 
with management in the late 1940s and reflects on the content of that 
'managerialism', before finally considering the wider ideological 
significance of Labour's evolving conception of management. 
The BIM was officially inaugurated by Cripps, supported by Harold 
Wilson (President of the Board of Trade) and the leaders of the FBI and 
112 Industrial efficiency and state intervention 
TUC, on 21 April 1948. The leading management journal welcomed the 
new body as an 'impressive climax to 30 years' struggle - a consum-
mation beyond the dreams of the inglorious pioneers who laboured 
throughout those discouraging decades'. Further, the 'lavish material 
support guaranteed by the Government' was 'the measure of its 
assurance of success'. The whole story added up to a great personal 
triumph for one man: 'Sir Stafford Cripps determined that his sponsored 
Institute should materialise, and his single-mindedness has sustained the 
project right up to the inaugural meeting' .1 
Over the next few years, the Director of the BIM, L. Russell, 
attempted to tum these early expectations into real gains. Much energy 
was expended early on, as might be expected, in the task of finding the 
new organisation a home, and providing it with suitable staff and 
facilities. At the same time, there were constant efforts to attract 
members, both via canvasses of individuals and corporations and via 
negotiated agreements with existing management bodies (most notably 
the Institute of Industrial Administration). A third kind of activity 
involved propaganda work in the outside community, which encom-
passed, amongst other things, a publications programme, a series of 
major conferences and an attempt to set up a network of Local 
Management Associations (LMAs) aimed at involving the grass roots.2 
All of the different aspects of the BIM's work were interdependent, 
but to many in the organisation the propaganda function was the most 
important. In part, this stemmed from a general perception that 
management standards in Britain were often quite poor. However, there 
was also the unavoidable fact that few managers had enrolled in any 
kind of professional organisation during the recent past. One estimate 
was that there were probably between 200,000 and 400,000 'persons 
exercising management responsibilities' in the country, but only 20,000 
in the existing management bodies.3 In these circumstances, successful 
propaganda became almost a condition of survival. 
The approach that the BIM took to its public work revolved around 
two aspects of current 'progressive' management thinking. There was 
some insistence, firstly, on the importance of human relations, an 
emphasis that harmonised with wider Government thinking. Managers 
were not to 'disregard the hopes and ideals' that were stirring 'the hearts 
and minds of the common people'. They must recognise that a 'new 
dawn' had occurred, and that old-style punitive incentives to work were 
redundant. Management, in this perspective, needed to be about 
building consent and involving the workforce. The first Chairman of the 
BIM, Sir Charles Renold, could thus argue that the key variable in firms 
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was morale, and that this must be carefully cultivated. As he explained, 
there were three conditions for success: 
1 The purpose of the firm must be felt to be worth while. 
2 Everybody engaged must feel that he belongs. 
3 And the show must be well run.4 
At the same time, the BIM was interested in improving all of the more 
technical aspects of industry - the everyday business of purchasing, 
manufacturing, selling, costing and accounting. The major objectives 
here, in every case, needed to be professional standards and modem 
methods; traditional 'rule of thumb' saws must be quickly jettisoned. 
Good management, in this conception, meant proficiency in a defined 
range of skills. As BIM officials emphasised, the principles to follow 
were the same whether the organisation was a small family firm or a 
huge nationalised industry.5 
Not surprisingly, the BIM was more successful in some aspects of its 
work than in others. Russell found that establishing an adequate 
headquarters organisation was more difficult than expected (his chosen 
building, for example, turned out to have dry rot) but, by the early 1950s, 
many of the initial problems had been resolved and the BIM was 
operating from specially adapted premises, with a large staff and 
relatively good facilities (such as a library of some 7,000 items). 
Additionally, the Institute's track record on propaganda continued to 
impress. At least one management conference was held by the BIM 
every year from 1948 onwards, with each attracting at least 400 
delegates. The publications which were produced, too, were very 
popular: the Institute offered 50 or 60 titles during these years, and was 
selling or distributing a quarter of a million copies from this list 
annually.6 
By contrast, other BIM activities were clearly less successful. 
Progress with establishing the LMAs was slow, with only four being 
created by 1951. Moreover, the continuing membership campaign 
proceeded very much as the more gloomy had forecast. There were 
some notable breakthroughs, as when the deal with the Institute of 
Industrial Administration (really a successful take-over) yielded 5,700 
members at one blow, or when talks with various unions resulted in 
eleven (including the NUM and the NUR) taking out subscriptions. But, 
in general, the situation was sticky; despite considerable effort, by 
mid-1951 only 959 corporate subscribers, 548 individual subscribers 
and 80 library subscribers had been added to the 541 founder members. 7 
One of the functions of the BIM was to bring together the wide range 
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of previously existing management bodies and to provide an agency for 
education in management. But whilst the BIM focused on the education 
of the practising manager, there was also the question of management 
qualifications for those at the beginning of their career. Here, the 
perceived need was to bring together and codify the great range of 
qualifications available in the field of management, mostly offered in 
technical colleges. To this end the Government had established a 
Committee on Education for Management in 1946, chaired by the 
well-known managerial ideologue, L.F. Urwick. The Report of this 
committee was published in 1947.8 
Urwick apparently had little difficulty in securing widespread 
support for his view of management education.9 The Ministry of 
Education regarded him as the leading expert on the issue, for example 
writing to him in mid-1945 for a booklist on management topics. Most 
of the existing bodies which issued qualifications in management 
accepted his approach, with some resistance from the Institute of 
Mechanical Engineers, which felt that his proposals were too generalist 
in character to cover all of the ground required for their engineers.10 
Certainly, Urwick' s proposals were notable for their belief in general 
management or what he called 'scientific management'. For him, 
scientific management was pioneered by F.W. Taylor (and H. Fayol), 
but what he regarded as the mark of scientific management was not a 
Tayloristic emphasis on work practices so much as a method. That 
method was 'scientific' in an inductivist sense, and was applicable to the 
management of any kind of body. In a work of this period Urwick 
approvingly cited Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management as 
follows: 
scientific management, in its essence, consists of a certain 
philosophy, which results in a combination of the four underlying 
principles of management. 
1 The development of a true science. 
2 The scientific selection of the workman. 
3 His scientific education and development. 
4 Intimate friendly co-operation between the management and the 
men.11 
Thus, Urwick's 'scientific management' was not incompatible with a 
human relations approach even though this was not his central concern. 
But, just as important, it led to an understanding of management as 
primarily to do with general principles of organisation. In Urwick's 
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view, the key to the efficient functioning of large-scale organisations 
was the specialisation of functions, the separation of conception and 
execution and therefore the centrality of the 'science of 
administration' .12 
This approach generated syllabuses for management education 
which were strategic and universalistic in character. They drew strongly 
on the Harvard Business School tradition of management as something 
understandable and teachable, separately from consideration of any 
particular production process. This was a perspective quite distinct from 
the American industrial engineering tradition, which focused attention 
precisely on the specifics of managing different types of production 
operations, and which might be considered a more legitimate 
descendent of Taylor's 'workshop management' orientation. 13 
Hence, for Urwick, management could (and should) be taught 
separately from a technical expertise which was specific to any one 
industry. This was an interpretation which he urged, for example, in a 
letter to the Institute of Electrical Engineers, during the discussions of 
his Report in 1946/7. It was a view, too, which largely informed the 
detailed syllabuses that resulted from the Urwick Committee's work, 
though, as P. Armstrong suggests, 'whilst the shell ofUrwick's syllabus 
embodies his formal and abstract view of management, the scheme as a 
whole was compromised in its fine print with a much more productivist 
view'. 14 
Urwick' s notions of appropriate forms of management education are 
important but not because of the widespread pursuit of the syllabuses 
that he provided. Though 100 colleges offered the Certificate course and 
62 the Diploma, the numbers of awards over the first fifteen years of the 
scheme's existence were only 810 and 640 respectively.15 At one level 
this was another 'great British failure' in management education. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note the way in which this approach was 
able to dominate the field with little resistance, and none from 
Government. Urwick's views did not conflict with any alternative 
doctrine of management. Moreover, as noted, they were fully 
compatible with the human relations approach which the Government 
treated as axiomatic. Indeed, both orientations were similar in their 
attention to universal principles of management practice which in tum 
could draw upon an emerging social science expertise, rather than upon 
an industrial engineering approach with its quite different levels of 
generality and forms of knowledge. As we shall see below, in discussing 
the nationalised industries, these two approaches could be combined to 
provide a distinctly 'Labourist' view of management. 
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Apart from the BIM and the Urwick Committee, Labour's concern 
with management was also expressed through agencies such as the 
Personnel Management Advisory Service (PMAS), which was set up by 
the Ministry of Labour.16 This acted initially to encourage the 
appointment of personnel managers as specialised functionaries within 
firms. Their role was clearly seen as linked, once again, to the human 
relations approach regarding management The PMAS focused on three 
dimensions of that approach - joint consultation, works information and 
Training Within Industry. Joint consultation, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
was at the heart of the human relations ideology, and was propagated by 
the PMAS as part of good industrial relations rather than directly linked 
to the productivity drive. Works information was seen as a corollary to 
joint consultation. The idea here rested upon the belief, so characteristic 
of this period, that conflict at work was largely the result of ignorance 
and misunderstanding. At factory level, therefore, one objective should 
be to provide useful information, news and views about the state of the 
national economy and individual companies in a simplified and 
digestible form, which would be disseminated to raise consciousness of 
production and productivity issues and thus to encourage positive 
participation in joint consultation. 17 Training Within Industry ( discussed 
in Chapter 4) was aimed at supervisors, especially in their 'personnel 
management' role, as the front line of contact between managers and 
workers. The TWI programme provided a total of 30 hours' 
factory-based instruction, divided into sections on job instruction, job 
relations and job .methods. 18 
How far all of this made much difference to the practices of British 
management is inherently difficult to judge. There was a feeling in 
official circles that it was a strategy which in some respects was already 
failing by the late 1940s. The classic 'personnel management approach' 
of appointing specialised personnel managers was limited by the lack of 
trained people to fill such jobs and by the resistance of firms worried 
about their overheads. Interestingly, it was also seen as constrained by 
the human relations emphasis on good supervision as part of line 
management, a view rather different from that which proposed 
'personnel' as a separate, staff function. 19 
The nationalisation (or socialisation, as it was officially called) of 
industry in Britain under the Attlee administration opened up a new 
agenda on many issues. It has commonly been asserted that the wave of 
nationalisations in this period rested on little detailed preparation, 
though much of this seems exaggerated.20 But as regards the manage-
ment of these new bodies the claim does seem close to the truth. As 
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Austen Albu later noted, during the major debates over the form of 
nationalisation in the 1930s, there was a 'striking absence' of debate 
about how these new institutions would be managed below board 
level.21 
The debates of the 1930s had effectively decided that, to amplify a 
point touched on earlier, Labour's preferred form of nationalisation 
would be the public corporation, with a Board appointed on an 'expert' 
rather than 'representative' basis. This line had defeated those who 
wished to see a direct role for workers in management of nationalised 
enterprises. Though the issue was raised again in the late 1940s the 
Morrisonian position was strictly maintained by the Labour leadership -
both in the Government and the TUC.22 
However, opposition to any notions of workers' control was 
accompanied by much emphasis on joint consultation as a desirable 
feature for nationalised industries and, in most of the industries, 
provision for such consultation was written into the nationalisation 
statute. The precise meaning of joint consultation was nevertheless 
obscure, and there was much debate in the late 1940s about the degree 
of 'Workers' Assistance in Management' that was appropriate. The 
major arena for these discussions was the Socialisation of Industries 
Committee, chaired by Herbert Morrison.23 
The first stimulus for examining this issue was a memorandum by 
Morrison which emphasised the need for a forum of management, 
technicians and workers to discuss the 'organisation and running' of 
nationalised industries. He wanted such consultation to take place at 
local, regional and national levels. It would, he argued, 'bring the Board 
face to face with the problems which were concerning the workpeople 
and could give the workers an opportunity of presenting their ideas and 
grievances at first hand to the Board' .24 
Part of Morrison's aim in raising this point was undoubtedly his 
desire to try to pre-empt more radical proposals for worker involvement. 
At a later date he was to make this explicit when he argued that if 'the 
arrangements were not satisfactory, there would undoubtedly be a 
demand for some form of direct participation by workers or trade unions 
in management', and such a development was, for him certainly, an ever 
present danger. He detected in the National Coal Board (NCB), for 
example, 'some signs of a tendency to overmuch consultation with the 
NUM on matters of management' .25 But it would perhaps be too cynical 
to dismiss all talk of 'workers' assistance' as a manoeuvre designed to 
dish any claims for more radical forms of industrial democracy. 
Ministers did believe that the place of the worker in socialised industries 
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should be different from that in the private sector, even if they were 
vague on what this meant, and they also hoped that this change would 
bring about a significant improvement in productivity. 
Much of the discussion of 'workers' assistance' focused on the 
question of whether consultation should take place using existing 
channels or through new machinery specifically devised for the purpose. 
Morrison and the official committee which he appointed to consider the 
matter looked favourably on the idea of separate machinery, with the 
Minister suggesting that a single structure tended 'to mix up questions 
of wages with questions of organisation' and seeing a case for different 
people being involved over different issues. 26 
As so often, change in this direction was resisted strongly by the 
Ministry of Labour, which feared any diminution in the authority of the 
trade unions, always felt to be a possibility with new or specialist 
machinery. Such a line was sustained, seemingly successfully, 
throughout the Attlee government period. 27 
As the official committee considered the merits of the various 
arguments, the members demonstrated how discussion of the workers' 
role in the nationalised sector was to be dominated by the rhetoric of 
human relations, very much as in the private sector (dealt with in 
Chapter 5). As the committee saw it, the objective of consultation was 
'to create within the organisation the particular kind of atmosphere or 
climate which will make the workers happy in their jobs'. So intangible 
an objective was unlikely to be produced 'merely by any institutional 
feature, such as a system of statutory committees'. Crucial to creating a 
suitable climate would be proper personnel management and works 
information. 28 
At the same time the committee stressed that matters of management, 
and the precise role for workers in it, were for the Boards of the 
nationalised industries to deal with. This was a constant refrain in these 
discussions, which was accepted by all of the Ministers involved as a 
principle (though Morrison in particular saw the doctrine of Board 
independence and responsibility as compatible with a degree of 
ministerial prodding).29 
This approach was, however, very much a weapon against more 
radical proposals. For example, when a group of managerial 'pro-
gressives', including Urwick, Wilfred Brown of Glacier Metals and 
George Dickson of the London Regional Board for Industry, urged the 
formation of advisory councils of managers, workers and consumers, 
emphasising the case for the involvement of workers on human relations 
grounds, Morrison was willing only to concede that existing 
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managements were 'unduly cautious and conservatively minded in their 
approach to the problems of enlisting the assistance of the staff. There 
was, he emphasised, no call for new measures: 'He doubted whether any 
corporate identity could be created out of the rather divergent interests 
of the workers, management and consumers' and 'whether any advisory 
council should be raised to a degree of responsibility which would 
derogate from the responsibility of the executive board.' 30 
This argument rumbled on throughout the Labour Government's 
period in office. Any proposals for increasing the workers' role which 
appeared to threaten the responsibility of the nationalised Boards were 
firmly rejected - such as happened with the schemes put forward by the 
National Union of Railwaymen, consistent opponents of the 
Morrisonian method of organisation, and the Union of Post Office 
Workers.31 
On the other hand, Ministers remained highly conscious that the 
existing forms of management in the nationalised industries were failing 
to generate the kind of enthusiasm and support from workers which had 
once been envisaged. In 1950 Morrison circulated to his colleagues a 
report about a London conference of employees in nationalised 
industries, which, he contended, showed 'a most disturbing situation'. 
He worried that a 'continuance of large-scale misunderstanding and 
discontent among the employees of the socialised industries' might have 
'the most serious consequences for their efficiency and for the success 
of policy of socialisation'. Certainly the evidence cited at this 
conference bore out the report's statement that in many cases no attempt 
was being made on the part of managements to inform employees of 
what they were doing or why.32 
The fears voiced by Morrison seem to have been shared by his 
ministerial colleagues, and so a sub-committee was established to look 
at the issue of 'Relations with Workers in Socialised Industries'. This 
accepted that these relations were not good. Whilst active discontent 
was unusual, passive unenthusiasm was widespread: 
there is a widespread sense of frustration coupled with disappoint-
ment at the results of socialisation. Sometimes labour relations are 
good by any standards, but even where this is so there is rarely, if 
ever, any positive enthusiasm for the new order of things. 
The Committee linked these attitudes to a number of features which 
marked the socialised industries - the continuation in office of the old 
private sector management, over-large 'perks' for managers, excessive 
bureaucracy, and a 'lack of concern for efficiency on the part of 
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management'. It then raised again the issue of separate mechanisms for 
joint consultation, suggesting that, in single structures, the salience of 
wage issues tended to mean that 'consultation about wider questions of 
policy and management will take a subordinate place'. The Committee 
also criticised the unions for falling short of expectations in 'educating 
officers and members in their responsibilities under public ownership'. 
But despite these quite tough comments, nothing practical seems to have 
resulted before the Government fell. 33 
The search for improved human relations in nationalised industries 
led up some eccentric paths. None was more bizarre, but also perhaps 
symptomatic of a strand in Labour's politics, than the burst of activity 
which followed a memorandum from Attlee to Morrison at the end of 
1948. In this the Prime Minister recounted a discussion which he had 
had with General Slim in which both agreed that there was a parallel 
between good officers in the army and good leadership in industry. The 
lesson to be learnt, according to Attlee, was clear: 
There is need in industry of the kind of spirit and leadership which 
obtains in a good regiment, an esprit de corps not only of the 
regiment but of the company, and the platoon. I am sure that this is 
necessary in, for instance, the coal industry, where you want the 
esprit de corps of the pit. 34 
However, Ministers resisted Attlee's idea that General Slim might have 
any role in spreading the word in civilian life, 'because the impression 
might be given that the Government thought that the military spirit 
should be introduced into industry'. Nevertheless, Attlee's 
memorandum led to a new round of activity on human relations, with the 
Minister of Labour suggesting an enquiry into what was occurring in the 
nationalised sector. This was resisted by the Chairmen of the Boards, but 
the Ministry of Labour pursued the matter informally, most notably 
convening a conference on the issue.35 
The focus of this conference was on good 'leadership', this being the 
perceived message of Attlee's original memorandum. The occasion was 
chaired by Lloyd Roberts from the Ministry of Labour, and the central 
concern, as so often in discussions of this kind, was with the role of 
supervisors and junior management, seen as in the 'front line' of the 
human relations offensive: 
The inquiry was prompted by the belief that the development of 
harmonious relations between managers and workers can be 
materially influenced by the appointment to managerial and 
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supervisory positions of those who, in addition to the necessary 
technical and intellectual qualifications, possess or will develop 
those intangible qualities which indicate a capacity for leadership. 
The conference also discussed some (unnamed) private sector models of 
supervisory training, which mainly differed from those in public 
industries because of their stress on the need for 'human relations' skills 
rather than simple technical proficiency.36 
All of this indicates the ways in which 'human relations' ideas were 
floated as relevant to the nationalised sector, just as Chapter 5 showed 
how, as a result of the productivity drive, they became so prominent in 
discussions about the private sector. Allowing for the different 
circumstances of ownership, was the discussion of management in the 
public sector simply the mirror of that in the private? On the evidence of 
the deliberations of the Socialisation of Industries Committee, the 
answer is clearly that it was not. Whilst human relations did to some 
extent dominate the agenda for discussion on management in the 
socialised industries there was an alternative theme also present, which 
focused on the degree of centralisation or decentralisation that was 
appropriate in both the main administrative pattern used in the socialised 
industries, and the associated management structures. 
This issue first arose in relation to the coal industry, which soon after 
its nationalisation was deemed to have adopted an overly centralised 
structure. In a memorandum of late 1947 Hugh Gaitskell, the Minister 
of Fuel and Power, stressed that the history of the industry was one of 
fragmentation, and that a big problem for the efficient management of 
the sector was the lack of managers with experience of running a 
large-scale organisation. (He backed this up with the assertion that the 
one exception to this was coal selling, which had been centralised under 
the Coal Mines Reorganisation Act 1930, and which, he said, was by no 
accident the most efficient part of the Coal Board.) This criticism was 
linked to the argument that the make-up of the Board was wrong, 
consisting largely of functional heads rather than directors with general 
responsibilities. Such a situation, Gaitskell argued, led to an imprecise 
chain of command on general management issues. 37 
This analysis seems to have been widely shared. Morrison, in 
particular, supported Gaitskell's views, which led him to a search for 
appropriate models of decentralised large-scale firms. He proposed a 
working party which, amongst other things, should look at how ICI and 
General Motors (GM) ran themselves. He himself circulated extensive 
extracts from P.F. Drucker's book on Big Business (1947) which was 
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largely concerned with GM, presenting it as an 'essay in federalism' 
which offered the important message that the operational units of the 
company were 'run much like the units in a planned economy' .38 
The proposed working party came to grief because of opposition 
from the Board Chairmen to any outside scrutiny of their efficiency ( see 
below). But Morrison continued to pursue the issue, for example 
circulating a Treasury 0. & M. discussion of 'Examples of Industrial 
Organisation', which focused on centralisation and decentralisation, 
with appropriate instances along with organisational charts. Morrison 
linked this material to a general argument that one of the main problems 
facing any large socialised industry was 'the determination of the right 
degree of decentralisation to adopt'. He was sensitive to the usual 
economies of scale arguments for centralisation, but again pointed to 
GM and ICI as examples of how efficient big companies decentralised. 39 
In the event, such discussions seem to have had little immediate 
effect, above all because of the continuing saga about government 
'interference' in the activities of the nationalised industries. Morrison 
was keen on setting up an efficiency unit which would scrutinise the 
Boards' activities. One reason for this proposal was to pre-empt the idea 
of Parliamentary Select Committees on the nationalised industries, 
which Morrison opposed as likely to 'take up a great deal of the time of 
the senior officers of the boards', an attempt at compromise which failed 
to persuade the Board Chairmen. 40 
But this was not Morrison's only consideration. He seems to have 
been genuinely concerned to evolve appropriate forms of organisation 
for the new giant enterprises that he was so instrumental in bringing into 
existence. He recognised that harmonious human relations were not 
enough, arguing that 'while good will between both sides of industry 
was extremely important, there was a danger that it might be over 
stressed to the detriment of efficient management and increased 
productivity'; and, on another occasion, that 'Education and indoc-
trination will not be good enough, nor committees; radical changes in 
organisation, methods of work, and management methods may 
sometimes be necessary' .41 
What is surely striking about Morrison's position is the extent to 
which the model from the private sector for managing large-scale 
organisations was treated as unproblematic. No one seems to have asked 
whether publicly owned industries should be run like General Motors or 
ICI or what this implied about the purposes of nationalisation. Morrison 
himself does not appear to have felt called upon to defend the parallel. 
The decentralisation issue seems to have emerged as the main 
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'managerial' problem that was specifically related to nationalisation in 
this period.42 In part this occurred because of its compatibility with the 
stress on human relations. Austen Albu, for example, argued that there 
was now a 'universal understanding of the difficulty of maintaining 
initiative, responsibility, communication of ideas and morale in 
large-scale undertakings of every kind'. This, in tum, meant that there 
was a need for greater decentralisation in the nationalised industries, a 
conclusion which, as for Morrison, pointed to ICI as the best example of 
decentralised management under a centralised Board.43 
This menu of management possibilities for the nationalised 
industries was obviously rather limited. In practice the management 
systems which emerged in those industries tended to reflect arguments 
about collective bargaining and capital finance as much as any notion of 
internal organisational efficiency. However, there was some tendency to 
greater decentralisation with successive nationalisations, from the 
highly centralised Coal Board to the regional organisation of gas. But 
overall it is obvious that, apart from the platitudes on human relations 
and a rather one-dimensional notion of centralisation, Labour never 
really got to intellectual grips with management in the public sector 
during this period. On the other hand, the parallels drawn with the 
private sector were linked to emerging trends in Labour's thinking about 
company organisation and management, a topic which will be 
considered in the final section of this chapter. 
Turning to the question of the unions and management, it is clear 
from Chapter 5, that the TUC and most union leaderships strongly 
supported the Government's productivity drive. This support raised the 
issue of what attitude was to be taken to management. Here, two rather 
different emphases co-existed. On the one hand, there was the persistent 
union claim for a greater share in management, meaning greater 
consultation from the shopfloor to the national level rather than any idea 
of joint management or radical forms of industrial democracy. On the 
other hand, there was the tendency to regard management as a technical 
practice, as an expert function on a par with other professional 
competencies. In this context management was something to be learned 
and thus something that, if mastered, might strengthen the unions' claim 
to a greater say in the running of industry. The latter position served to 
give an ideologically congenial gloss to the campaign by the TUC in 
particular to encourage union members to learn management 
techniques. 
Both of these arguments were apparent, for example, in the report of 
the TUC to the special conference of union executives in September 
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1948. The aim here was to encourage unions to do more to take advan-
tage of existing management training facilities. Whilst the immediate 
context was that of raising productivity, education in management 
technique, it was argued, also arose 'for the unions as a question of long 
term policy, mainly from the standpoint of the workers' claim to fuller 
participation in the control of industry' .44 
The TUC's support for training in these latter terms was further 
emphasised in the document Trade Unions and Management, produced 
after the 1949 Congress. Much of this was taken up with descriptions of 
the kinds of techniques that unions should be interested in learning. 
These were seen as encompassing job evaluation, time and motion 
study, and work measurement. But the underlying message emphasised 
the longer term objective. Jack Tanner of the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union, for example, argued that there 'must be a development in the 
attitude of trade unionists to industrial management'. Management 
'should be no longer regarded as a "mystery" and it was essential 
that . . . unions should learn its techniques and the elements of 
production engineering'. This kind of lesson was very much supported 
by E.P. Harries, in charge of the TUC's Production Department. He saw 
a major part of the task of that department as educating 'all sectors of the 
T.U. movement in the problem of management', adding that this was a 
crucially necessary development at workshop as well as headquarters 
levels.45 
In some ways such an attitude towards management is unsurprising, 
given the general union commitment to production and productivity, 
though it is in marked contrast to the attitude typically taken prior to the 
war. But what is perhaps more interesting is the precise way in which 
this new attitude to management was advocated. Trade Unions and 
Management produced two reasons why the unions should change their 
approach. One emphasised individual advancement: there was a 
common assumption at this time that in the long run, at least in the 
nationalised industries, the normal route to an administrative job would 
be by training competent trade unionists in management. The other was 
that such knowledge would allow unions to 'react knowledgeably to 
simpler proposals' .46 
This reactive posture, which characterised most of the TUC's 
pronouncements on management, needs to be compared with what may 
be called a 'radical productionism', where learning about management 
was seen as allowing unions 'to participate directly in achieving 
productive efficiency'. This contrast should not be overdrawn. There 
were undoubtedly shades of opinion on the issue of the degree to which 
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training trade unionists in management involved the idea that existing 
managers were inefficient. But some trade unionists did certainly take a 
highly critical line, even though they were in a minority against the TUC 
view, which was that such a challenge to the legitimacy of management 
could cut across the industrial co-operation and consensus that it wished 
to establish.47 
The position on this of one union, the Association of Supervisory 
Staff and Engineering Technicians (ASSET), is of especial interest. 
ASSET' s role was central partly because, at least on occasions, it opted 
to take a 'radical productionist' line. But, in addition, ASSET was the 
union for (junior) managers and supervisors, and so was integral to the 
attempt to forge a new link between labour and management. Moreover, 
Labour's two key ideologues on management, Austen Albu and Ian 
Mikardo, were prominent ASSET members. 
'Radical productionism' did not become a consistent ASSET 
position, but it was powerfully expressed on occasions and this was 
especially so during the economic crises of 1947 and 1949. In the latter 
case, for example, an editorial in the union's journal argued that: 'Inside 
ASSET we have many, many managers who are fighting bitterly to 
establish industrial democracy; are waging a ceaseless war against 
directors' policy that creates inefficiency and discontent.' The union 
also provided Mikardo (the union's parliamentary spokesman) with a 
platform to expound similar views.48 
Mikardo was partly successful in getting this kind of radical view of 
management into the economic policies of the Left in the Labour Party. 
Both of the best known manifestos of the Labour Left in this period, 
Keep Left and Keeping Left, essentially accepted the kind of case that 
ASSET was promoting. The first of these, for example, attacked the 
BIM as too conservative in its approach to management reform: 'Its 
constitution and powers are circumscribed in order not to offend the 
existing institutions and the existing firms of consultants - a major 
example of that tenderness to vested interests to which we have already 
referred.' Keeping Left linked its proposal for the extension of economic 
planning in the name of greater efficiency to the argument that this 
action by the Government 'would entitle it to ask the unions to institute 
a mass scheme of education in management for their officers, shop 
stewards and other representatives, and would thus canalise the energies 
of the unions into a new progressive full employment function' .49 
Mikardo was therefore something of a link over 'radical 
productionism' between ASSET and the Left of the Labour Party. This 
position, whilst noted, is not sufficiently emphasised in most treatments 
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of the Labour Left. In fact, one of the striking features of the period is 
the extent to which the Left in this area mirrored the priorities of the 
Labour leadership. The Left, too, put increased output and higher 
productivity at the centre of its agenda - it just advocated more radical 
means than the leadership to achieve these ends. This sharply divided 
the Parliamentary Left from the Communists, who after 1947 rejected 
their earlier 'radical productionism' in favour of a posture stressing the 
defence of working-class standards against 'heightened exploitation' .50 
Nevertheless, the appeal of this 'radical productionist' position 
should not be exaggerated. ASSET itself was an ambiguous body. 
Whilst there seems to have been little active resistance to Mikardo's role 
as spokesman for the union, its own 'managerialism' was more complex 
than a simple endorsement of standard contemporary Left positions. The 
idea of a training in management as preparation for advancement up the 
industrial career hierarchy was clearly popular in ASSET, and this 
obviously tended to produce a rather different perspective on the 
legitimacy of existing industrial organisation. But more important was 
the way in which ASSET could also be drawn into the dominant 
consensual approach to industrial issues. 
The issue of the journal ASSET for July 1947 carried a front page 
message from Herbert Morrison. He wrote: 
I wish ASSET luck in its work and hope that by spreading and 
extending its membership this vast miscellaneous body of the middle 
class, which is composed of the technical, supervisory and the 
managerial classes, will become ever more competent to make an 
increasing contribution to the economic and social well-being of the 
community. 
Underlying this mellifluous message lay a rather different kind of 
managerialism than that espoused by Mikardo. The point of organising 
managers into a union was not to spearhead the exposure of existing 
inefficiencies, but to draw managers into the great arch of co-operative 
endeavour across classes in the cause of higher productivity .51 
Morrison's outlook echoed that of Austen Albu in 1942. The latter 
had suggested then how Labour needed to approach management: 
If the Trade Union movement were to make a constructive approach 
to them, proposing collaboration for positive social purposes, many 
of them could be persuaded that the real interests, both of themselves 
and of the nation, lie in an association with the political and industrial 
organisations of the Labour movement. 
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And this in tum was reminiscent of ideas put forward very clearly in 
Sidney Webb's undeservedly neglected work of 1917.52 Such a view of 
management was embedded in a much broader view of changes in 
British society. The possibility of a Labour alliance with management 
was commonly seen not as an act of political will, but as resting on a 
fundamental change in the function of management in the modem 
corporation. In short, it depended upon the idea of a managerial 
revolution. 
As has been already noted, the book titled The Managerial 
Revolution, written by James Burnham, had appeared in Britain in 1942. 
Burnham had argued that the world was already a long way down a path 
which would lead to managers becoming everywhere the ruling class (in 
a context of state-owned property). His analysis was couched in Marxist 
terms, and he saw this new ruling class as co-existing with different 
political arrangements, totalitarian initially, possibly democratic later, 
but always maintaining effective power.53 
This work was a frequent reference point for the Left in the later 
1940s. Broadly speaking, Labour writers, especially but not exclusively 
those on the Right of the party, tended increasingly to accept the central 
thesis about the shifting locus of power in society, a process which may 
perhaps be seen as culminating in the New Fabian Essays of 1952 and 
Crosland's Future of Socialism of 1956.54 
The idea of a shift in the locus of power rested in tum on the idea of 
the separation of ownership and control in the modem corporation. This 
alleged separation became a commonplace in much Labour discussion 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s. It implied both that the 'old' idea 
linking political centrality to the ownership of the means of production 
was outdated, and also, perhaps more important in the current context, 
that managers were no longer 'agents of capital'. Rather, they were 
(actual or potential) experts in administration and human relations, a 
'third estate' in the realm, with no inherent reason for being 
anti-Labour.55 
Such propositions were hardly new in the 1940s, but they were 
becoming much more important as Labour, from its position as the party 
of government, had to grapple both intellectually and politically with 
management. Faced with issues about running newly nationalised 
industries, Labour was forced to take a view on how far this process of 
management would differ from that in the private sector. As suggested 
above, discussions on managing the nationalised industries implicitly 
suggested the difference was small. This was made explicit by Albu, 
once more, who argued that the real division in relation to producer units 
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was not that between the publicly and privately owned but that between 
the owner-controlled and the professionally controlled, the latter 
making up the bulk of the private sector.56 
Similarly, faced with the need to deal with the 80 per cent of the 
economy remaining unnationalised, Labour was forced to take a view 
on the character of the private sector. It is important not to oversimplify 
the substance of that view but Brady, a critic of the managerial 
revolution thesis, seems to have broadly got it right when he linked it to 
the perception of management as a neutral expertise: 'Here the thesis of 
Burnham's Managerial Revolution seems to have been taken over by 
Labour spokesmen and theoreticians, lock, stock and barrel' he wrote; 
'In effect for the syndicalist idea has been substituted a Labour version 
of the Burnham thesis of management by disinterested professional 
experts. ' 57 Indeed the whole enthusiasm for the BIM can be seen as 
based on this understanding of management. The central function of the 
BIM, therefore, was to generate and deploy 'expertise' through the 
economy, not least amongst trade unionists. 
On the basis of such a view of management's role, Labour seemed 
willing to offer management their place in the sun of British politics. 
And there is evidence that politically this posture had some success. 
Cripps, the leader and symbol of Labour's new managerialism, was a 
popular figure with significant sections of management. But there is also 
good evidence of subsequent disillusionment, based on the fact that 
despite the foundation of the BIM and Labour's undoubted enthusiasm 
for managers as (potential) key agents in the productivity campaign, the 
stratum never really felt itself to have been accepted. 
In October 1945 Industry Illustrated noted that the 'present 
government' was concerning itself with industrial management to a 
degree that was a 'novelty in this country' but then went on to lament 
the fact that official policies, especially on the Working Parties, had not 
broken away 'from the rather jejune doctrinaire assumptions about 
employer cum trade union partnerships'. There could be no doubt, the 
journal continued, 'that in the last analysis industry is run by the 
managers, who must still be there to lead the productive team, whether 
the political climate is a socialistic or a capitalistic one'. Later the same 
year the seriousness of the Government's intent about efficiency was 
noted, but there was also criticism of Labour for having ignored the 
professional manager in its new reforms. As the journal's editor put it: 
'One would have thought this government would have been the most 
ready to recognise and appreciate Industry's tiers etat.'58 
In fact, throughout the Labour Government's period in office, most 
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of the economic bodies that it established were resolutely tripartite and 
involved employers, unions and government (though in some cases 
'experts' substituted for government as the third element). This pattern 
was true of such bodies as the Working Parties, the National Production 
Advisory Council for Industry, the Economic Planning Board, the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity and most smaller scale 
committees. The BIM was denied its place in these forums, despite its 
claims, and support from MPs such as Mikardo. 
The issue of management's role in such bodies does not seem to have 
been raised at Cabinet level, but discussions amongst senior civil 
servants give the flavour of the thinking behind this position. The most 
explicit reference here occurred in the context of debate about whether 
or not the BIM should send representatives to the Committee on 
Industrial Productivity. The BIM couched its claim for such representa-
tion by asserting that it had an analogous position to the TUC and FBI. 
The civil service response is worth quoting in full: 
In the first place, the analogy is false, since the B.I.M. is not a 
political union of managers and does not claim to represent the 
personal interests of managers in the way in which the F.B.I. or 
T.U.C. represent their members. 
In the second place, if the BIM claims were admitted it could only 
open the door to its being pressed on other occasions and for other 
bodies as various as NPACI, Regional Boards for Industry and 
Development Councils. In fact every two-sided body might well 
become triangular in future, and the role of the independent or 
Government member to ensure that the work got done with 
maximum reconciliation of the employers and trade unionists would 
tend to disappear in the claim of the non-elected manager to speak in 
effect for the public interest in efficiency. This would be the 
'managerial revolution' with a vengeance.59 
This view seems to have prevailed. In this instance and occasionally 
elsewhere the BIM was granted a small representation, but explicitly on 
the basis of its expertise, not as an interest group. 
Undoubtedly, all of this ultimately rested on a sensible appreciation 
of political realities. Partly as a consequence of government encourage-
ment, by the late 1940s the BEC, FBI and TUC had become significant 
power-brokers, and bodies jealous of their prerogative as presenters of 
industrial opinion to government. This governmental role given to 'the 
two sides of industry' both reflected and reinforced the adversarial 
system of industrial relations in Britain. It was a system in which 
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organised management remained at best a bit player. As Stalin might 
have said, how many divisions had the BIM? But it chimed in very 
poorly both with the rhetoric of the managerial revolution and with 
Labour's attempted rapprochement with management in the name of 
production and productivity. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that Labour was forced to think hard 
about management in the late 1940s, perhaps especially in relation to the 
nationalised sector. Much (but not all) of the Labour Movement was 
persuaded to accept that management was neutral, an embodiment of 
expertise, which both could and should be an ally of Labour. The 
expertise in question must involve a large dollop of human relations, but 
was to remain administrative in character and largely separate from 
knowledge about any particular production process. The figure of the 
manager was, at least potentially, both progressive and professional. 
This intellectual alliance with the manager rested in turn on a 
conception of the large joint stock company as an increasingly benign 
agency, unless monopolistic or with a history of particularly bad 
industrial relations or investment policies. Hence the broad movement 
to 'consolidationism' in Labour's policies both reflected and reinforced 
a particular view of management and its role in the private corporation. 
Such a position was not without its contradictions. If big private and 
nationalised companies were so similar, and ICI a plausible model for 
the nationalised industries, why was it so often considered for 
investigation by the Monopolies Commission or as a prime target for 
nationalisation?6() If managers' knowledge was so important why were 
their counsels usually to be excluded from the major places where 
economic policy was discussed? 
Labour could, of course, have gone down a different route and 
attempted a path of 'radical productionism', allying itself more strongly 
with 'progressive' management against employers. But whatever else 
might be said about such a strategy, it would have necessitated a very 
radical break with the party's emergent understanding of the private 
sector. Whereas, before 1945, relatively little had been generated on this 
subject, by 1951 the situation was very different. The simple fact was 
that Labour had been forced to come to terms with industry because of 
national considerations, which meant recognising and dealing with 
employers' associations alongside the TUC. Such a relationship 
effectively precluded carrying the theory of the managerial revolution 
into political practice. 
Chapter 7 
The 'Americanisation' of 
productivity, 1948-51 
Periodically in the twentieth century British firms and governments, 
conscious of the economy's relative decline, have turned to the USA for 
a model of how things might be done better.1 The late 1940s was one 
such period. As on previous occasions, looking across the Atlantic for 
ideas to improve efficiency and productivity was conditioned by a range 
of short-term factors, and these also shaped what was seen as relevant in 
the US model. This chapter focuses on the causes and effects of the 
Labour Government's attempts to encourage British industry to adopt 
features of American production techniques, especially but not only via 
the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP). 
It should be emphasised that this was by no means the only aspect of 
'Americanisation' in the period. Private sector companies without any 
government role were, albeit to a largely unknown degree, attempting to 
borrow from US practice. As Clark notes: 'American influences in 
Britain were continuous from the 1890s onwards and their presence 
went through successions of peaks and troughs. British firms did track 
American developments and create fragile and particularistic channels 
of learning about products, processes and work organisations.' 2 
Another source of American impact on British industry was US 
multi-national investment in Britain. Whilst the main initiative here was 
of course private, it was facilitated by a general policy of encouragement 
from British governments, including those of Attlee. In 1949, the 
Cabinet Economic Policy Committee reasserted that position, ordering 
that US direct investment proposals be encouraged 'provided that they 
contribute either (a) to our dollar viability by dollar saving or dollar 
earning, or (b) to our general economic recovery by supplying US 
techniques, know-how, patented processes' .3 
The content of 'Americanisation' was always ambiguous, and its 
precise meaning in the debates and initiatives of the late 1940s is 
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considered later. But one notable feature of Americanisation in other 
countries at this time was strikingly absent from Britain - vigorous 
anti-trust policies. In the defeated enemy countries of Germany and 
Japan anti-monopoly and anti-cartel measures were central, at least 
initially, to Americanisation. By contrast, in Britain anti-monopoly 
policy was a very damp squib, notwithstanding the passing of the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948. As Helen Mercer 
shows, the Act's impact was reduced to very little largely because the 
Board of Trade, which both filtered applications to the Monopolies 
Commission and adjudicated upon its reports, was effectively 
influenced by business interests.4 
The creation of the AACP in 1948 reflected the convergence of both 
the British and American administrations' concern with productivity. 
The origin of the British Government's involvement has been dealt with 
in earlier chapters. For the American side the creation of the AACP was 
closely linked to the general policy of economic aid to Western Europe 
under the Marshall Aid programme. Marshall Aid's overall objectives 
and effects have been much debated,5 but in the present context the most 
important point to note is that, as well as giving immediate aid in order 
(allegedly) to stave off economic collapse and Communism, it 
embodied a 'politics of productivity'. This rested in part on the belief 
that increases in productivity had ameliorated social conflict in the USA 
itself, which in tum led to the idea that the long-run stability of Western 
Europe could be secured if growth and productivity were to be 
encouraged by US policy. Thus, Marshall Aid became to some extent 
about exporting American techniques of production in order to secure 
the perceived benefits of an American-style social peace.6 
In this broad context the specific idea for the AACP emerged from a 
meeting between Stafford Cripps and Paul Hoffman (head of the 
European Co-operation Administration) in the summer of 1948. The 
note of this discussion is quite revealing about the attitudes which the 
British Government held at this time: 
The Chancellor said that he recognised the great interest which the 
Americans took in productivity. He had himself taken a lead in this 
matter over the last three years and it was indeed vital for the U.K. 
He therefore welcomed the suggestions that the US should help us 
in this matter; but it was vital, if the conservative outlook of both 
employers and labour was to be broken down, that any arrangements 
should be made by industry itself and not imposed upon industry by 
action of the two Govemments.7 
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Cripps' s reaction was conditioned not only by his prior interest in 
productivity but also by his recognition of US sensitivities about how far 
European countries were making their own efforts at economic 
expansion and adjustment and not just relying on Marshall Aid to bale 
them out. Thus, whilst the AACP was never a formal condition for the 
receipt of Marshall Aid, it was based on a recognition by the British 
Government that the giving of Marshall Aid was a contentious issue in 
the USA, so that it would be foolish not to respond to US initiatives 
which might ease its political passage in Congress. 8 
Cripps was clearly also very sensitive to the politics of the proposal 
in Britain. He secured the support of the official representatives of the 
employers and unions, but both bodies interpreted the matter in the light 
of their own concerns. The FBI had already been alerted to the very 
unfavourable view being taken in the USA about British industry's 
performance. The head of the US Department of Labour Productivity 
Division, L. Silberman, had visited Britain in early 1948 and, 'although 
very friendly', .had 'formed a devastatingly adverse view of British 
productivity' which compared 'even worse with American than he had 
been led to expect'. The FBI's response was therefore to welcome the 
AACP as an opportunity for correcting 'ill-informed or self-interested' 
criticisms of British industry by Americans, and, at the same time, 
reducing the Labour Government's role in the productivity issue by 
placing 'the whole of this question firmly in the hands of industry 
itself .9 
Similarly, the TUC had its own views as to why the AACP should be 
supported. At the General Council meeting when the proposal was 
approved, Jack Tanner of the AEU argued that 'criticism has been 
levelled by certain Americans on semi-official visits to this country not 
against British workers but against managements, and he thought it 
would not be harmful for American industrialists to realise the 
difficulties which British industry was facing'. Like the FBI, the TUC 
had earlier been hesitant about the Government's proposals for a 
renewed productivity drive in the autumn of 1948, involving direct 
official contact with workers and employers via local and national 
conferences. Both bodies to a certain extent wanted to keep government 
at arm's length, away from 'their' members, and saw the AACP as 
means of achieving this. 10 
Endorsement by the peak associations of capital and labour did not 
mean unanimous support for the AACP. A letter from Homsey Trades 
Council to the TUC reflected an extreme version of what was, per-
haps, a widespread view on the Left: 'The introduction of American 
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methods such as the Taft-Hartley anti-T.U. bill, the use of tear gas 
against strikers, lynching and the Ku Klux Klan, will not increase 
productivity.' 11 
The AACP proposal in fact touched a raw nerve of anti-American 
sentiment, evident across the political spectrum. 12 In announcing the 
idea Cripps went out of his way to stress the agreement given by the FBI 
and the TUC, and emphasised that the AACP was proposed 'not on the 
basis of our industries being inferior to those of other countries', but 
because 'an exchange of experience and knowledge of production 
would be of great benefit to this country'. 13 
Given this endorsement, if not enthusiasm, the AACP was 
established in 1948 as a bipartite body, with representatives from the 
BEC as well as the FBI, the TUC and employer and union repre-
sentatives from the USA, but no government members. It was intended 
that the organisation's life would be coterminous with Marshall Aid, 
that is, ending in June 1952. In the early stages the AACP established a 
five-part programme of work for itself: (i) plant visits and exchange of 
information on production techniques; (ii) an enquiry into maintenance 
of productive plant and power; (iii) productivity measurement; (iv) an 
examination of specialisation in industrial production; and (v) the 
collection of economic information. The last four of these objectives 
spawned committees, all of which reported rather inconclusively in 
1949. This reinforced the dominance of team visits to America as the 
AACP's main activity (in fact the only one for which it is usually 
remembered). By the end of its existence the Council had arranged 49 
team visits in specific industries, and 17 on specialist subjects (for 
example, management education). Three visits of US teams to the UK 
were also organised. 14 
The role of the AACP in the productivity drive of the late 1940s must 
be partly seen in the context of the agenda set by its major participants, 
the peak associations. Certain areas, notably restrictive practices (by 
both firms and labour), were ruled out as specific objects of enquiry by 
the British participants, despite the Americans' view that these were 
likely to be important in explaining Anglo-American differences in 
productivity. Such questions were simultaneously said to be a 'purely 
British matter', to be fairly unimportant and, in any case, to be 
welcomed where they existed by both employers and unions in Britain 
because they encouraged 'stability through organisation' .15 Parallel to 
this kind of exclusion was a pact not to consider anything to do with 
labour relations: 'all agreed that there was to be no interference with the 
normal negotiating machinery and procedure of industry'. 16 However, 
The 'Americanisation' of productivity 135 
none of these issues could be effectively excluded from the team reports, 
a point considered later. 
More positively, both the employers and unions had various ideas as 
to what they thought the AACP should focus attention upon. The FBI, 
in setting out its 'fundamental considerations' in agreeing to the AACP, 
emphasised three points. It argued that: 
(a) lowest cost should be the criteria of efficiency rather than 
production per man hour; 
(b) greater efficiency was constantly barred by restrictions on capital 
developments; 
( c) the big problem in efficiency is bottlenecks in materials and 
supplies.17 
The first point related to the FBI view that production per man hour 
comparisons with the USA were, despite their popularity, unfair and 
inappropriate because they did not reflect the higher capital intensity of 
US production and thus distorted the overall efficiency differences. This 
was a highly important issue for the whole productivity drive and will 
be considered several times in the following pages. It clearly links to the 
second point, the belief of the FBI that, under Labour, investment had 
become the 'residual legatee' of resources rather than the first call. The 
Government's view was that, contrary to this assertion, it-was giving a 
high priority to investment, but that, especially because of the need to 
divert resources into exports, there was a limit to what might be 
achieved on this front, and in any event much more could and should be 
done to raise output with existing capital equipment. The last point was 
a staple complaint of the FBI in this period, linked to the belief that 
controls were excessive and should be removed more rapidly. Thus, 
from the FBI point of view, the AACP was largely a forum for pressing 
a pre-existing and well-known agenda of issues which it saw as crucial 
for productivity .18 
However, there was also recognition that by involving unions the 
AACP could function to raise questions in a rather different way than 
the normal diet of FBI representations to the Government. An FBI draft 
report on the AACP in 1950 argued that productivity was basically an 
issue of 'men and machines'. Given that machinery was largely outside 
the AACP remit, the focus should be on men. In this context it was 
argued that the Council could 'influence the psychological approach and 
affect the climate of opinion': 
Productivity consciousness is a long step towards the realisation of 
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high productivity. It is in helping to promote this that the Council 
believe that its work has been and is of the greatest potential value. 19 
There is a clear parallel between the FBI and TUC approaches to the 
AACP. On the one hand they both wanted to use it to press their own 
hobby-horses; for example, in the case of the TUC, the importance of 
Joint Production Committees. Equally, both were convinced that in the 
long run higher investment was the crucial element in raising 
productivity. But the TUC, like the FBI in its more reflective moods, 
accepted that in the short run the level of capital equipment had to be 
taken as given. What, therefore, was left? With restrictive practices and 
industrial relations ruled out, the TUC, like the FBI, tended to end up 
with a rather vacuous psychologism. Thus, Tanner from the AEU 
argued that: 'if we are going to get any immediate results it does mean 
improved and increased co-operation between management and work 
people'. Naesmith from the cotton weavers saw this co-operation as 
being something to be spread from the peak associations to the 
shopfloor: 'The issue with us is how to get the people in the mills and 
factories and the workshops themselves lined up on the need for change 
and the way in which the changes should go.' 20 
The sectoral teams sent from Britain to the USA all consisted of 
representatives of both employers and employees, with the latter 
supposed to include supervisors, technicians and those from 'workshop 
level', including operatives and shop stewards. In practice, the 
composition of the teams was a persistent bone of contention. Early in 
1949 Harries at the TUC wrote that the whole idea of team visits was 
'going badly' because some trade associations were insisting on sending 
non-trade unionists.21 
It was subsequently agreed that the procedure would be for the 
AACP to invite employers' associations to ask firms if they wished to 
nominate people for the teams; that they would be requested to do this 
in collaboration with trade unions; and that they would also be 
questioned as to whether the unions agreed to the nominations. This 
looks like, and seems to have functioned as, a rather uneasy compromise 
between the supposedly bipartisan character of the AACP and the fact 
that much of the non-dollar cost of the visits was borne by employers. 
The composition of the teams was also affected by the Americans 
screening-out communists on security grounds.22 
Only one detailed account of a team visit seems to have survived. 
This is a case study relating to the making of the Cotton Spinning 
Report, by P.H. Cook of the Tavistock Institute. In this instance the 
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worker members were nominated by the unions, and the eventual report 
was strongly endorsed by the employee side. Cook saw the team's 
efforts as making a 'serious and important contribution to its industry' 
and emphasised the importance of good communications within the 
team for its perceived success - a very Tavistock point of view.23 
Like all of the other teams, that on cotton spinning was sent around 
factories in Britain before it went to the USA. This 'briefing tour' 
involved visiting 17 companies over a fortnight, before a six-week tour 
of the USA which covered 35 plants. On the team's return, 29 meetings 
were held to publicise its report and findings, and the average attendance 
at these was said to be in excess of 100 people.24 
This pattern was similar to that for most of the teams, though whether 
all were quite so easily co-operative is unclear. Cotton spinning was 
perhaps atypical in the collaborative character of its industrial relations, 
though in most cases the 'screening' process seems to have ensured a 
minimum of discord amongst team members. Controversy arose most 
explicitly in cases where the unions felt that team membership had been 
'fixed' by employers in order to secure a report favourable to them-
selves. For example, the Foundry Workers' Union protested ineffec-
tively about the composition of the Steel Founding Team. When the 
team's report was published the union produced its own counter-report, 
which earned it a dressing-down from the General Council of the TUC 
on the grounds that '[the union] had obviously sought to influence shop 
stewards to take an antagonistic view of the Report' .25 
What message did the majority of team reports carry about the 
sources of Britain's low productivity compared with the USA? With 66 
reports on diverse industries, and the politically charged nature of the 
issue, it is not perhaps surprising that different authors have drawn 
rather different conclusions on this subject. For example, Broadberry 
and Crafts have tended to emphasise the overmanning and restrictive 
practices that were 'revealed' by the reports.26 Carew, by contrast, 
stressed the general social-psychological approach of the reports, with 
their belief that the particular character of American labour was vital. 
Coupled to this, for Carew, was an emphasis on the need for 'scientific 
management' as in the American model. In this account, therefore, the 
most important aspect of the AACP was its 'ideological challenge to 
basic labour movement values' .27 
Though having very different views about the accuracy of the AACP 
diagnosis of Britain's productivity problems, both Broadberry and 
Crafts and Carew tend to focus attention on issues concerning labour. Is 
this a fair portrait of the reports? It must be conceded at once that the 
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reports did contain a great deal of rhetoric about the alleged differences 
in labour attitudes and industrial relations between the USA and Britain. 
This derived partly from the 'lowest common denominator' kind of 
approach of the FBI and TUC to the AACP, and was no doubt 
encouraged by the bipartisan nature of the teams. 
Much of this material was by its very nature ill-focused and lent itself 
to vacuous generalisation. As a contemporary critic noted: 
The teams, it seems, have found the real secret of high productivity; 
it lies not in machinery, not in factory layout - in short not primarily 
in technical improvements, but in the American Way of Life. If only 
the American Way (the reports suggest) could be transferred to 
Britain, how hardworking, how comfortable everyone would be. 
This approach perhaps reached its nadir in the Grey-Iron Founding 
Report, which remarked upon the observed great energy of New 
Yorkers, and noted: 'Several members of the Team were infected by this 
energising atmosphere and enjoyed a greater capacity for activity and 
less need for sleep than was customary for them in Britain.' 28 
Rather little detail was given about industrial relations in the team 
reports. Whilst much is said about the technical aspects of production, 
the allegedly 'central' issue of workers' attitudes and behaviour is 
ill-supported by evidence. Oddly enough, the only report to have 
comparative figures on industrial relations showed more days lost by 
strikes in the USA than the UK.29 This may, of course, partly reflect the 
desire of the employers and TUC to keep restrictive practices and the 
specifics of industrial relations off the AACP agenda. 
A detailed contemporary study compared the assertions of the AACP 
reports with evidence from American industrial relations literature to 
see how far US practices were as presented in the team reports. The 
overall conclusion was that the American worker appeared much less 
different from the British worker than the AACP suggested: 'We can 
see, then, that the Productivity teams, excellent though they were on the 
technical aspect of production, gave a misleading picture of the 
American worker and his trade union.' The study went on to speculate 
how this misrepresentation might have arisen, given the union involve-
ment in the teams. It noted the short time spent in the USA, the desire 
that some had to 'shake-up' British labour, the selective nature of the 
firm visits within the USA ( with four out of five firms approached by the 
AACP withholding co-operation) and the psychology of intensive visits 
in a collaborative team framework. 30 
In part, therefore, the AACP can rightly be seen as just one more 
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instalment in 'the British Worker Question': the long-standing process 
of blaming labour for the ills of the British economy.31 Certainly the 
TUC was alive to the extent to which a certain kind of essentially 
anti-union propaganda could be read off from the team findings. It 
responded very critically to the 'Fleming-Waddell' report, an internal 
AACP summary of the first fifteen team reports, which it saw as 'over-
weighting atmosphere and psychological factors' and playing down the 
machinery and investment aspects of higher US productivity. This 
indeed was a general problem for the TUC, as it tried to balance support 
for the AACP with criticism of those who used the reports only for 
propaganda. 32 
However, it is worth emphasising that the reports generally contained 
a good deal of substantive material which is not about workers and their 
attitudes. Carew, whose main interest is in labour relations, and who 
relies largely on TUC sources for his discussion of the AACP, rather 
glosses over this other material, simply saying that it focused on 
'scientific management'. Broadberry and Crafts similarly mention the 
AACP critique of British management, but focus on the restrictionism 
of labour since this fits in more with their economists' assumption about 
the importance of competition in labour and capital markets.33 
An analysis of 58 team reports prepared in 1952/3 shows that the 
main factors that they deemed responsible for the US lead in 
productivity were as follows. Heading the list were 'extensive use of 
mechanical aids' and 'appreciation by work people of need for higher 
productivity', followed closely by three questions of 'managerial 
technique' - 'modem methods of costing', 'production planning and 
control' and 'work study' .34 
Thus, alongside the almost mandatory reference to workers' 
attitudes, emphasis was placed on a range of factors which related either 
to low levels of investment in Britain (which, as we have seen, both the 
TUC and FBI accepted but regarded as unchangeable in the short run) 
or to managerial practices broadly defined. This was not, of course, the 
kind of finding which the FBI wanted from the AACP, though it had 
always been anxious that this might happen. As Middlemas.remarks: 'In 
this sense, the FBI's fears were justified: the long-term thrust of the 
Marshall Aid experience highlighted management inadequacies, not 
those of the workforce. ' 35 
The critique of management even comes across quite strongly in 
Hutton's We Too Can Prosper, despite the TUC's feeling that the author 
of this book had succumbed to the AACP disease of broad psycho-
logistic generalisation without supporting evidence. Hutton's first 
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substantive chapter was called 'Better maqagement, higher product-
ivity' and cited as evidence of the superiority of American management 
the summary of 22 team reports in the appendix of the AACP' s 
Education for Management.36 
The AACP concern with management raises a much broader issue 
about the forms of management that 'Americanisation' was held to 
entail in the late 1940s. This issue is considered later in the discussion 
of other components of government activity which also aimed at 
encouraging British industry to adopt (perceived) American methods. In 
many ways the questions raised there fell outside the institutional 
character of the AACP. However, that institutional character needs first 
to be considered in a little more detail. 
General questions about the impact of Labour's initiatives on 
productivity, together with an overall assessment of the AACP, are 
considered in Chapter 8. Here the focus is on the peculiarities of the 
AACP as an agency for raising productivity. As so often with the impact 
of an institution, there are great difficulties of interpretation, because no 
one criterion can be applied. Clearly different actors hoped for different 
things from the AACP. The Government hoped to appease American 
criticism of British economic policy and performance and so help to 
secure the continuation of Marshall Aid, while at the same time 
encouraging union and employer enthusiasm for the productivity effort. 
The USA had high hopes of the AACP and felt that these were being 
realised. Its participating representatives recognised that the AACP 
formed a 'temporary defensive alliance' between the FBI and TUC 
rather than an enthusiastic partnership. This stemmed from what was 
seen as the defensiveness of the British participants about the causes of 
Britain's lagging productivity- allegedly demonstrated by the refusal to 
confront restrictive practices, the 'over emphasis' on higher investment 
as the key to progress and the general refrain of 'British practice is 
suited to British conditions' .37 However, these drawbacks were never 
serious enough to threaten what was seen as the major gain, the 
acceptance of the need to raise British productivity by following the 
American example. 
Politically, the Government was committed to a 'hands-off' approach 
to the AACP. The difficulty with this from the Government's point of 
view was how to respond if the Council was seen to be insufficiently 
active or doing inappropriate things. This issue came to the surface in 
the autumn of 1949 when the US Government put forward proposals 
aimed at increasing technical assistance to Britain. The issue for the 
Government was how far this was to be channelled via the AACP. 
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Doubts on the desirability of using the Council were voiced by some 
senior civil servants, who noted that the AACP had not supplied 
government departments with its minutes, and indeed seemed to be 
working very hard to minimise any kind of liaison or contact. So the 
technical assistance proposal raised a dilemma: should the government 
reconcile itself to the various disadvantages of handing the whole thing 
over to the Council or should it think out some way of enabling the 
official machine to work openly with the Council and find a formula 
acceptable to industry to explain this state of affairs?38 
In the event the Government channelled the increased assistance via 
the AACP, maintaining the earlier proposition that the Council was 
more likely to engage British producers, as well as to maintain 
America's support, if it were seen to be clearly working apart from 
Whitehall. 
For the FBI, to repeat, the AACP was a means of getting government 
'off its back'. The FBI used the Council as a basis for resisting the taking 
of decisions on productivity elsewhere. For example, it remained aloof 
from the work of the Ministry of Supply's committee on standardisation 
by arguing that this work should be done by the AACP. Similarly it 
suggested that the vexed issue of data gathering for productivity 
measurement should come under the Council - though this did not lead 
to any greater co-operation by industry in producing reliable data. 39 
Overall, therefore, it would seem right to characterise the FBI's 
response to the AACP as minimalist and defensive. It welcomed the 
Council as a means of combating US misperceptions of Britain and 
keeping the Government at a greater distance, rather than as a significant 
initiative in the battle to raise productivity in British industry. 
Some of the same attitudes were shared by the TUC. But the 
productivity issue was more complex for the union side than for the 
employers. On the one hand, it was 'their' government which was 
setting so much store by raising productivity, and, as a central 
component of the Labour Movement, the unions could hardly ignore the 
political emphasis given to this objective. On the other hand, many 
union officials understood that Anglo-American comparisons were 
being used to attack trade unionism. The broad character of the TUC's 
response to this dilemma is clear. In public, it embraced the AACP with 
great enthusiasm. Yet, in private, it acted to try to restrain both the 
wilder rhetoric of the 'American Way of Life', with its usual anti-union 
implications, and the Left's criticism of some of the AACP material. 
Hence the TUC became politically committed to the idea of the AACP 
to a much greater extent than the employers. 
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As indicated in earlier chapters, the TUC was willing to go to 
unprecedented lengths in support of the productivity drive. Though not 
strictly part of the AACP, this support is well illustrated by the TUC's 
own 'Team Visit' to the USA in 1949. What was striking in the report 
which emerged from this initiative was the extent to which unions were 
encouraged to see productivity as their responsibility. As the document 
put it, the 'real problem confronting trade unions was to find ways and 
means of increasing productivity'. In pursuing this theme the role of 
American unions seems to have been substantially exaggerated, as when 
the report. claimed that unions there made 'a major contribution to 
increasing the efficiency of less competent companies' .40 
As Carew has persuasively argued, such conclusions were poorly 
supported by the evidence unearthed by the TUC. In fact, US pressure 
had produced a rather more 'up-beat' report which in effect recom-
mended 'American' practices to the British even though these were 
rarely actually pursued by US unions. One result of the visit was the 
creation in early 1950 of the TUC's own Production Department, which 
focused attention on spreading the gospel of productivity amongst rank 
and file trade unionists, especially by providing training in management 
techniques for such people.41 
In sum, union leaderships to a striking degree in this period saw their 
role as encour!lging the productivity drive, though they often believed 
that this could be done more effectively by the unions themselves than 
by the heavy hand of government. Nevertheless, this attitude did not 
lead to a significant radical 'productionism', involving a challenge to 
managerial prerogatives on the grounds of management inefficiency. As 
the Director-General of the FBI reported: 
I must say I have been much impressed by the recognition by the T.U. 
members of that Council that each side has its own distinct function, 
and I feel there is no danger there of collaboration leading to 
encroachments by the trade unions on to the field of management.42 
The AACP was created for a political purpose as much as directly to 
raise productivity. Equally, the support of the peak associations for it 
was part of a political 'deal' between them and the Government. Its 
economic impact ( considered in Chapter 8) must be seen in the light of 
this political situation. In particular, the FBI continued to be quite 
successful in using the Council to keep government out of certain areas 
related to productivity, whilst resisting any enlargement of the unions' 
role in this issue. In this sense the AACP may be seen as a case study of 
the problems that were encountered by the Attlee Government in its 
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pursuit of policies via 'corporatist' structures of close co-operation and 
indeed significant dependence upon the peak associations.43 
For many, the crucial issue in the attempts at 'Americanising' British 
industry in the immediate post-war period revolved around 'scientific 
management' .44 Carew's discussion of the AACP, for example, presents 
the key 'success' of that body in terms of the growing acceptance 
amongst British labour of scientific management, which it had 
previously resisted. Like many authors, Carew does not offer a 
definition of scientific management but tends to treat it as synonymous 
with Taylorism, in other words as concerned with the direct role of the 
worker in production, or what in recent years has often been called the 
'labour process' .45 
Whilst this equation of scientific management and Taylorism is 
appropriate for much of the early period of the scientific management 
movement before and after the First World War, it is very much less so 
in relation to the 1940s. Writers such as Urwick and Brech, for example, 
had incorporated much of the contemporary human relations approach 
into what they called scientific management.46 Similarly, a major 
managerial ideologue such as de Haan could remark of scientific 
management that: 'increasing output and raising efficiency are its 
technical and economic goals, while its social purpose consists of 
careful treatment of the human factor in industry and of the raising of the 
standard of living of the community' .47 
Even where the definition of scientific management did not include 
the whole human relations package, it usually referred to a range of 
issues beyond the focus on labour. It might therefore embrace subjects 
such as production organisation, production control and managerial 
techniques which fell between 'the labour process' on one hand and 
human relations on the other. 
This background to the events of the 1940s is important because, in 
order to understand the significance of the debate about scientific 
management and Americanisation in that period, it is necessary to 
define the meaning and connotations of these terms with some care. To 
that end this chapter will schematically divide the package that was 
being proposed into three: standardisation (or, with simplification and 
specialisation, what were often called 'the three Ss'); standard costing 
and budgeting, commonly seen as a crucial accompaniment to standard-
isation; and work study, including time and motion study. Together, 
these techniques would seem to define the main thrusts of the American-
isation of production in this period, along with the human relations 
perspective, which was dealt with in Chapter 5. 
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Perhaps the longest standing adverse comparison of British and 
American industry was in terms of the scale of its units of production. 
The argument that British firms were too small to compete effectively 
with those in the USA goes back to at least the First World War, but 
came to prominence in the 'rationalisation' movement of the 1920s and 
1930s. Very generally put, this movement proposed inter alia that 
Britain suffered from too many small units which were unable to realise 
the economies of scale that were available to larger scale firms. A key 
corollary of rationalisation was mass production of a standardised 
product.48 
In the inter-war period the main focus of the rationalisation 
movement was on the depressed staple industries such as iron and steel, 
coal and cotton. But in the Second World War attention shifted 
somewhat to the consumer goods industries, encouraged by the policy 
of concentrating their production in fewer units, and only allowing the 
manufacture of utility (i.e. standardised) goods.49 
This latter orientation was carried over into the Working Party 
investigations of the 1945-7 period. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, these 
were enquiries by tripartite (employer/union/independent) bodies into a 
range of consumer goods industries. Some proposed programmes of 
rationalisation or 're-equipment and consolidation' in order to gain the 
(alleged) economies of scale from larger units producing larger runs of 
output, and this was most strikingly so in the case of cotton.50 
The cotton recommendation is a classic example of the proposed 
'Americanisation' of an industry which was based in part on previous 
comparisons with US experience. The relevance of the American model 
was also vigorously disputed by a dissenting member of the Working 
Party, the economist John Jewkes. He argued that the production 
economies of scale in the industry were quite limited, and that the 
danger of inflexibility stemming from mass production was high. In 
sum, he felt that it would be 'a fatal mistake to allow the claims for mass 
production, standardisation or bulk selling to conceal the increasing 
reliance which ought to be placed upon the disposal in the markets of the 
world of quality products, fashioned in detail to suit the demands of the 
consumer'. 51 
Whatever the merits of the 'Americanisation' proposals in cotton or 
elsewhere, the idea of standardisation of production as a major route to 
productivity increase informed a great deal of the Government's policy 
in this period. For example, it was a major part of the idea behind 
Development Councils, Labour's most distinctive proposal for the 
reorganisation of the private sector. 
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Development Councils sprang in part from the Working Parties, 
several of which proposed a permanent tri- or bipartite organisation for 
their industry. One element in the Development Council proposals was 
that they would encourage 'rationalisation', in the sense of amal-
gamations and concentration of production. However, partly because of 
the very strong opposition of most employers (and the FBI) few 
Development Councils were actually created, with those that were being 
largely restricted to common service functions - research, marketing 
and the like. Thus, the high hopes held by both civil servants and some 
Labour Ministers of Development Councils as major instruments of 
industrial change were dashed. The whole episode had demonstrated a 
commitment to standardisation, but this was largely gestural.52 
Whilst Development Councils were Labour's most original policy 
initiative for private industry, and an important channel for ideas on 
standardisation, they were by no means the only important initiative in 
this area. The Ministry of Supply had pursued standardisation in its 
military hardware purchasing during the war period, and carried this 
idea over into the Attlee years. The direct leverage of the Ministry 
declined as the volume of government purchases fell off, but standard-
isation continued to be pursued in such forums as the Engineering 
Advisory Council, which was dominated by the employers but in fact 
reluctantly created under union pressure.53 
These efforts became focused on the Lemon Committee, which was 
set up to look at the whole issue of standardisation in engineering. Its 
report came out strongly in favour of the benefits to be gained from 
increased standardisation, and in particular advocated an expanded 
British Standards Institute (BSI) to pursue this objective. Whilst 
employers seem to have generally welcomed the Lemon findings, they 
were emphatic that any enhanced role for the BSI should not encroach 
on the voluntary nature of standard setting. Their insistence was based 
on two points. First, they argued that if standardisation were pressed too 
far it would threaten innovation and technical change. Second, it was 
felt that the BSI could become an agency for increasing government 
control of the private sector, about which employers were, of course, 
extremely sensitive, not to say paranoid, in this period.54 
The BSI was expanded in the late 1940s, and this involved further 
government money pro rata with money from industry. The Ministry of 
Supply used the Lemon Committee to cajole engineering employers; 
some responded, but they continued to insist that this was a matter for 
the industry itself, and in particular the trade associations. Some of these 
associations had an existing concern with the issue, which may have 
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been accentuated by government pressure. For example, the associ-
ations of locomotive manufacturers and aircraft constructors continued 
to be active in this area. ss 
However, these two examples point to a major issue in the 
standardisation debate. Locomotive manufacturers, almost entirely, and 
aircraft producers, to a significant extent, were dependent on the public 
purchasing of their output. Thus, in both industries standardisation was 
encouraged by the purchaser. In the case of the railways this occurred 
because of policies adopted by the newly created British Railways 
Board. In the case of aircraft, the position was more obscure; on the one 
hand, the aircraft trade association, the Society of British Aircraft 
Constructors (SBAC), stressed its independence from government 
while, on the other hand, there was a mandatory requirement by the 
Ministry of Supply for the use of SBAC standard parts in aircraft bought 
by the British government.56 
There was a general attempt at Cabinet level to try to get public 
purchasing used as an instrument of standardisation, but the results seem 
to have been very uneven. Standardisation was successfully achieved in 
electricity generator sets, though how far this was economically 
desirable is debatable. For the full benefits of standardisation to be 
achieved there must obviously be utilisation of the most efficient design, 
without any inhibition of technical change. This is always a difficult 
balance to achieve.s7 
The publication of the Lemon Committee Report was timed to 
coincide with an AACP enquiry into Simplification in Industry. This, 
like so much of the material during these years, argued that 'any 
organised and determined effort to reduce our manufacturing variety 
still further could make a rapid and major contribution to increasing 
productivity and lowering costs in British industry' _ss 
The AACP document was followed up in 1950 by a report on 
progress over simplification. This gave a very general overview of 
activity in relation to the '3 Ss' which suggested that much was 
happening. Yet its recommendations also noted that 'a campaign should 
be launched at once in every industry in which a policy of simplification 
can be applied', which implied a need for very much more action.s9 
Another initiative concerned with standardisation was organised by 
the Special Research Unit (SRU) of the Board of Trade. This was a unit 
which was designed to apply operations research to industrial problems 
and which did a lot of work on productivity, particularly looking at how 
standardisation might improve efficiency. One of the most interesting 
SRU studies was of Glacier Metals, which also figured in the discussion 
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of human relations in Chapter 5. Here, the managing director, Wilfred 
Brown, approached the SRU with data on cost savings available from 
standardisation. He presented a table which was very much grist to the 
mill of the standardisers (Table 7 .1 ). But it was also made clear that the 
achievement of such economies would require a radical change in the 
structure of demand for the products, in this case a change in the 
components policy of the car industry. Car manufacturers were, in fact, 
commonly regarded as slow to pursue component standardisation, 
though there was some movement towards model standardisation.60 
Hutton called standardisation, simplification and specialisation 'the 
three charmed Ss of high productivity'. Alongside this went an equally 
hyperbolic emphasis on American management as essentially about cost 
measurement. American management 'is measurement', he argued, 
adding that 'all measurements are part of the planning, costing or 
reaching of targets . . . because only these measures are made which 
have relevance to these operations'. However, this was merely an 
extreme version of a common refrain about the deficiencies of British 
cost accounting, and the absence in particular of systems of standard 
costing and budgeting. Thus, almost all of the Working Parties reported 
unfavourably on the position in this regard. In cotton, for example, 
enquiry revealed that the industry as a whole lacked 'adequate know-
ledge of its cost structure'. A survey of the Working Party publications 
by the SRU concluded: 'The Reports find the system of costing in 
British industry to be, on the whole, hopelessly inadequate.'61 
This was a theme, too, of many of the AACP industry reports. The 
AACP in fact sent a specialist team to the USA to report on management 
accounting. It argued that the key to American efficiency was US 
manufacturers' costing and budgeting procedures, and recommended 
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that British management 'in considering the future and preparing plans, 
should make the fullest use of budgeting and forecasting, based on 
accounting and costing data' .62 
The question of economic measurement and productivity engaged a 
great deal of attention in this period. Much effort was devoted to 
formulating and then proselytising direct measures of productivity at 
factory level for use as a management tool. However, this seems to have 
been largely a dead-end, meeting resistance from many managers who 
regarded cost rather than productivity measures as more helpful, a view 
that was supported by the AACP team, which emphasised that in the 
USA 'industry makes little attempt to measure productivity, preferring 
to rely on unit costs'. The AACP report went on to stress that what the 
Americans had was not different measurement techniques, but much 
keener attitudes on the intensity and speed of deployment of cost 
information, and its central role in everyday management activity. The 
keys were accurate costing, standard costing, and an understanding of 
their focal role in making production decisions.63 
The response of British industry to this propaganda on costing does 
not seem to have been very enthusiastic. One letter to the FBI 
commented on the AACP report: 
It seems to me to have been compiled by a bunch of rather third rate 
accountants wearing the blinkers traditional to that profession, with 
the sole object of trying to magnify the importance of the accountant 
in industry. 
There were more positive reactions, but overall the evidence suggests 
little changed. During the war costing seems to have improved in areas 
where cost-plus contracts required more accurate calculations, but after 
the war 'the thought in many entrepreneurs' minds that cost accounting 
was just another new-fangled administrative overhead could not easily 
be dislodged' .64 
In his survey of British management at the end of the 1950s, Granick 
argued that: 
The single major managerial development of post-war Britain does 
not really violate the proposition that managerial professionalism is 
still rejected. For this development has been concentrated in the area 
of production efficiency and on the lowest level of managerial 
hierarchy. It is old-fashion work study, bearing the new name of 
'O. & M.' .... While this is undoubtedly highly important for effi-
cient operations, it represents a managerial movement which was 
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revolutionary in American industry during the first decade of this 
century - but had been routinised into standard operating procedure 
in the US by the 1920s at the latest.65 
Thus, work study represents the one clear 'victory' for Americanisation 
of the early post-war period, and one strongly encouraged in the late 
1940s. 
The major channel of such encouragement, was, like so much in the 
area of productivity, the brainchild of Stafford Cripps. Whilst Minister 
of Aircraft Production during the War he had become an enthusiast for 
motion study, and set up a Production Efficiency Board in the Ministry 
to propagate this. Post-war, he had pressed for transforming this into a 
Production Efficiency Service (PES), offering free and general 
management consultation to small firms, but with a considerable dose of 
motion study.66 
Cripps's enthusiasm was very much for motion study, that is 
ergonomics, which he wished to keep sharply separate from time study, 
a much more contentious technique involving questions about the pace 
of work and wage calculations. In part this division reflected the 
peculiar if explicable desire to keep separate 'wage' and 'production' 
issues, as discussed in Chapter 5. But whilst motion study was being 
encouraged by the PES in the late 1940s, time study was also spreading, 
basically as part of the growth of piece-rate systems, encouraged by the 
British Institute of Management as a good management practice.67 
The SRU was less inhibited about linking the two elements, and 
made investigations of time and motion study in the context of its 
research into productivity. A report by the SRU argued plausibly that 
most advocacy of time and motion emphasised the motion/ergonomic 
aspect, but that most adoption of it occurred as a basis for wage payment 
systems. In its view the discussion of time and motion as a device for 
aiding productivity had been bedevilled by the linkage with pay 
bargaining, as this involved controversial issues about how far unions 
would accept a 'scientific' basis for wage setting to displace collective 
bargaining. Generally the SRU saw merit in time and motion, but 
regarded claims that it was a crucial and scientific technique to be 
overblown. 68 
Work study emerged strongly in the 1950s, partly as a result of the 
example of particular firms, notably ICI, and partly because of the 
growing enthusiasm for piece-work systems. Nevertheless, it was also 
linked to the productivity drive of the 1940s and to the idea of 
Americanisation. Carew treats the spread of work study as a key index 
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of the success of Americanisation, in the sense that it secured the 
support of workers for American-style scientific management, aimed at 
the subordination of labour. This general thesis is considered in the 
conclusion below, but it is important to note that by itself, work study 
was rather less radical in its implications than Carew suggests, because 
so little else in the package of 'scientific management' had been 
adopted. Enthusiasm for work study in the 1950s did not herald a radical 
restructuring of work and production organisation, but was more of an 
'add-on' to existing production systems. As Granick implies, it was 
therefore rather limited in its implications for British firms, rather akin 
to the take up of just-in-time systems by British firms in the 1980s and 
1990s.69 
The clear implication of this chapter, to conclude, is that the extent of 
'Americanisation' of British industry in the early post-war years was 
very limited. Whilst the precise content of what Americanisation might 
mean is disputable, it is difficult to argue that any of the possible aspects 
connected with such a process - standardisation of components or 
products, standard costing and budgeting, 'mass production' techniques 
in general- went very far in this period. Work study was, at most, a very 
pale imitation of Tayloristic practices and its significance remained 
largely confined to wage bargaining procedures. 
Given the scale of Government and other efforts which went into 
propaganda for Americanisation, this very limited impact requires some 
explanation. Central here is the fact that many British industrialists were 
sceptical about the relevance of the American model for British 
conditions. No doubt in part this stemmed from a common gut reaction 
to the American model. But there was also a reasoned case which more 
than one authority made. The Engineer, for example, the trade paper of 
the engineering industry, was far from vitriolically anti-American, yet 
on a number of occasions it questioned just how relevant the US 
example was for British industry. One editorial thus argued: 
Britain, manufacturing for the world rather than for its home market 
alone, has to take into account ... national tastes and likings. The 
consequence is that mass production methods cannot be so highly 
developed as in America, and output per worker is necessarily lower. 
Furthermore, many of the heavier engineering products of this 
country are made to special orders and designs, so that not even 
group productive methods are applicable. 
On another occasion it pointed out that obsession with the American 
model had led to the neglect of the fact that, in many areas, Britain's 
The 'Americanisation' of productivity 151 
competition came from Europe, not the USA: 'Much of real value to the 
industries of this country would, we believe, be learnt from a study of 
plants in Western Europe, which are confronting problems much more 
similar to our own than are those facing American producers' .70 
Such scepticism was also evinced by some economists. Jewkes's 
view on cotton has already been noted, and he made similar points in a 
more general article in 1946. Another economist, G.C. Allen, expressed 
a parallel argument, though emphasising that he was not against 
learning from abroad. For Allen, the lesson was that 'an uncritical 
acceptance of foreign types of organisation as the norm' seemed 'as 
foolish as insular complacency' .71 
But if a case can be made for the logic of some resistance to 
Americanisation in the 1940s, this line of argument has its dangers. 
Thus, for neo-classical economists (and historians who follow them), it 
is all too likely to lead to a Panglossian view that whatever industrialists 
did was for the best. This is a little hard to accept even in relation to 
cotton, where the significance of 'Americanisation' can be seriously 
questioned, but it is all the more so in areas where the most obvious 
forms of such 'Americanisation' would appear to have been only too 
relevant. For example, it is hard to believe that the engineering firm able 
to produce 20,000 different types of bearing would not have benefited 
from a dose of the '3Ss' .72 
The simple point is that 'Americanisation' was differentially 
applicable to industries in Britain. In some cases markets could have 
been exploited with standardised products, in other cases this might 
have been a problem. In particular, standardisation of components 
would seem to have offered a much more fertile field for economies of 
scale than standardisation of some final products. This is brought out 
quite strikingly in the contrast between the clear market limitations in 
the standardisation of diesel locomotives in Britain as opposed to the 
possibilities in valve manufacture.73 The important fact is how little this 
differential applicability was taken into account in the discussions - for 
example, it hardly seems to figure in FBI deliberations. 
Finally, there is the question of 'Americanisation' in the more 
specific sense of work practices, and the idea that the AACP and other 
initiatives successfully sold an ideology of managerialism to the unions 
and the Labour Party in Britain, on the back of which 'Tayloristic' work 
practices were then introduced. It has already been suggested that work 
study, although undoubtedly popular in the 1950s, was a rather limited 
change in British industry. It was not a sign of 'Taylorism' being widely 
deployed. British resistance to Taylorism in the sense of systematic 
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de-skilling, work fragmentation and machine-pacing of production 
seems to have remained strong. In part, this was because of the absence 
of the necessary parallel changes in product mix and production 
techniques. 74 
On an ideological plane, too, resistance to Taylorism was also 
significant. Carew is undoubtedly right in arguing that the AACP and 
Americanisation generally reinforced the spirit of 'class compromise' 
under the Labour Government. But this process surely had largely 
domestic roots, relating to the basics of Labour's electoral strategy, and 
can therefore be traced to the 1920s rather than the 1940s. Similarly with 
the trade unions, the acceptance of the productivity drive and its impli-
cations by union leaders was undoubtedly a striking feature of this 
period. But it seems much less clear that this owed much to American 
influence, as it fitted in with the whole union movement's conception of 
its role from, at least, 1941. So whilst Carew is right to suggest the 
importance of Marshall Aid for the political divisions in Western 
European Labour Movements in the late 1940s, it is much less apparent 
that it fundamentally affected the stance on economic and production 
issues that was taken by either the Government or the unions. 
Chapter 8 
Evaluation and implications 
The previous discussion has focused on what Labour did about 
productivity between 1945 and 1951. It has demonstrated that the 
Government remained very concerned about the issue throughout the 
whole period and was willing to intervene in a number of different ways 
to stimulate improvement. In this chapter, the aim is to provide some 
perspective on Labour's initiatives, by asking questions about what was 
actually achieved in terms of the central policy objective - the 
amelioration of productivity. Did the administration's policies have any 
real impact on British industry's efficiency? And what were the factors 
that determined the efficacy, one way or another, of the various 
Government measures? 
An obvious way of assessing Labour's record at this time is to look 
at the various quantitative analyses that are available about Britain's 
productivity record. Yet, before turning to these studies, it is as well to 
note that their methodology makes them of rather more limited value 
than might be imagined, not least for the problem being considered here. 
First, it must be emphasised that most of the quantitative estimates rely 
on either labour or total factor calculations, in which the ratio of change 
in labour inputs on their own, or in combination with capital inputs, is 
measured relative to changes in output. This approach always yields a 
large element of the productivity variation which cannot be accounted 
for by changes in factor inputs. Such 'residuals' of course need to be 
explained, and often open the door to a wide variety of ad hoe 
hypotheses. The end product is, therefore, all too often speculation 
rather than substantiated argument. 
Second, there is also a problem of timescale. Many of the estimates 
deal with the grand sweep of Britain's long-run performance in the 
post-war period, rather than the 1940s as a single decade. To attempt a 
more limited perspective is fraught with difficulties. Productivity 
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estimates for short periods must always be treated with reserve because, 
given problems with the data, changes in apparent performance over a 
few years may easily be statistical artefacts. This is even more so in 
relation to the 1940s, since the available series for these years are highly 
deficient by current standards. 
With these problems in mind, what do the quantitative studies 
suggest about productivity at the time of the Attlee Governments? 
Cairncross, the author of the most authoritative macroeconomic survey 
of the period, accepts Feinstein' s conclusion that GDP per head rose 1.6 
per cent per annum between 1945 and 1951, and 2.5 per cent per annum 
in the three years 1948-51. Labour productivity in manufacturing 
apparently followed a similar pattern, rising at an average rate of 2.6 per 
cent per annum across the six years, but accelerating to 3.5 per cent per 
annum between 1948 and 1951.1 
These recent calculations may be compared to those made at earlier 
dates. Rostas, writing in 1952, focused on labour productivity and 
measured output in physical terms. Using 1948 as a base year with value 
100, he demonstrated that performance in large industries had been very 
variable, so that the index of output per head in 1951 ranged from 99 for 
cotton to 129 for steel tubes, with the (unweighted) average being 118.2 
Such estimates are broadly in line with those calculated by Nicholson 
and Gupta, who focused on the period 1948-54.3 Finally, there is the 
pioneering study of what would later be called total factory productivity, 
published by Reddaway and Smith in 1960. These authors suggest that 
(allowing for increased labour and capital inputs) the rate of 
productivity increase changed positively between 1948 and 1951, 
allowing an average of 3.3 per cent per annum. This performance 
compared well with that achieved over the following four years, when 
the comparative figure was only 1.1 per cent per annum.4 
Taken together, therefore, the figures do at least imply that, by any 
standards, productivity was tending to improve quite appreciably in the 
late 1940s. Indeed, Rostas referred to a 'general favourable development' 
during this period, while Reddaway and Smith noted that their data might 
appear 'too good to be true' .5 But had this pattern been shaped in any way 
by Government policies? The latter authors felt that the acceleration of 
1948-51 had reflected 'recovery from wartime organisation' and would 
prove unsustainable.6 Rostas accepted this point, but argued that an 
enhanced 'productivity consciousness' had also been important: 
This meant that the large potentialities for an immediate improve-
ment of productivity were realised, that ways and means to improve 
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productivity were expected and that positive measures were adopted 
in many factories and workshops for this purpose. 7 
In this light, at least, the Government was to be congratulated for its 
various efforts. 
Reviewing the quantitative evidence does not, to conclude, yield any 
easy answers. A reasonable hypothesis is that productivity did grow 
somewhat exceptionally in the late 1940s, and that this was connected 
in some ways to Labour's initiatives. Nevertheless, the case here 
remains essentially unproven. Can any further light be cast on the whole 
matter by adopting a rather more detailed focus? What, specifically, can 
be said about the effectiveness of the different Government measures, 
case by case? 
Evaluating some of the initiatives is fairly straightforward. Hardly 
anybody felt that the Tizard Committee had achieved very much.8 By 
contrast, reactions to the Production Efficiency Service were generally 
favourable: in the words of an FBI source, the PES was not significant 
'in a national sense', but nevertheless continued to undertake 'useful 
activity' .9 However, as a brief review will demonstrate, reaching clear 
conclusions about many other of the developments that have been 
discussed in this book is much less easy. 
Opinion about the impact that JPCs had made on productivity levels, 
to begin with, remained divided. The journal Future asked a sample of 
manufacturers about joint consultation in general during 1951, and 
found that only 6 per cent regarded it as 'really valuable', with the vast 
majority (57 per cent) stating only that it was useful 'as evidence of 
desiring good relations'. 10 The NIIP survey on JPCs, already referred to, 
also presented somewhat mixed evaluations. 'The majority of senior 
managers interviewed' supported JPCs, and the committees had clearly 
helped to solve a range of everyday problems, relating to questions such 
as 'hours, breaks and shifts' and holidays. Against this, discussion of, 
for example, 'work tempo' or 'methods of production' continued to be 
very much less successful. Moreover, even when good results were 
achieved on production questions, they usually involved only a small 
minority of the workforce: 
It was found that worker representatives who actually came in 
contact with management in the discussion of production problems 
did, in a number of cases, become really 'efficiency minded', but 
such individuals frequently complained in interviews that it was very 
hard to get their constituents to show any real enthusiasm.11 
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Opinion about the BIM was equally varied. Contemporary observers 
agreed that there was much to be proud of. The Manager, for example, 
noted in mid-1950 that 'the degree to which the BIM has been accepted 
in national affairs already, is the measure of its success'. The monthly 
journal Business, in a similar vein, applauded the 'un-doubted 
influence' won by the new institution. Yet, alongside these plaudits, 
there was a more general sense of disappointment, a feeling that, in the 
widest perspective, the BIM had not really lived up to expectations. It 
was observed that, if the Institute had gained a reputation, its real 
authority nevertheless remained limited, confined to an all-too-familiar 
circle of civil servants, management movement experts and progressive 
manufacturers. The great majority of industrialists and managers, by 
contrast, continued to be apparently unenthusiastic and certainly 
uninvolved. Symptomatic of this, as The Economist amongst others 
pointed out, was the situation over the BIM's budget, since, after five 
years of operation, the Institute still needed extensive Treasury support, 
with business subscriptions accounting for only around half of annual 
expenditure. 12 
Circumstantial evidence on the BIM offers no clearer picture. 
Observers noted that British management was becoming more pro-
fessional in the 1950s but argued that there still remained much scope 
for improvement. As Mary Stewart reported in 1953, a good number of 
the defects associated with traditional, stereotypical 'captains of 
industry' remained depressingly intact; 'too many' of the 'old 
fashioned, mid-Victorian, high-handed backwoodsmen' continued in 
control. 13 Taken together, such evidence suggests that the conclusion 
reached by the 1960 Liverpool University study, Management in 
Britain, is probably about right. There could be no precise measure of 
the Government's various attempts to improve management standards, 
the Liverpool team decided, 'but their effects appear to be mildly 
encouraging rather than startling' .14 
What, finally, of the two large-scale exercises in spreading 'know 
how', the Working Parties and the Anglo-American Council on 
Productivity? As regards the Working Parties, it is worth recording, 
first, that some of their reports were read in considerable numbers. 
About 4,000 copies of the pottery document were printed and over 3,000 
sold. The cotton report proved even more popular, with two-thirds of a 
14,000 print-run being bought in the first few months of availability .15 
Moreover, there can be no doubting the Government's resolve to ensure 
that Working Party recommendations were implemented. The Board of 
Trade, as has been noted, formed a special squad to check on progress 
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here, and could provide the President with detailed lists of successes and 
failures, such as the one covering pottery that he produced in Parliament 
during late 1949.16 However, when it comes to assessing how many of 
the Working Party recommendations were actually implemented in each 
case, the situation is very much less clear. Harold Wilson, in the House 
of Commons statement already referred to, claimed that action had 
occurred on 12 of the 30 measures outlined in the pottery report. A 
feature in Business presented a rather less rosy picture. Progress had 
been made over some questions, with, for example, the industry's wage 
structure being revised as the Working Party wanted. Yet, at the same 
time, there was still clearly much to do: only about one-third of the 
manufacturers, Business claimed, kept accounts in such a form as to 
allow detailed costing, despite all of the admonitions. 17 The fact that 
some of the issues discussed in the Working Party reports had to be 
raised once again during the British Productivity Council sector studies 
of the mid- l 950s suggests that the impact of the earlier enquiries was at 
best uneven. 18 
The impact of the AACP proves equally hard to summarise simply. 
This organisation's reports were, once again, distributed in some 
numbers, with, for example, 300,000 of the first 20 documents being 
sold within a few months of publication.19 Moreover, AACP teams spent 
a considerable amount of time publicising their findings. Typical here 
were the activities of the two printing teams, who visited the USA in 
1951. Their reports sold 11,400 and 9,000 copies, but this was only the 
beginning of the publicity effort. In fact, the teams addressed over 200 
meetings between them, explaining the position to, amongst others, the 
British Federation of Master Printers Congress, the Joint Industrial 
Council of the Printing Industry, the Printers' Managers and Overseers 
Association Conference, a Typographical Association delegate meeting 
and numerous print shops up and down the country.20 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the AACP message was not always 
received with either favour or enthusiasm. Many on the Left, to repeat, 
argued that the teams had spent too much time enthusing about 'the 
American way of life' and too little on what was really going on in that 
country.21 Less partisan commentators were equally uneasy, partly for 
the same reasons. The journal Engineering commented of one report: 
'clearly the team was impressed ... but it is impossible to avoid the 
suspicion that they were impressed as much by the USA as by the diesel 
locomotive industry itself. 22 Others felt that, anyway, the USA did not 
make a good point of comparison. The Manager could thus conclude of 
the AACP reports: 
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The results are demonstrably valuable and impressive. But it is not to 
decry them, and it is not to be churlishly unappreciative of a 
remarkably generous piece of international co-operation, if we say 
that some of the energy might have been spent in sending teams to 
countries whose problems are more nearly akin to our own.23 
In this climate, sober assessments of what was actually being achieved 
by the AACP efforts were relatively few and far between. Some press 
comment was favourable and specific, as the Business feature 
'Lancashire is Learning From Anglo-US Teams'. On the other hand, 
much was relatively cautious. Future felt that none of the reports was 
producing results 'as speedily as the idealists ... would wish', though it 
added that this did not mean that the AACP had achieved nothing. The 
Times Review of Industry argued that the visits were 'significant' and 
their value 'certainly not negligible'. Moreover, the whole exercise was 
undoubtedly encouraging 'greater receptivity to fresh thinking on the 
subject'. Yet, in the end, it judged the effect on industry of all of the 
activity to be only 'marginal'.24 
The AACP was, of course, keen to contribute to this debate itself, and 
produced a quantity of publicity material showing that team reports had 
changed attitudes and practices.25 Some of this was of dubious value, 
aimed at maximising publicity, but there was also a series of more sober 
'Follow up Statements', which tried to present a balanced and truthful 
reflection of what had been achieved. These were often cautious in tone. 
Thus, Statement 5, Streamlining Production: A Review of Productivity 
in the Internal Combustion Engine Industry, noted that the team report 
had encouraged 'the reorganisation of factory lay-out and, often, 
production methods', but it did not present the AACP document as the 
only agent of modernisation. What seemed to have happened was that 
'many companies' had 'incorporated the recommendations of the report 
in policies of expansion which were already underway'. 26 The review of 
action taken on the reports by the electricity supply teams was equally 
careful to avoid exaggeration. The original documents had been 
'accepted as a valuable contribution'. Moreover, there were examples, 
some spectacular, of new techniques being copied from the USA. But 
none of this was 'the real and important result of the productivity team 
programme'. Rather 'the dominant purpose' had to be about the 
'fermentation of new ideas and the raising of keen interest to apply new 
ideas to British circumstances'. And measuring change here was a very 
much more intangible business: 
Success can only be reflected in the increasing efficiency of the 
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industry in the years ahead. The proof of productivity puddings lies 
in their eating and this particular pudding affects the taste of all 
others.27 
Taken together, the evidence on micro-performance offers no easy 
conclusion. Nevertheless, what seems to emerge from this and the 
quantitative data is a pattern of success and failure. In other words, it 
seems right to conclude that Labour's programme on productivity did 
produce some real gains. But it remains abundantly clear, too, that a 
number of the initiatives led only to cosmetic change, and that the 
overall impact of the Government's efforts was less than it might have 
been. What accounts for the gap between potential and reality? 
Broadly speaking, three kinds of explanation have been produced on 
this point. Some have argued that Labour's policies were badly 
formulated, simply technically deficient. Others assert that the whole 
programme was poorly targeted, and therefore unsurprisingly in-
effective. The barriers to efficient production in Britain largely 
originated with the unions, and took the form of restrictive practices. 
Labour should have been doing something about this, rather than 
tinkering with agencies such as the BIM. Finally, a third hypothesis 
contradicts the first two, and proposes that the seat of the problem was 
not in the strategy but rather in the party that was carrying out the 
strategy. Labour, in this view, simply lacked the will to enforce the 
modernisation that it perceived to be necessary. The Government 
capitulated before the employers, but it could and should have done 
better. Over the following pages an attempt will be made to assess 
whether any of these explanations is really consistent with the facts. 
On the question of technical proficiency, it is quite evident that some 
of the initiatives were at least partly flawed. Taking the Working Party 
exercise as an example, a number of defects are immediately obvious. 
Individual enquiries rarely had access to current data, with the pottery 
team, for example, having to rely upon statistics from 1935.28 On top of 
this, there was a noticeable lack of overall strategy. Indeed, The 
Economist noted, to repeat, that the Working Parties were 'apparently 
being sent off into the wilderness of industrial policy without any course 
to steer or any compass to assist them in holding to it' .29 
There was, too, a range of more general problems with the whole 
programme. Translating recommendations emerging from the specific 
initiatives into practical steps that could be implemented by the ordinary 
employer or worker was never easy, as one observer found out: 
Sometimes when I heard two managers from opposite ends of the 
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scale conversing with each other on productivity, I had the 
impression that they were talking at cross purposes, speaking 
different languages. Very often an employer with bad experience 
simply cannot understand the flood of good advice and high sounding 
moral formulas which are showered on him. 30 
At the same time, as the previous chapters have shown, policies on 
productivity were neither always consistent nor unaffected by other 
considerations. There was, for example, an obvious potential difficulty 
in trying to get industry to modernise and at the same time squeezing it 
for exports.31 Moreover, political requirements might easily cloud an 
issue or affect a productivity equation: as The Economist remarked of 
these years, there was sometimes 'more industrial politics than 
industrial policy' .32 Indeed, the commitments to tripartism and 
voluntary collective bargaining continued to set very definite limits on 
the Government's room for manoeuvre. 
Accordingly, it must be admitted that the creators of the efficiency 
programme were to some extent themselves responsible for its rather 
chequered impact. Pressure on Labour Ministers was no doubt very 
great at this time, but it would perhaps have made a difference if a little 
more thought had gone into some of the initiatives. Nevertheless, it is 
also clear that this explanation alone cannot account for the whole 
problem. Even accepting the defects and inconsistencies, there was still 
an overwhelming amount of good in the programme. Indeed, even 
critical contemporaries were struck by the reasonableness and 
pertinence of much of what Labour was doing on productivity, and this 
judgement has been repeated in later, more scholarly accounts.33 
Technical deficiency may have blighted execution and policy muddle 
blunted impact, but these factors alone are insufficient to explain the 
various disappointments in performance. 
What of the second argument, that the whole strategy was poorly 
targeted? The suggestion here is that trade union and worker restrictive 
practices were the biggest obstacle to faster growth in post-war Britain. 
If the Government had been really serious about productivity, it would, 
as a consequence, have tried to do something about these issues. Yet 
Labour's hands were tied here, because the unions were its allies, and 
vital power brokers in the post-war consensus. The end product was a 
set of half-hearted policies to deal with issues that were only ever 
marginal. In this scenario, the results could only ever be disappointing. 
At first sight, this is all certainly very persuasive, not least because it 
seems to fit into a much broader literature linking Britain's economic 
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decline to the pernicious influence of trade unions.34 In these circum-
stances, it is hardly surprising to find versions of the core argument 
appearing in recent work by authorities as diverse as Barnett, 
Broadberry and Crafts (separately and together) and Middlemas.35 Nor 
is it remarkable to discover that Olson's much cited tour de force also 
repeats a version of this thesis.36 Is such endorsement sufficient to 
uphold the merit of arguments about restrictive practices? 
This is not an easy question to answer. However, it is probable that 
what is being proposed here is much less plausible than its proponents 
would seem to believe, largely because the central proposition - that the 
unions were strangling the economy - is overexaggerated. This point 
can be established in two main ways. Firstly, it is worth noting that very 
few of the assertions about the prevalence of restrictive practices in the 
1940s are actually grounded on hard facts. Broadberry, for example, 
cites work by Zweig and by Scott et al. in support of his argument, yet 
seems to have given these authors a highly perverse reading. Zweig, 
writing in 1951, offered a survey, largely based on interviews, of unions 
and productivity in five industries. He found that restrictive practices 
were prevalent in only one of these (printing) and he largely cleared the 
other four (iron and steel, building and civil engineering, cotton and 
engineering). Lest there be any mistake, he added a clear summary of his 
own viewpoint: 
When I started my inquiry I was under the impression that restrictive 
practices were increasing, because of the strengthened power of the 
unions. But fortunately the reverse is true.37 
Scott and his co-authors produced a study of industrial relations and 
technical change in a Merseyside steel works during the early 1950s. 
The conclusion offered again contradicts Broadberry's reading, since it 
emphasises how smoothly technical change had occurred, and explains 
this partly in terms of the plant's high rate of union membership.38 
Neither case, certainly, gives much support to the view that labour's 
restrictive practices were immovable obstacles to changes in 
production. 
This kind of muddle raises doubt, but a more damaging line of 
enquiry is opened up by simply returning to contemporary sources. 
What did observers and experts in the 1940s think about restrictive 
practices? Some, certainly, believed them to be prevalent.39 Yet most of 
the evidence points to a rather different picture, as a brief review will 
demonstrate. 
One kind of enquiry into restrictive practices at this time was carried 
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out by journalists or academics and involved interviewing those in 
industry. Zweig's findings have already been referred to, but two other 
surveys are worthy of mention. The journal Future asked a sample of 
employers in 1951 whether trade union practices or trade customs 
restricted output or kept up costs, and found that neither was much of a 
problem. It commented: 
In management's view, restrictive practices of all kinds have little 
effect on British industrial efficiency. Possibly economists of the 
Right and of the Left will join forces to. protest that such replies 
cannot be honest. However that may be, only 19 per cent of those 
replying alleged that trade union practices impeded output or put up 
costs, and only 14 per cent admitted difficulties in connection with 
trade customs. 40 
Also instructive is the work of the Oxford research group under R.F. 
Harrod.41 This held regular meetings with senior businessmen between 
1947 and 1949 and asked them, amongst other things, about restrictive 
practices. A majority of those questioned felt that such restraints existed. 
On the other hand, 'a number stressed how difficult it was to make a 
rational assessment of their effect'. 42 Indeed, actual instances of 
damaging action appeared hard to pin down. Asked whether the 
'resistance of labour' had prevented the introduction of new machinery, 
most replied that it had not, leaving the group to comment: 
There was little evidence that resistance of labour to new machinery 
was important in preventing investment by a firm. Only 3 out of 18 
who discussed this returned an affirmative answer, and only 2 felt it 
to be ... an important factor. 43 
A second group of enquiries which cast light on the situation were those 
carried out by industrialists themselves. Again, the findings of these 
investigations hardly support the pessimists' case. Some of the 
Management Research Groups discussed restrictive practices in private 
during 1947, on the basis of a questionnaire answered by 22 firms. 
Again, the absence of problems was felt to be the most noteworthy 
feature of the situation. Thus, of the questionnaire, it was remarked: 
Only one firm mentions 'Trade Union restrictive practices' as an 
adverse factor, and then 'only in isolated instances'. This is surely 
most surprising in view of all that is being said on the subject today.44 
More significant, still, were the facts uncovered by the BEC at the end 
of the 1940s. This organisation first contacted its 66 members ( all trade 
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associations) about restrictive practices in 1947, and received 22 replies. 
Of these, half stated that trade union restrictive practices were either 
absent or so small as to be irrelevant in their industries, while half made 
a variety of complaints.45 This led the BEC to compile a much more 
detailed form for its members to fill in, which was circulated over the 
following year. The new enquiry generated 35 replies and revealed that 
23 trade associations could identify one or more restrictive practices in 
their industries. Yet only 18 of the 23 felt such problems to be serious. 
Moreover, even here distributions tended to be rather skewed. Thus, 8 
of the 18 complained of only one or two of the 15 possible types of 
restrictive practice, which meant that some important sectors (for 
example, engineering) remained virtually trouble-free. Similarly, some 
kinds of restrictive practice were comparatively unknown: 8 of the 15 
categories appeared four or fewer times in the 18 questionnaires. The 
picture revealed, in other words, was of a small number of trouble-hit 
industries (cotton, shipbuilding, bleaching and printing) and a relatively 
limited group of recurring restrictions.46 
Most of the available evidence, therefore, points in one direction. It 
is neither totally unambiguous nor fully comprehensive but it hardly 
supports a picture of rampant restrictive practices. This, in tum, makes 
the 'wrong target' thesis less than plausible. What of the third 
explanation for the gap between government effort and actual outcome, 
the view that the problem was really Labour itself? 
There are a number of versions of this kind of thinking. Some would 
accuse the Government of simply lacking determination in its pursuit of 
reform. This was a point made by Labour left-wingers throughout the 
1940s. Thus, Mikardo, in a debate about productivity policy during 
1948, argued that: 
The problem is not that we want some doctor to prescribe some new 
medicine. It is the problem of getting the patient to take the medicine 
which he has already got, and which, in fact, is jolly good medicine. 
The real problem which the Chancellor has to face, and which with 
great respect, I say he always funks, is how to get people to apply 
better methods. 47 
On the other hand, there are those who would go further than this and 
suggest that the root of the Government's timidity lay in its ideological 
disposition. Social democracy, the argument runs, is always likely to 
compromise with private enterprise, perhaps even to the extent of 
allowing capitalists to set its real agenda. This is an interpretation 
favoured, for example, by Mercer, who draws on Miliband's wider 
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work, The State in Capitalist Society, to understand how Labour failures 
on industrial policy in the 1940s came about. The central point for her is 
that the party and the Government shared a 'commitment to the private 
enterprise system'. Actual policy was, as a consequence, always going 
to be insipid: 
This [commitment] prompted an inevitable reliance on voluntary and 
co-operative methods of control, an inability to compel, and the 
necessity for retreat in the face of opposition.48 
Again, a clear cut assessment of this hypothesis is far from easy. 
However, two reflections can be offered on what is being argued. One 
element of this case against Labour is that the party was not really 
serious about reform. Yet, as has been shown in this book, this is simply 
incorrect. With Labour, industrial modernisation and socialism went 
hand in hand, neither possible without the other. Nevertheless, it is 
accurate to state that the party did accept the parliamentary system and 
the existing rule of law. Moreover, as the preceding narrative has often 
shown, Labour was wedded to introducing reform by consultation, using 
tripartite discussions to establish consensus. 
Of course, standing outside history, it is quite legitimate to quarrel 
with these dispositions. Indeed, a whole host of commentators have 
written books on the party, wishing that it was not what it was. However, 
a more interesting line of enquiry is surely to take Labour at face value, 
and ask whether it could in fact have done more to prosecute industrial 
policy in the particular circumstances of the late 1940s. This approach 
is really about political realities. Did Labour have enough support for a 
more radical pursuit of its policies? On the other hand, were its 
opponents solid or might they have been fractured with a little more 
pressure? It is to these questions that the next section turns. 
Labour's greatest ally on the industrial modernisation question was, 
of course, the General Council of the TUC. This body had accepted the 
need to increase productivity in an important document ('Production 
Under Full Employment') of 1946, ratified its view with Congress,49 and 
then done everything possible to aid official initiatives. The TUC had its 
own priorities in the productivity debate, but in practice fully supported 
Working Parties, JPCs and the BIM, and embraced the idea of the 
AACP and tried to make it work.50 At the same time, there were 
numerous TUC attempts to get member unions fully behind this policy. 
Of note here were the special conferences on the subject for the various 
executives; the establishment of an in-house Production Department in 
1950; and the support provided for a mission to the USA, which 
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concentrated on discovering how American unions were responding to 
the productivity question.s1 Furthermore, all of this activity was 
conducted in a language which was both straightforward and uncom-
promising. The journal Future described some union officials' 
comments in favour of the AACP as 'remarkably outspoken', while the 
Financial Times, reviewing a TUC statement on the unions and 
productivity, noted that it contained 'a few home truths' .s2 
Labour could, therefore, count on the TUC and various other trade 
union leaderships. However, it is quite clear that support for its policies 
amongst rank and file workers was very much less secure. Certainly, 
when issues were taken to ordinary branch meetings, little enthusiasm 
was in evidence, as was noted by a number of observers.s3 Moreover, 
wider public appreciation of, and sympathy for, what Labour was trying 
to do on industry was hardly impressive. 
To start with, most people did not think that production was the most 
pressing issue facing Britain. Gallup surveys found that everyday 
matters to do with living and eating were always at the forefront of 
people's minds, with other topics attracting very much less attention. 
For example, an enquiry of May 1948, asking 'What is the chief 
problem that the Government must solve during the next few months?', 
discovered that the popular choices for action were the cost of living (38 
per cent), housing (31 per cent) and the food situation (21 per cent). 
'Production' was seen as the key issue by only one per cent of those 
replying.s4 
Secondly, when people were asked specifically about productivity, 
their answers hardly indicated a yearning for more radical official 
measures. Government surveys revealed that many did not understand 
what the phrase 'increased productivity' meant. Indeed, of samples 
questioned between 1948 and 1951, only between 16 and 18 per cent 
provided unambiguously correct definitions.ss On the other hand, when 
opinions were voiced about how productivity could be increased, the 
preferences which were revealed tended to encompass traditional solutions 
(for example, enhanced incentives) rather than imaginative departures.56 
This was partly because, for many, industrial under-performance was 
mostly a matter of personal laziness rather than systemic failure. A Gallup 
poll of July 194~7 asked why Britain was not producing more and reported 
that answers could be ranked in the following way: 
People don't work hard enough/long enough 
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Incentives too few, wages too low, taxes too high 8 
Strikes; industrial unrest 8 
Inefficient management; bad organisation 4 
Other; no opinion 52 
In fact, there seems to have been a general feeling that the Government 
had gone as far as it should in interfering with business. A majority 
accepted existing controls of every kind as necessary and only 10 per 
cent or fewer thought them 'all bad' .58 However, this did not imply a 
widespread belief that private enterprise was somehow failing the 
nation. Indeed, two comprehensive Future surveys of 1950 found that 
most people preferred to work for ordinary firms rather than national-
ised industries; felt that business was generally efficient; and thought 
that their particular boss was 'a good chap'. Some clearly wished to 
have a greater say in how private companies were run, but there was no 
great discontent with the capitalist system as such.59 
So much for those on, or potentially on, Labour's side. What of its 
enemies? Should the Government have been so circumspect with 
employers? Were they really as formidable an opposition as some of 
them liked to think? 
This question has, of course, attracted a good deal of attention in the 
historiography, and remains somewhat controversial. Early com-
mentators on the FBI's relationship with Labour asserted that business 
was sometimes not happy with what the Government was doing but 
never resorted to sabotage or unconstitutional opposition. Mercer argues 
that this kind of interpretation is entirely misleading, in that there were 
continuing attempts to derail official policy. 60 Reviewing the evidence 
that has become available suggests that Mercer is completely right on 
this point, though even she may have understated the problem. This 
conclusion can be supported by looking at various facets of business 
opinion about what Labour was trying to do during these years. 
The first point to make is that in abstract terms few businessmen had 
very much sympathy even with the basic assumptions of the 
Government's approach. Thus, for example, most did not agree that 
management should be more professional. Indeed, there was a deeply 
ingrained belief that good managers were 'born and not bred' and that 
the only way to learn management was 'in the school of hard knocks'. 
Experts needed to be found a place, it was generally conceded, but they 
must never be allowed to dominate; in the memorable epigram of the 
1950 FBI President, Sir Robert Sinclair, 'the specialist should be on tap 
but not on top' .61 
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Nor were many businessmen (as opposed to managers) really in 
favour of joint consultation. Some disliked the idea because they felt 
that it would open the door to union agitators. It was necessary, in this 
perspective, to reject 'peevish feminine socialism' and 'keep forcing 
[the unions] back' .62 Elsewhere, the objection was that a consultative 
approach would compromise the manager's ability to manage.63 
Sinclair's views on this were, once again, very forthright: 
he stressed that in any business the line of authority must be kept 
clear, and stigmatized the practice recently adopted in Germany of 
having one or more of the directors appointed as representatives of 
the workers as sheer nonsense. 64 
Finally, there was, too, a more general dislike of the state's involving 
itself in business at any level. Examples of this have been referred to 
throughout the previous chapters, so that further elaboration is really 
unnecessary. The views of the managing director of a prominent 
Yorkshire firm were representative: 'I am strongly of the opinion that 
the Government should leave Industry to run its own business without 
so much interference and advice. ' 65 
In these circumstances, when businessmen turned to address what 
Labour actually proposed for industry, it was inevitable that many 
would feel that the right course was outright opposition. Needless to say, 
this was expressed in different ways according to the precise issue at 
hand. One prevailing reaction was to seek methods of minimising 
change: to find out how little business could get away with in the face of 
Government pressure. The mentality at work here was captured by a 
disgruntled participant at a Conservative Party gathering for business-
men in Scotland during the Spring of 1947. His private account of the 
event included the following: 
I am sorry to say that the general impression which the meeting left 
on my mind was rather along the following lines- We, the Unionists, 
and we, the Capitalists, know what we want and what we think would 
be best for the country, but instead of asking the willing co-operation 
of the working man, the attitude seems to be, what concessions must 
we make to him to get him to come along with us. In other words how 
can we bribe him.66 
On the other hand, if the situation was felt to merit it, the business 
community could take a very much more aggressive line. This occurred, 
most notoriously, in relation to Development Councils, where concerted 
action from manufacturers continued to frustrate Government 
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intentions, as an anonymous civil servant's description of progress with 
the Hosiery Working Party's report of 1948 illustrated: 
Consideration of (and opposition to) a Development Council has 
absorbed practically all the attention the manufacturers' Associations 
have given to the Report. The Federation have gone ahead with 
certain work recommended ... and have pointed to these activities as 
evidence that a Development Council is unnecessary. Apart from this 
it has not been possible to obtain their considered views on the 
recommendations or even on the production targets suggested by the 
Report.67 
But it was also evident in some less publicised cases. Looking at the 
BIM's early history, for example, it is hard not to conclude that a large 
section of industry wanted the institution either made ineffective or else 
actually wound up.68 The FBI's position was one of public support but, 
in private, its officials admitted that their objective was to keep the 
whole initiative 'in the hands of industry rather than of Government' .69 
Elsewhere, in confidential exchanges between firms, attitudes were 
expressed very much more bluntly; members of IMRA (Industrial 
Management Research Association, the new name of the old Manage-
ment Research Group 1) were repeatedly advised, for example, that the 
Institute should be seen 'as a political weapon of the present 
Government designed to facilitate the process of nationalization' .70 Nor 
was hostility simply confined to gesture. The BIM's opponents were 
active enough to engineer the resignation of the Deputy Director 
('Members are aware that he had written for Communist papers and 
were not happy about him'); frustrate the spread of Local Management 
Associations, which Russell thought vital; and maintain a long-running 
whispering campaign against the BIM which was certainly damaging.71 
All of this left Labour in a very difficult position. The party had 
proposed a set of policies and received a popular mandate, but it was 
evident that Labour supporters were least concerned about industrial 
modernisation. Opposite stood a determined foe, willing to conduct a 
tenacious and wearing campaign to limit change. In these circum-
stances, the only real option had to be a strategy of negotiation and even 
compromise. Labour might have done more to publicise its case and 
broaden support, as Crofts argues, but, on industrial policy specifically, 
it is not really clear that this would have made much difference. 72 A 
small but significant illustration sums up the Government's wider 
predicament. It relates, once again, to Development Councils. Industry 
argued vociferously in public that these were clearly a prelude to 
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nationalisation - creeping and then outright state control. In 1951, 
Political and Economic Planning (PEP) examined this claim and 
reported that it was 'impossible to find in any Government statement 
any justification for . . . [it]'; the industries for which Development 
Councils had been proposed were all, without exception, outside the 
categories ever talked about as suitable for appropriation. Nevertheless, 
as PEP had also to remark, even without a rational basis, the idea of 
back-door nationalisation still persisted.73 
It seems reasonable to opine, in the light of this discussion, that much 
thinking about Labour's problems over productivity policy in this 
period has been misleading. The Government cannot be accused of 
focusing on the wrong target or of lacking the will to pursue solutions. 
It certainly made mistakes and did not always harmonise objectives 
successfully. However, if the gap between effort and outcome is to be 
fully understood, due weight must be given to the actions of the 
employers; to repeat Mikardo's analogy, patients who remained 
unwilling to take their medicine, or even acknowledge the expertise of 
the doctor. 
Four general observations may be offered as a conclusion to this 
study. The first concerns the Labour Party. Many historians have viewed 
Labour as essentially about redistribution. Typically, therefore, the 
Attlee years are described in terms of the creation of the welfare state. 
In this book, Labour has emerged in a rather different light, as a party 
which both considered the whole issue of production and attempted 
appropriate solutions to the manifold problems that existed in the area. 
The view presented here, therefore, confirms some recent scholarship 
on other periods, which suggests strongly that Labour's involvement 
with industrial modernisation throughout its history has been drastically 
underestimated. 74 
The second point relates to the wider historiography of the immediate 
war and post-war years. A number of historians have viewed this period 
as one of consensus, which bore fruit in a long-lasting 'post-war 
settlement' .75 The evidence presented in the preceding pages, however, 
cannot be made to square with such an interpretation. Bluntly put, there 
was no general agreement on industrial policy during these years. In 
fact, dissonance and not harmony continued to be the most characteristic 
feature of discussion. Divisions existed between departments of state; 
between peak organisations; between management experts and 
industrialists; and, most importantly, between the main political parties. 
That this was the case must surely call into question the whole concept 
of 'consensus'. There may be some justification for using the term to 
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describe the position in the higher echelons of Whitehall, but little 
reason appears to exist for its deployment elsewhere. 
Finally, two comments need to be made about the long-running 
debate on Britain's economic decline. The first is about theories of 
causation. As Chapter 1 indicated, writing about the economy's chronic 
under-performance has tended to move in cycles, often fuelled by 
current fashion. During the last few years two explanations have been in 
vogue. Many have subscribed to the view that the real problem for 
Britain has continued to be its trade unions - creators of an inflexible 
market, police officers enforcing restrictive practices, opponents of any 
kind of constructive change. Elsewhere, in more liberal circles, such a 
partisan judgement is taken to be vulgar and one-sided. Blame should 
instead be allocated, as in the Ealing comedy, The Man in the White Suit, 
to all of Britain's institutions. The 'bolshie shop steward' is joined by 
the reactionary, venal entrepreneur and the bungling civil servant in a 
role call of stage villains. 
These kinds of propositions may make good political propaganda, 
but they cannot be accepted as fully accurate representations of what 
happened in the past, at least not that part of the past that is covered in 
this book. Critics of the unions or 'big government' will find little 
comfort in the evidence that has been presented here. Only the liberals' 
stereotypical entrepreneur seems in any way grounded in fact. Indeed, it 
is, perhaps, ironic that the very group which in the end frustrated 
attempts at industrial modernisation in the Attlee years was also the one 
with most to gain from it. In some senses, more than a few of the 
nation's entrepreneurs gambled away their long-term commercial future 
after the war because of a pathological fear regarding state interference. 
There is also an interconnected, if more general, point about the 
whole 'decline' literature, which relates to its common methodology. 
Many accounts about allegedly culpable institutions are presented with 
the political parties left out. The failures are explained by reference to 
'the British disease', a peculiar culture, or even an unfinished 
revolution. Yet, as this book has shown, such an approach is really 
unjustifiable. Party politics did (and does) make a difference to 
industrial questions, as to many others. 
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